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FOREWORD
This dissertation is mainly based on the research outcomes, which are accomplished under
the supervision of Dr. Georges Kaddoum from February 2015 to May 2019. This work is
ﬁnancially supported by the research chair of physical layer security in wireless networks.
This dissertation is subjective to address the secure concern of physical layer security over
several general but useful fading channel models. Resultantly, my Ph.D. study successfully
ended with 7 journal papers published, 4 IEEE international conference papers published and
1 conference paper under review as the ﬁrst author.
Apart from the ﬁrst two chapters, where the background of physical layer security are intensely
introduced, the remaining chapters are based on my journal papers. For those chapters, I did
a comprehensive literature review, reasonably formulated problems, feasibly proposed possi-
ble solutions, mathematically analyzed and simulated the performance, and technically draft
manuscripts. After the presentation of those chapters, chapter 9 concludes the whole work and
lists several future research directions.
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Sécurité de la couche physique des réseaux sans ﬁl: modélisation et caractérisation des
performances
Long KONG
RÉSUMÉ
Poussée par la croissance et l’expansion exponentielles des périphériques sans ﬁl, la sécurité
des données joue, de nos jours, un rôle de plus en plus important dans tous nos transactions
et interactions quotidiennes avec différentes entités. Des exemples possibles, y compris les
informations de santé et les achats en ligne, deviennent très vulnérables en raison de la nature
intrinsèque du support de transmission sans ﬁl et de l’ouverture d’accès aux liens sans ﬁl. Tra-
ditionnellement, la sécurité des communications est principalement considérée comme étant
les tâches traitées au niveau des couches supérieures de la pile de protocoles en couches, les
techniques de sécurité, y compris le contrôle d’accès personnel, la protection par mot de passe
et le chiffrement de bout en bout. Ces techniques ont été largement étudiés dans la littéra-
ture. Plus récemment, le potentiel que présente la couche physique pour améliorer la sécurité
des communications sans ﬁl apporte de plus en plus d’intérêt. Etant un paradigme nouveau
et attrayant au niveau de la couche physique, la sécurité de la couche physique repose sur
deux travaux fondamentaux: (i) la théorie de l’information de Shannon. (ii) le canal d’écoute
électronique de Wyner.
Compte tenu des fondements de la sécurité de la couche physique et de la nature différente
des divers réseaux sans ﬁl, cette thèse est censée combler davantage le manque qu’on trouve
dans les résultats des travaux de recherche existants. En guise de précision, les contributions de
cette thèse peuvent être résumées comme suit: (i) exploration des métriques de conﬁdentialité
sur des canaux à évanouissement plus généraux; (ii) la caractérisation d’un nouveau modèle de
canal à évanouissements et l’analyse de sa ﬁabilité et de sa sécurité lors de son application aux
systèmes de communication numériques; (iii) étude de la sécurité de la couche physique sur
les canaux aléatoires MIMO à évanouissement α −μ .
En prenant en compte le modèle d’écoute électronique classique d’Alice-Bob-Eve, la première
contribution peut être divisée en quatre parties: (i) nous avons étudié les performances de
conﬁdentialité sur des canaux SISO à évanouissement α − μ . La probabilité de capacité de
conﬁdentialité non nulle (PNZ) et la limite inférieure de probabilité d’interruption de secret
(SOP) sont calculées pour le cas particulier où le canal principal et le canal d’écoute subissent
le même paramètre de non-linéarité d’évanouissement, à savoir, α . Par la suite, aﬁn de combler
le manque d’expression de forme fermée de la SOP dans la littérature et d’étendre les résultats
obtenus au chapitre 2 pour le cas des canaux d’écoute SIMO à évanouissement α − μ . En
utilisant le fait que les rapports signal sur bruit (SNR) reçus au niveau du récepteur légitime
et au niveau de l’écoute clandestine peuvent être approchés en tant que nouvelles variables
aléatoires (RV) de distribution α − μ , la métrique SOP est donc dérivée et donnée en termes
de la fonction H bivariée de Fox ; (ii) la performance de conﬁdentialité sur les canaux d’écoute
électronique Fisher-Snedecor F à évanouissement est initialement prise en compte. Les SOP,
XPNZ et ASC sont ﬁnalisées en termes de fonction G de Meijer (iii) aﬁn de généraliser les
résultats obtenus sur F canaux d’écoute électronique de Fisher-Snedecor à évanouissement
α−μ , un canal à évanouissement plus ﬂexible et plus général, comme le modèle d’atténuation
de la fonction H de Fox, est pris en compte. Les analyses exactes et asymptotiques de SOP,
PNZ et al capacité de conﬁdentialité moyenne (ASC) sont développées avec des expressions
de forme fermée; (iv) Enﬁn, motivés par le fait que la distribution MG (mélange gamma) est
un outil attrayant, qui peut être utilisé pour modéliser les SNRs reçus instantanément sur des
canaux sans ﬁl à évanouissements, les métriques de conﬁdentialité sur divers canaux d’écoute
électronique à évanouissements sont dérivées en utilisant l’approche MG.
En raison de la puissance de transmission et de la portée de communication limitées, les re-
lais coopératifs ou les réseaux sans ﬁl à sauts multiples sont généralement considérés comme
deux moyens prometteurs pour résoudre ces problèmes. Inspiré par les résultats obtenus
aux chapitres 2 et 3, le second apport consiste à proposer un modèle de canal à évanouisse-
ments novateur mais simple, à savoir le cascadé α − μ . Cette nouvelle distribution est avan-
tageuse puisqu’elle englobe facilement les canaux cascadés existantes Rayleigh, Nakagami-m
et Weibull. Sur cette base, les performances de ﬁabilité et de conﬁdentialité d’un système
numérique sur des canaux de fading α − μ en cascade sont ensuite évaluées. Les expressions
en forme fermée des mesures de ﬁabilité (y compris la quantité d’atténuation (AF), la proba-
bilité de coupure, la capacité moyenne du canal et la probabilité d’erreur de symbole moyenne
(ABEP)) ainsi que les mesures de conﬁdentialité (y compris SOP, PNZ et ASC) sont fournies.
En outre, leurs comportements asymptotiques sont également effectués et comparés aux résul-
tats exacts.
Considérant les effets de la densité des utilisateurs, de la distribution spatiale et du facteur
d’affaiblissement de propagation sur la conﬁdentialité de la communication, le troisième as-
pect de cette thèse est détaillé dans le chapitre 8 en tant qu’investigation sur la conﬁdentialité
du système MIMO stochastique sur des canaux d’écoutes électroniques avec évanouissement
α − μ . La géométrie stochastique et le schéma de transmission spatio-temporelle classique
(STT) sont utilisés dans la conﬁguration du système. La question de la conﬁdentialité est
évaluée mathématiquement par le biais de trois métriques, à savoir la coupure de connexion,
la probabilité de la capacité de conﬁdentialité non nulle et la capacité de conﬁdentialité er-
godique. Ces trois métriques sont ensuite dérivées en termes de deux schémas de classement
et comparées ensuite aux simulations de Monte-Carlo.
Mots-clés: sécurité de la couche physique, α − μ , Fisher-Snecedor F , fonction H de Fox,
distribution gamma mixte (MG), α −μ cascadé, réseau MIMO stochastique
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ABSTRACT
Intrigued by the rapid growth and expand of wireless devices, data security is increasingly play-
ing a signiﬁcant role in our daily transactions and interactions with different entities. Possible
examples, including e-healthcare information and online shopping, are becoming vulnerable
due to the intrinsic nature of wireless transmission medium and the widespread open access of
wireless links. Traditionally, the communication security is mainly regarded as the tasks at the
upper layers of layered protocol stack, security techniques, including personal access control,
password protection, and end-to-end encryption, have been widely studied in the open litera-
ture. More recently, plenty of research interests have been drawn to the physical layer forms
of secrecy. As a new but appealing paradigm at physical layer, physical layer security is based
on two pioneering works: (i) Shannon’s information-theoretic formulation and (ii) Wyner’s
wiretap formulation.
On account of the fundamental of physical layer security and the different nature of various
wireless network, this dissertation is supposed to further ﬁll the lacking of the existing research
outcomes. To be speciﬁc, the contributions of this dissertation can be summarized as three-fold:
(i) exploration of secrecy metrics to more general fading channels; (ii) characterization a new
fading channel model and its reliability and security analysis in digital communication systems;
and (iii) investigation of physical layer security over the random multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) α −μ fading channels.
Taking into account the classic Alice-Bob-Eve wiretap model, the ﬁrst contribution can be di-
vided into four aspects: (i) we have investigated the secrecy performance over single-input
single-output (SISO) α − μ fading channels. The probability of non-zero (PNZ) secrecy ca-
pacity and the lower bound of secrecy outage probability (SOP) are derived for the special case
when the main channel and wiretap channel undergo the same non-linearity fading parameter,
i.e., α . Later on, for the purpose of ﬁlling the gap of lacking closed-form expression of SOP in
the open literature and extending the obtained results in chapter 2 to the single-input multiple-
output (SIMO) α − μ wiretap fading channels, utilizing the fact that the received signal-to-
noise ratios (SNRs) at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper can be approximated as new
α − μ distributed random variables (RVs), the SOP metric is therefore derived, and given in
terms of the bivariate Fox’s H-function; (ii) the secrecy performance over the Fisher-Snedecor
F wiretap fading channels is initially considered. The SOP, PNZ, and ASC are ﬁnalized in
terms of Meijer’s G-function; (iii) in order to generalize the obtained results over α − μ and
Fisher-Snedecor F wiretap fading channels, a more ﬂexible and general fading channel, i.e.,
Fox’s H-function fading model, are taken into consideration. Both the exact and asymptotic
analysis of SOP, PNZ, and average secrecy capacity (ASC), are developed with closed-form
expressions; and (iv) ﬁnally, motivated by the fact that the mixture gamma (MG) distribution is
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an appealing tool, which can be used to model the received instantaneous SNRs over wireless
fading channels, the secrecy metrics over wiretap fading channels are derived based on the MG
approach.
Due to the limited transmission power and communication range, cooperative relays or multi-
hop wireless networks are usually regarded as two promising means to address these concerns.
Inspired by the obtained results in Chapters 2 and 3, the second main contribution is to propose
a novel but simple fading channel model, namely, the cascaded α − μ . This new distribution
is advantageous since it encompasses the existing cascaded Rayleigh, cascaded Nakagami-m,
and cascaded Weibull with ease. Based on this, both the reliability and secrecy performance
of a digital system over cascaded α − μ fading channels are further evaluated. Closed-form
expressions of reliability metrics (including amount of fading (AF), outage probability, average
channel capacity, and average symbol error probability (ABEP).) and secrecy metrics (includ-
ing SOP, PNZ, and ASC) are respectively provided. Besides, their asymptotic behaviors are
also performed and compared with the exact results.
Considering the impacts of users’ densities, spatial distribution, and the path-loss exponent on
secrecy issue, the third aspect of this thesis is detailed in Chapter 8 as the secrecy investigation
of stochastic MIMO system over α −μ wiretap fading channels. Both the stochastic geometry
and conventional space-time transmission (STT) scheme are used in the system conﬁguration.
The secrecy issue is mathematically evaluated by three metrics, i.e., connection outage, the
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and the ergodic secrecy capacity. Those three metrics
are later on derived regarding two ordering scheme, and further compared with Monte-Carlo
simulations.
Keywords: Physical layer security, α − μ , Fisher-Snecedor F , Fox’s H-function, mixture
gamma (MG) distribution, cascaded α −μ , stochastic MIMO network
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INTRODUCTION
As stated in the report of Ericsson entitled "10 hot consumer trends 2019" Ericsson (2018),
technology does make our daily life cheaper, easier, and more convenient. Speciﬁcally, super-
markets without checkouts; schools with increasing robotization of teachers and hospitals with
non-human doctors; restaurants with mechanized menus; and cars with non-human drivers are
just few already being realized possibilities. These examples are obvious the applications of
ICT. The services provided are implemented by using the wireless transmission medium. How-
ever, the openly accessible physical nature of radio links makes the legitimate links vulnerable.
Thus, the ever-increasing services provided by ICT come with an unavoidable security con-
cern. It is also highlighted in the aforementioned report that 52% of consumers think most
popular apps collect more smartphone data than needed in order to make proﬁts. Resultantly,
safeguarding our conﬁdential messages from being intercepted or misused is a challenging
problem Jameel, F., Wyne, S., Kaddoum, G. & Duong, T. Q. (2018); Neshenko, N., Bou-Harb,
E., Crichigno, J., Kaddoum, G. & Ghani, N. (2019).
Communication security concerns exist as long as there are wireless communication links.
Dating back to the ancient times, either ﬂags or ﬂames were used to deliver battleﬁeld infor-
mation. As a consequence, enemies were easily able to access the information. The security
concern of how to provide high data conﬁdentiality from head to toe arose. In the recent war
era, encrypted telegraph was widely used to convey important messages. In this context, the
only way to decrypt the cipher text is to know the encryption scheme. Therefore, the decryp-
tion process is time-consuming even if the cipher texts are at hand. The encryption philosophy
is also employed to enhance the security of wireless networks.
Taking a glance at the layered protocol stack, technical solutions, such as personal access
controls (ﬁngerprints, face recognition, watermark), password protection, authorization, and
end-to-end encryption, are widely employed for keeping eavesdroppers and attackers away.
2Although seemingly effective, these techniques still present many limitations. For example,
the most popular encryption methods, such as AES and RSA, are key-based solutions, this kind
of solutions are based on the assumptions that the one way functions are difﬁcult to break, in
other words, this means that unauthorized devices have insufﬁcient computational capabilities
for decryption; obviously, this assumption is increasingly losing its validity due to the expo-
nential growth of the users’ computational ability. Also, devices are connected to the network
with different power, and they join in or leave the network randomly, due to the decentral-
ized nature of future wireless networks Yang, N., Wang, L., Geraci, G., Elkashlan, M., Yuan,
J. & Di Renzo, M. (2015). As a consequence, key management and distribution are becoming
challenging. For those reasons, the downsides of key-based solutions become apparent:
- low spectrum efﬁciency due to the transmission of additional headers and data;
- high computation and battery consumption, especially for public key based solutions;
In addition, the rapid growth of computational devices makes it adequately possible for eaves-
droppers to have sufﬁcient computational capabilities against the mathematical assumption
(e.g., factorizing large integers). Besides, the current and future wireless network topologies
are becoming decentralized. Moreover, random distributed users with different power and
computational abilities can access the wireless network. Resultantly, key generation and man-
agement become increasingly challenging.
To this end, the attempts of merely relying on the upper layers security enhancement solutions
are no longer a wise and perfect policy. In addition, recent research attention shifted from the
upper layers to the physical layer due to Shannon’s original information-theoretic establish-
ment and Wyner’s degraded wiretap channel formulation. As a new framework, physical layer
security is appealing and promising, since it is not based on cryptography algorithms or secret
keys (though they might support such solutions.). The essence of physical layer security is to
3smartly exploit the intrinsic randomness of wireless medium to reversely secure the legitimate
transmission links Bloch, M. & Barros, J. (2011); Zhou, X., Song, L. & Zhang, Y. (2016).
Problem Statement and Motivations
Over the years, the emergence of various wireless networks, such as cognitive radio networks,
wireless sensor networks, mobile-to-mobile (M2M) networks, device-to-device (D2D) com-
munications, wireless body area networks (WBAN) Chong, P. K., Yoo, S. E., Kim, S. H. & Kim,
D. (2011); Moosavi, H. & Bui, F. M. (2016), and many others, has attracted plenty of research
interests from the wireless communication and signal processing communities. Due to the
uniqueness characteristics of each communication scenario, many novel fading channel mod-
els appear to meet their requirements.
For examplem, as stated in the literature, the α − μ fading channel was proposed in 2008
to model the small-scale fading of wireless links. Later on, it was proved to be valid for
the WBAN, and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication scenarios Jeong, Y., Chong, J. W.,
Shin, H. & Win, M. Z. (2013); Wu, Q., Matolak, D. W. & Sen, I. (2010). Similarly, the Fisher-
SnedecorF fading channel was proposed to model the composite fading, and it was veriﬁed to
accurately characterize the D2D communication links at 5.8 GHz in both indoor and outdoor
environments. Since both α − μ and Fisher-Snedecor F have their own characteristics when
applying to different communication scenarios. For this reason, a fairly general and ﬂexible
fading model is needed to compensate the most or all the existing fading models. To address
this issue, one possible promising candidate is the Fox’s H-function distribution. In this thesis,
we have demonstrated that the Fox’s H-function distribution can be easily tailored to emulate
the α − μ , the Fisher-Snedecor F , cascaded α − μ fading models, and many other fading
distributions as special cases.
4Following the aforementioned discussion, in this thesis, we explored the secrecy concern over
this generalized wireless fading channels from the information-theoretic perspective.
Research Objectives
In this thesis, we will focus on the investigation of physical layer security over the α − μ ,
Fisher-Snedecor F , and Fox’s H-function fading channels. Three key secrecy metrics, in-
cluding the secrecy outage probability (SOP), the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
(PNZ), and the average secrecy capacity (ASC), are developed for the purpose of (i) provid-
ing mathematical computational tools for wireless communication engineers to quickly access
and subsequently evaluate the security risk; and (ii) enabling network designers to degrade the
quality of received signals at the malicious users or devices.
Bearing this objective in mind, we have introduced the Parseval’s relation for Mellin transform
to formulate the aforementioned secrecy metrics with consideration of the classic Alice-Bob-
Eve wiretap channel. This useful relation is fairly beneﬁcial since it enables us to have closed-
form tractable expressions for all the secrecy metrics.
Besides, the MG distribution is also introduced as a powerful tool to model the received SNRs
over wireless channels, and subsequently applied herein to characterize the secrecy perfor-
mance.
In order to consider more complex scenarios, studies are also conducted to characterize the
physical layer security over the cascaded α − μ wiretap channel. In addition, physical layer
security of random wireless MIMO α − μ fading channels are subsequently explored, where
the impacts of path-loss exponent, fading conditions, and ordering policies, are well discussed.
Contributions and Outline
The dissertation is structured as shown in Fig. 0.1, and detailed as follows.
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Figure 0.1 The paradigm of thesis contribution
Chapter 1 brieﬂy introduces the state-of-arts of physical layer security and the tools used in
this thesis. Chapters 2 and 3 investigate the SOP over single-input single-output (SISO) and
single-input multiple-output (SIMO) α − μ wiretap fading channels, respectively. Precisely,
the SOP and the PNZ are derived with closed-form expressions.
Chapter 4 investigates the physical layer security over Fisher-Snedecor F fading channels,
where the SOP, PNZ and ASC, are derived in closed-form. The asymptotic behavior of the
6ASC are also analyzed to provide a relatively simpler form for speciﬁc cases. Simulation
results are presented to validate the accuracy of our analytical results.
In continuation with the previous three chapters, we have further considered a more general
and ﬂexible fading channel model in Chapter 5, namely, the Fox’s H-function fading model.
The main contribution of this chapter is three-fold. First, we have derived the closed-form
expressions for the three key secrecy metrics; Second, the asymptotic behaviors of those three
metrics are also provided in a simple and accurate mathematical form, especially for several
extreme cases; Third, we also investigate the secrecy performance in the presence of colluding
eavesdroppers. The so-called super eavesdropper is taken into consideration, and the MRC
and SC schemes are applied and further compared when evaluating secrecy performance for
the colluding eavesdropping scenario. For the sake of verifying the obtained novel results,
three general fading models, including the α − μ , the Fisher-Snedecor F , and the extended
generalized-K distributions, are taken into consideration.
In addition to the aforementioned contributions, the Mixture Gamma (MG) distribution, which
is used to ﬂexibly model the legitimate and illegitimate received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs)
over various wireless channels, is considered in Chapter 6, where the secrecy metrics are de-
veloped with closed-form expressions, and further validated by Monte Carlo simulations over
three fading channels.
In Chapter 7, we propose a novel fading channel model, i.e., the cascaded α −μ fading chan-
nel, which is a promising candidate to the MIMO pinhole or multiple-hop amplify-and-forward
(AF) systems’ channel modeling. Moreover, both the reliability and secrecy analysis are con-
ducted over the cascaded α −μ fading channels.
Considering the spatial distribution of users, Chapter 8 deploys the stochastic geometry tool,
and analyzes the connection outage probability, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity,
7and the ergodic secrecy capacity of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Wireless Networks
over α −μ Fading Channels. Closed-form mathematical expressions are obtained in terms of
Fox’s H-function. Useful insights to demonstrating the interactions between different parame-
ters are also provided.
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes this dissertation and presents several possible future research
directions.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The attempts of simply adding encryption schemes to the existing protocols at various commu-
nication layers, though provide security, come at the cost of additional computational com-
plexity. Due to the limited storage capability and power constraints of light devices, the
high computing-cost security techniques undoubtedly pose a heavy burden to communica-
tion devices (such as radio-frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) tags, certain sensors, etc.) Poor,
H. V. & Schaefer, R. F. (2017). Therefore, shifting the security to the physical layer can provide
a promising solution. Physical layer security has emerged as an appealing and revolutionizing
concept, which is not based on cryptography algorithms or secret keys (though they might sup-
port such solutions) Di Renzo, M. & Debbah, M. (2009); Duruturk, M. (2010); Shiu, Y. S.,
Chang, S. Y., Wu, H. C., Huang, S. C. H. & Chen, H. H. (2011). The foundation of physical
layer security is information-theoretic, and it is supposed to be robust against attackers with
any computing capabilities Jorswieck, E., Tomasin, S. & Sezgin, A. (2015).
1.1 State-of-the-arts of Physical Layer Security
1.1.1 Principle of Physical Layer Security
To illustrate the general concept of physical layer security, an example of a three-node wireless
communication model is considered, as shown in Figure 1.1. In this network conﬁguration,
the sender node wishes to transmit its secret messages to the intended receiver node in the
presence of a passive eavesdropper node. The communication link between the transmitter and
the legitimate receiver is called the main channel, whereas the one between the transmitter and
the eavesdropper is referred to as the wiretap channel. Usually the messages received in the
legitimate and illegitimate terminals are different.
Wireless signals undergo many phenomena, including multipath fading, pathloss, etc. Fading is
a self-interference physical phenomenon due to the multi-path propagation of the signals, while
path-loss is indeed the attenuation of the wireless signal amplitude. It is mainly affected by the
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Transmitter Legitimate receiver
Eavesdropper
Private messages
Interference
Figure 1.1 Illustration of wiretap channel
model with one transmitter, one legitimate
receiver and one eavesdropper
distance. In other words, if the legitimate users have information transmission over smaller dis-
tances, whereas the illegitimate users eavesdrop private information over wiretap channel with
larger distance. Then, the received signal detected at legitimate users are certainly much strong
than that at the eavesdroppers. In this vein, in wireless communication networks, the main
objective of adopting physical-layer security is to maximize the rate of reliable information
from the source to the legitimate destination, while all malicious nodes are kept as ignorant as
possible of that information. The breakthrough philosophy behind physical-layer security is to
exploit the characteristics of the wireless channel (i.e., fading, noise, interference) for achiev-
ing high reliability of wireless transmissions. While all these characteristics have traditionally
been regarded as impairment factors for reliable communication, the paradigm of physical layer
security takes advantage of these characteristics for achieving secure information transmission.
1.1.2 The Advantages of Physical Layer Security
The conceptual beauty of physical layer security is not only due to its essence of enhancing
security at the bottom layer, but also to take advantage of the randomness of wireless links (i.e.,
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noise, multipath fading, interference) as a feasible and effective means to address the security
risks Wu, Y., Khisti, A., Xiao, C., Caire, G., Wong, K. & Gao, X. (2018b).
As shown in Table 1.1, physical layer security is compared with the classical cryptography to
list the pros and cons of these techniques.
Table 1.1 Comparisons between two techniques (Tech.) i.e., classical cryptography
(CC) and physical layer security
Tech. Advantages Disadvantages
CC
1. Secret key based
2. Widely used in the upper layers and
nearly every application of information
and communication technology
1. Without information-theoretic security
2. High computing power
3. Low spectrum efﬁciency
4. One-way functions
5. Incapability of eavesdropping and
interference in PHY layer
PLS
1. Information-theoretic based
2. No computational restrictions
3. Works at the bottom layer
1. Almost secure
1.1.3 The Evolution of Physical Layer Security over Fading Channels
On the way of prompting the research work on physical layer security, the following corner-
stones are undoubtedly the fundamental masterpieces.
1) Shannon: the notion of information-theoretic secrecy was ﬁrst introduced Shannon, C.
(1949)
2) Wyner: the concept of wiretap channel model was established Wyner, A. D. (1975)
3) Csiszar and Korner: the existence of channel codes guaranteeing robustness to transmission
errors was found Csiszar, I. & Korner, J. (1978)
4) Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. E. Hellman: Secrecy capacity over AWGN channel was math-
ematically expressed, which is the difference between the main channel capacity and the
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wiretap channel capacity Leung-Yan-Cheong, S. & Hellman, M. (1978)
Cs = log2
(
1+
P
δm
)
− log2
(
1+
P
δw
)
, (1.1)
where P is the transmit power, δm, and δw are the noise variance at the legitimate user and
eavesdroppers, respectively.
This work suggests that positive secrecy can be achieved, when the channel capacity for
the AWGN wiretap channel is lower than that of the AWGN main channel. Consequently,
conﬁdential communication is impossible unless the Gaussian main channel has a better
quality of received SNR than the Gaussian wiretap channel does.
5) Bolch et al.: Secrecy capacity over quasi-static fading channels was established Bloch, M.,
Barros, J., Rodrigues, M. R. D. & McLaughlin, S. W. (2008)
Cs =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣log2
⎛
⎜⎜⎝1+ |hm|2 Pδm︸ ︷︷ ︸
γB
⎞
⎟⎟⎠− log2
⎛
⎜⎜⎝1+ |hw|2 Pδw︸ ︷︷ ︸
γE
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
+
, (1.2)
where hm and hw are the channel fading coefﬁcients of the legitimate channel and wiretap
channel, respectively. γB and γE are used to represent the received instantaneous SNRs at
the legitimate and illegitimate receivers, respectively.
The foundation laid by Bloch et al. demonstrates that in the presence of fading, information-
theoretic security is achievable even when the eavesdropper has a better average SNR than
the legitimate receiver (without the need for public communication over a feedback chan-
nel).
More recently, many researchers turned their attentions to the opportunistic exploitation of the
space/time/user dimensions for secure communications. In Gopala, P. K., Lai, L. & Gamal,
H. E. (2008), the secrecy capacity of ergodic slow fading channels was derived. The secrecy
capacity of parallel fading channels was given in Liang, Y., Poor, H. & Shamai, S. (2008); Liu,
T., Prabhakaran, V. & Vishwanath, S. (2008b), where Liang et al. (2008) considered the broad-
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cast channel with a common message. Moreover, the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel
with multiple antennas was studied in Negi, R. & Goel, S. (2005),Parada, P. & Blahut, R.
(2005),Khisti, A., Tchamkerten, A. & Wornell, G. W. (2008),Liu, T. & Shamai, S. (2009),Og-
gier, F. & Hassibi, B. (2011),Shaﬁee, S. & Ulukus, S. (2007). In particular, the secrecy capac-
ity of the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel has been fully characterized
in Khisti, A., Wornell, G., Wiesel, A. & Eldar, Y. (2007), Khisti, A. & Wornell, G. (2007),
Liu & Shamai (2009), Oggier & Hassibi (2011) and more recently its closed-form expressions
under a matrix covariance constraint have been derived in Bashar, S., Ding, Z. & Xiao, C.
(2012). Furthermore, a large number of recent works have considered the secrecy capacity of
more general broadcast channels. In Liu, R., Maric, I., Spasojevic’, P. & Yates, R. (2008a),
the authors study the two-user MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel. The two-user broadcast
channel with two conﬁdential messages, each of which must be kept secret to the unintended
receiver, has been studied in Khisti, A. & Wornell, G. W. (2010a). A recent contribution has
extended the result to the MIMO Gaussian broadcast channel Liu, R. & Poor, H. (2008). Multi-
receiver wiretap channels have also been studied in Bagherikaram, G., Motahari, A. & Khan-
dani, A. (2013); Choo, L.-C. & Wong, K.-K. (2009); Khisti et al. (2008) where the conﬁdential
messages to each receiver must be kept secret from an external eavesdropper.
The relay channel with conﬁdential messages was studied in the works of Aggarwal, V., Sankar,
L., Calderbank, A. & Poor, H. (2009); Lai, L. & Gamal, H. E. (2008); Oohama, Y. (2001,0).
In this setup, one party communicates with another party directly, as well as through a relay
node. In this work, the feedback channel was also studied because of its advantages over the
wiretap channel. The general principle consists of two aspects: (1) when the main channel is
noisier than the wiretap channel, feedback may permit unconditional secrecy; whereas without
feedback this is not possible Leung-Yan-Cheong, S. K. (1976); (2) when the main channel
and feedback channel are both noisy, perhaps it is possible to increase the secrecy capacity to
the usual capacity without secrecy constraint Lai, L., El Gamal, H. & Poor, H. (2008); Tekin,
E. & Yener, A. (2007). Finally, the role of feedback in multiple user channels was found to aid
secrecy in Tang, X., Liu, R., Spasojevic, P. & Poor, H. (2007).
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Since then, numerous researchers, from the ﬁelds of signal processing and wireless commu-
nications began to explore such an appealing paradigm for enhancing secrecy. The secrecy
performance of point-to-point communication over AWGN, Rayleigh, Rician Kong, L. & Kad-
doum, G. (2019), Nakagami-m, Weibull, α − μ Kong, L., Tran, H. & Kaddoum, G. (2016b);
Kong, L., Kaddoum, G. & da Costa, D. B. (2018a); Kong, L., Kaddoum, G. & Rezki, Z.
(2018c), Fisher-Snedecor F Kong, L. & Kaddoum, G. (2018), and κ −μ/η −μ fading chan-
nels Bloch et al. (2008); Kong et al. (2016b); Kumar, S., Chandrasekaran, G. & Kalyani,
S. (2015); Liu, X. (2013a,1); Sarkar, M. Z. I., Ratnarajah, T. & Sellathurai, M. (2009) were
investigated. Moreover, the secrecy performance of multiple-input single-output (MISO) sys-
tems, single-input multiple-output (SIMO) system, MIMO systems Kong, L., He, J., Kaddoum,
G., Vuppala, S. & Wang, L. (2016a); Kong, L., Kaddoum, G., da Costa, D. B. & Bou-Harb,
E. (2018b); Kong, L., Vuppala, S. & Kaddoum, G. (2018e), and MIMO multiple eavesdrop-
pers (MIMOME) were fully characterized Khisti & Wornell (2010a); Khisti et al. (2007); Og-
gier & Hassibi (2011).
With the recent emergence of various communication networks and technologies, there has
been a growing research interest in the applications of physical layer secrecy techniques for
various wireless systems, such as mmWave communications Vuppala, S., Tolossa, Y. J., Kad-
doum, G. & Abreu, G. (2018); Wang, C. & Wang, H. M. (2016), cooperative networks Wang,
C., Wang, H., Ng, D. W. K., Xia, X. & Liu, C. (2015a); Yao, J., Zhou, X., Liu, Y. & Feng,
S. (2018); Zhang, N., Cheng, N., Lu, N., Zhang, X., Mark, J. & Shen, X. (2015b), cognitive
radios networks Kwon, T., Wong, V. & Schober, R. (2012); Wang, C. & Wang, H.-M. (2014),
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) systems Zhang, H., Xing, H., Cheng, J.,
Nallanathan, A. & Leung, V. C. M. (2016a); Zhang, M. & Liu, Y. (2016), wireless ad hoc and
multi-hop networks and cellular networks (LTE, 5th Generation (5G) Yang et al. (2015), Mas-
sive MIMO Kapetanovic, D., Zheng, G. & Rusek, F. (2015)), satellite communications Lin,
M., Lin, Z., Zhu, W. & Wang, J. (2018); Zheng, G., Arapoglou, P. & Ottersten, B. (2012), in-
ternet of things Mukherjee, A. (2015) , wireless body area networks (WBAN) Moosavi & Bui
(2016), Smart Grid Lee, E.-K., Gerla, M. & Oh, S. (2012), wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
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Jameel, F., Wyne, S. & Krikidis, I. (2017); Zou, Y. & Wang, G. (2016), devices-to-devices
(D2D) communications Tolossa, Y. J., Vuppala, S., Kaddoum, G. & Abreu, G. (2018); Wang,
L., Liu, J., Chen, M., Gui, G. & Sari, H. (2018), ultra-dense networks Kamel, M., Hamouda,
W. & Youssef, A. (2017), visible light communication Pan, G., Ye, J. & Ding, Z. (2017),
NOMA Tran, D., Tran, H., Ha, D. & Kaddoum, G. (2019), etc.
1.1.4 Secrecy Metrics
According to Bloch et al. (2008), the instantaneous secrecy capacity over fading channels is
deﬁned as the difference between the main channel capacityCM = log2(1+γB) and the wiretap
channel capacity CW = log2(1+ γE),
Cs =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
CM −CW , γB > γE
0, otherwise,
(1.3)
where γB and γE are the received SNRs at the legitimate and illegitimate receivers, respectively.
1.1.4.1 Secrecy Outage Probability
The outage probability of the secrecy capacity is deﬁned as the probability that the secrecy
capacity Cs falls below the target secrecy rate Rs, i.e.,
Pout(Rs) = Pr(Cs < Rs). (1.4)
The secrecy outage probability can be conceptually explained by two cases: (i) the instanta-
neous secrecy capacityCs is lower than the given target secrecy transmission rate, even though
positive secrecy capacity is guaranteed; (ii) secrecy outage event deﬁnitely happens when the
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secrecy capacity is non-positive. Thus, (1.4) can be mathematically rewritten as
Pout(Rs) = Pr(Cs < Rs|γB > γE)Pr(γB > γE)+Pr(γB < γE)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γ0
γE
fB(γB) fE(γE)dγBdγE +
∫ ∞
0
∫ γE
0
fγB(γB) fγE (γE)dγBdγE
=
∫ ∞
0
fγE (γE)
[∫ γ0
0
−
∫ γE
0
]
fγB(γB)dγBdγE +
∫ ∞
0
∫ γE
0
fγB(γB) fγE (γE)dγBdγE
=
∫ ∞
0
FγB(γ0) fγE (γE)dγE ,
(1.5)
where γ0 = M(1+ γE)− 1, M = 2Rs . FB and FE are used to denote the CDFs of the received
instantaneous SNRs at Bob and Eve, respectively. Similarly, fB and fE are utilized to express
the PDFs of the received instantaneous SNRs at Bob and Eve, respectively.
1.1.4.2 The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity refers to an event that the positive secrecy capacity
can be achieved, i.e. Pr(Cs > 0). With regards to this deﬁnition, the PNZ is further rewritten
as
Pr(Cs > 0) = Pr(γB > γE)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γB
0
fγB(γB) fγE (γE)dγEdγB
=
∫ ∞
0
fγB(γB)FγE (γB)dγB.
(1.6)
1.1.4.3 Average secrecy capacity
The secrecy capacity undoubtedly plays a vital role in physical layer security. It is a signiﬁcant
benchmark to measure the fundamental limit of the secure transmission between different par-
ties over noisy and fading channels. It is theoretically associated with Wyner’s wiretap channel
model. For the sake of providing a simple form of calculating the average secrecy capacity C¯s,
the following expression is given Lei, H., Ansari, I. S., Pan, G., Alomair, B. & Alouini, M. S.
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(2017a).
C¯s =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1+ γB) fB(γB)FE(γB)dγB︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
+
∫ ∞
0
log2(1+ γE) fE(γE)FB(γE)dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
−
∫ ∞
0
log2(1+ γE) fE(γE)dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
.
(1.7)
1.2 Wireless Fading Channels
One of the main contributions of this dissertation is to consider more general and ﬂexible fading
channels. In this subsection, three key fading channels are listed.
1.2.1 α −μ Fading Channels
The α −μ distribution was ﬁrst proposed by Yacoub in 2007 Yacoub, M. D. (2007a). Its PDF
is given w.r.t. X as follows
fX(x) =
αμμxαμ−1
ΩˆαμΓ(μ)
exp
(
−μ
(
x
Ωˆ
)α)
, (1.8)
where Ω = α
√
E (xα) is the α−root mean value, α > 0 is an arbitrary fading parameter used
to denote the non-linearity of environments. μ > 0 is the inverse of the normalized variance of
xα , which is used to denote the number of multipath clusters. The parameter μ is calculated by
μ = E
2(xα )
V (xα ) .
The CDF of α −μ distribution is given by
FX(x) =
Γ
(
μ,μ
(
x
Ωˆ
)α)
Γ(μ)
. (1.9)
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The general α − μ fading distribution can be reduced to several well-known fading models.
For example,
- when α = 2,μ = 1, the Rayleigh distribution is obtained;
- when α = 2,μ = m, it is then reduced to the Nakagami-m distribution;
- when α is the fading parameter, and μ = 1, it is the so-called Weibull distribution.
Later on, it has been reported in the literature that, in the ﬁled experiments, the α − μ distri-
bution characterizes several different wireless communication scenarios Chong et al. (2011);
Dias, U. S. & Yacoub, M. D. (2009); Karadimas, P., Vagenas, E. D. & Kotsopoulos, S. A.
(2010); Michalopoulou, A., Zervos, T., Peppas, K., Lazarakis, F., Alexandridis, A. A., Dan-
gakis, K. & Kaklamani, D. I. (2011); Michalopoulou, A., Alexandridis, A. A., Peppas, K., Zer-
vos, T., Lazarakis, F., Dangakis, K. & Kaklamani, D. I. (2012); Reig, J. & Rubio, L. (2013);
Wu et al. (2010), including V2V communication networks and WBAN.
1.2.2 Fisher-SnedecorF Fading Channels
The Fisher-Snedecor F distribution was ﬁrst proposed by Yoo et.al in 2017 to characterize
device-to-device (D2D) communication links. Compared to the other frequently used channel
model, i.e., the generalized-K distribution, the Fisher-Snedecor F is experimentally studied
and proved with a good, and in most cases, a better ﬁt to the real channel data. This distribution
demonstrates a simple but effective fading model, especially at 5.8GHz for both indoor and
outdoor environments.
Technically speaking, the Fisher-Snedecor F distribution is modeled with two parameters,
i.e., m and ms. m and ms represent the amount of shadowing of the root-mean-square (rms)
signal power and the fading severity parameter, respectively. The PDF and CDF of the Fisher-
SnedecorF distribution are respectively given by
fX(x) =
2mm(msΩ)msx2m−1
B(m,ms)(mx2+msΩ)m+ms
, (1.10)
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FX(x) =
mm−1x2m2F1
(
m+ms,m;m+1;− mx2msΩ
)
B(m,ms)(msΩ)m
, (1.11)
whereB(m,ms) is the beta function, Ω= E [x2] is the mean power.
In addition, it is worthy to mention that Fisher-Snedecor F distribution is also ﬂexible since
it can be attributed to some other fading models by ﬁxing m and ms with special values. For
example, when ms → ∞, and m= m, it is Nakagami-m distribution. Further for m= 1, it is the
Rayleigh distribution.
1.2.3 Fox’s H-function Fading Channels
The Fox’s H-function distribution was introduced as a pure mathematical ﬁnding by Cook in
1981 Cook Jr, I. D. (1981). It is much more ﬂexible since it can be easily generalized to many
fading models, such as Gamma, exponential, Chi-square, Weibull, Rayleigh, Half-normal, as
well as the two aforementioned fading models.
The Fox’s H-function distribution is much more ﬂexible and generic, due to its mathematical
deﬁnition, which is given by
fX(x) = κHm,np,q
⎡
⎣λx
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ai,Ai)i=1:p
(bl,Bl)l=1:q
⎤
⎦ , γ > 0,
(a)
=
κ
2π j
∫
L
m
∏
i=1
Γ(bl +Bls)
n
∏
l=1
Γ(1−ai−Ais)
q
∏
i=m+1
Γ(1−bl −Bls)
p
∏
l=n+1
Γ(ai+Ais)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Θ(s)
(λx)−sds,
(1.12)
where λ > 0 and κ are constants such that
∫ ∞
0 fk(γk)dγk = 1. j =
√−1, (xi,yi)l is a shorthand
for (x1,y1), · · · ,(xl,yl). Step (a) is developed by expressing Fox’s H-function in terms of its
deﬁnition (Mathai, A. M., Saxena, R. K. & Haubold, H. J., 2009a, eq. (1.2)). Ai > 0 for all
i = 1, · · · , p, and Bl > 0 for all l = 1, · · · ,q. 0 ≤ m ≤ q, 0 ≤ n ≤ p, L is a suitable contour
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separating the poles of the gamma functions Γ(bl+Bls) from the poles of the gamma functions
Γ(1−ai−Ais).
As reported in the literature, the Fox’s H-function distribution provides a general but feasi-
ble model that compasses most distributions. This is due to its property to re-express those
functions in the form of Fox’s H-function Bodenschatz, C. D. (1992). For instance, Rayleigh
distribution includes exponential function and power functions. By using 1.13, Rayleigh dis-
tribution is then the so-called Fox’s H-function distribution.
For the purposes of showing the effectiveness and feasibility of Fox’s H-function distribution,
we have listed several special functions, which can be transformed in terms of the Fox’s H-
function Prudnikov, A. P., Brychkov, Y. A. & Marichev, O. I. (1990).
1
B
x
b
B exp
(
−x 1B
)
= H1,00,1
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(b,B)
⎤
⎦ , (1.13)
ln(1+ x) = H1,22,2
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (1.14)
Γ(a,x) = H2,01,2
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(0,1),(a,1)
⎤
⎦ . (1.15)
1.3 Fox’s H-function
The Fox’s H-function is a general function involving Mellin-Barnes integrals Mathai et al.
(2009a). It is a generalization of Meijer’s G-function. In this dissertation, both the univariate
and bivariate Fox’s H-functions play an important role when deriving the secrecy metrics. As
such, this subsection offers a brief introduction of these two functions.
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1.3.1 The Univariate Fox’s H-function
Without the constraints of λ and κ , i.e., λ > 0, and κ is constant, the univariate Fox’s H-
function is deﬁned as follows
Hm,np,q
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ai,Ai)i=1:p
(bl,Bl)l=1:q
⎤
⎦= 1
2π j
∫
L
Θ(s)x−sds. (1.16)
The Meijer’s G-function is a special case of Fox’s H-function obtained by simply setting all
Ai = 1, i= 1, · · · , p and Bl = 1, l = 1, · · · ,q. In other words,
Hm,np,q
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ai,Ai)i=1:p
(bl,Bl)l=1:q
⎤
⎦= Gm,np,q
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ai)i=1:p
(bl)l=1:q
⎤
⎦ . (1.17)
1.3.2 The Bivariate Fox’s H-function
Similarly, the bivariate Fox’s H-function is deﬁned as follows Mathai, A. M. & Saxena, R. K.
(1978):
Hm,n;m1,n1;m2,n2p,q;p1,q1;p2,q2
⎡
⎣x,y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ai;αi,Ai)i=1:q
(bl;βl,Bl)l=1:p
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ci,Ci)i=1:q1
(dl,Dl)l=1:p1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ei,Ei)i=1:q2
( fl,Fl)l=1:p2
⎤
⎦
=− 1
4π2
∫
L1
∫
L2
Θ(s,ξ )Θ(ξ )ΘE(s)xξ ysdsdξ ,
(1.18)
where L1 and L2 are two suitable contours, m,n,m1,n1,m2,n2, p,q, p1,q1, p2,q2 are positive
integers with constraints: 0 ≤ m ≤ q, 0 ≤ n ≤ p, 0 ≤ m1 ≤ q1, 0 ≤ n1 ≤ p1, 0 ≤ m2 ≤ q2,
0 ≤ n2 ≤ p2. The sequence of parameters αq, βp, Aq, Bp, Cq1 , Dp1 , Eq2 , and Fp2 are real and
positive numbers.
Θ(s,ξ ) =
n1
∏
i=1
Γ(1−ai+αis+Aiξ )
m1
∏
l=1
Γ(bl −βls−Blξ )
p1
∏
i=n1+1
Γ(ai−Ais−Aiξ )
q1
∏
l=m1+1
Γ(1−bl +Bls+Blξ )
, (1.19a)
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Θ(ξ ) =
m1
∏
i=1
Γ(dl −Dlξ )
n1
∏
l=1
Γ(1− ci+Aiξ )
q1
∏
i=m1+1
Γ(1−dl +Dlξ )
p1
∏
l=n1+1
Γ(di−Diξ )
, (1.19b)
Θ(s) =
m1
∏
i=1
Γ( fl −Fls)
n1
∏
l=1
Γ(1− ei+Eis)
q1
∏
i=m1+1
Γ(1− fl +Fls)
p1
∏
l=n1+1
Γ(ei−Eis)
. (1.19c)
In addition, on condition that Ci = 1, Dl = 1, Ei = 1, and Fl = 1, the bivariate Fox’s H-
function is reduced to the bivariate Meijer’s G-function. The univariate and bivariate Meijer’s
G-functions are thereafter used in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7.
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Long Kong, Hung Tran, and Georges Kaddoum
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1100 Notre-Dame Ouest, Montréal, Québec, Canada H3C 1K3
Paper published in IET Electronics Letters, January 2016.
2.1 Abstract
Recently, many works have focused on analyzing the metrics of physical layer security over
different wireless channels, such as additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), Rayleigh, Rician
and Nakagami-m fading distributions. In order to extend the analysis to the general case, α−μ
fading channel is considered, which can span the aforementioned cases. For this purpose, the
physical layer security over α − μ fading channel is presented in this letter. The closed-form
expressions for the probability of positive secrecy capacity and upper bound of the secrecy
outage probability are derived. Their accuracies are assessed through comparison of theoretical
analysis and simulations results.
2.2 Introduction
Physical layer security is a promising solution that addresses the security issue while directly
operating at the physical layer from the information-theoretic viewpoint. Numerous contribu-
tions exist that analyze the secrecy performance over AWGN, Rayleigh, Rician, Nakagam-m
and Weibull fading channels. Performance analysis in terms of secrecy capacity and outage
probability has been investigated Bloch et al. (2008); Liu (2013a,1); Sarkar et al. (2009). How-
ever, to the best knowledge of the authors, there is no previous work focusing on the general
case of fading channels. With regard to different values of α and μ , the α −μ fading channel
can be reduced to the speciﬁc fading channel, such as Rayleigh, Nakagami-m and Weibull fad-
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ing distributions by adjusting certain parameters. In this letter, the secrecy performance over
α−μ fading channel is evaluated by the closed-form expressions for the probability of positive
secrecy capacity and upper bound of secrecy outage probability. Consequently, our theoretical
analysis is conﬁrmed by simulation results.
2.3 System model and secrecy performance analysis
A three-node classic model such as the one shown in Fig. 2.1 is used here to illustrate a
wireless network with potential eavesdropping. In the wiretap channel model, a legitimate
transmitter (Alice) equipped with a directional antenna wishes to send secret messages to an
intended receiver (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve), the link between Alice and
Bob with fading coefﬁcient hm is called the main channel, while the one between Alice and
Eve with fading coefﬁcient hw is named as the wiretap channel. Both channels undergo the
α −μ distribution.
Alice Bob
hm
hw
Eve
Figure 2.1 Illustration of system model
with two legitimate transceivers (Alice and
Bob) and one eavesdropper (Eve)
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Recalling that the probability density function (PDF) of the α −μ fading channel coefﬁcients
hi,(i ∈ {m,w}) is given by Yacoub (2007a)
fhi (h) =
αiμ
μi
i h
αiμi−1
hˆαiμii Γ(μi)
exp
(
−μi h
αi
hˆαii
)
, (2.1)
where hˆi = α
√
E
(
hαii
)
is the α−root mean value, αi > 0 is an arbitrary fading parameter, μi >
0 is the inverse of the normalized variance of hαii . The parameter μi is calculated by μi =
E2
(
hαii
)/
V
(
hαii
)
, where E (·) andV (·) are the expectation and variance operators, respectively.
Γ(x) =
∫ ∞
0 t
x−1e−tdt is the Euler’s Gamma function. In particular, when changing the values
of α and μ to the following cases: (i) α = 2, μ = 1; (ii) α = 2, μ = m; and (iii) μ = 1, the
α-μ fading model can be simpliﬁed such that it follows Rayleigh, Nakagami-m and Weibull
distributions, respectively.
Let gi = |hi|2 denote the instantaneous channel power gain with unit mean. The PDF of gi is
expressed as Song, Y., Shin, H. & Kim, W. (2008)
fgi (x) =
αix
αiμi
2 −1
2Ω
αiμi
2
i Γ(μi)
exp
[
−
(
x
Ωi
)αi
2
]
, (2.2)
where Ωi = Γ(μi)Γ(μi+ 2αi )
. Therefore, the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at Bob and Eve
receiver sides can be expressed as
γi =
Pigi
Ni
(2.3)
where Pi and Ni are the transmission power and noise power, respectively. Without loss of
generality, we assume Nm is equal to Nw in this paper. In addition, since we consider that Alice
is equipped with a directional antenna, then the transmitted powers Pm and Pw may be different
because Bob and Eve are present in different locations in the network.
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According to Bloch et al. (2008); Liu (2013a,1); Sarkar et al. (2009), the secrecy capacity for
the given network is given as follows
Cs =Cm−Cw =
⎧⎨
⎩ log2
(
1+γm
1+γw
)
, if γm > γw
0, if γm  γw
(2.4)
where Cm and Cw are the capacities of the main channel and the wiretap channel, respectively.
Therefore, the probability of positive secrecy capacity can be derived as follows
Pr (Cs > 0) = Pr
[
log2
(
1+ γm
1+ γw
)
> 0
]
= Pr (γm > γw)
= 1−Pr
(
γm
γw
< 1
)
= 1−Pr
(
gm
gw
<
Pw
Pm
)
.
(2.5)
According to equation (16) in Tran, H., Duong, T. Q. & Zepernick, H. (2011), equation (2.5)
is derived as
Pr (Cs > 0) = 1−Fγ(1) (2.6)
where Fγ(x) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of x, which is given as
Fγ(x) = Pr
(
gm
gw
<
Pw
Pm
· x
)
=
(
PwΩw
PmΩm
)αμm
2 x
αμm
2
μmβ (μm,μw)
2F1
(
μm+μw,μm;1+μm;−
(
PwΩw
PmΩm
)α
2
x
α
2
)
,
(2.7)
herein 2F1 (., ; .; .) denotes the Gaussian hypergeometric function and β (., .) is the Beta func-
tion.
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The outage probability of the secrecy capacity is deﬁned as the probability that the secrecy
capacity Cs falls below the target secrecy rate Rs, i.e.
Pout (Cs  Rs) = Pr
[
log2
(
1+ γm
1+ γw
)
 Rs
]
= Pr
[
γm  2Rs (1+ γw)−1
]
= Pr (γm  γth+ γthγw−1) ,
(2.8)
where γth = 2Rs . Due to the complex form of the PDF of α-μ fading distribution, it is difﬁcult
to obtain a closed-form expression for (2.8). However, when the target data rate Rs approaches
zero, we can obtain the upper bound of the outage probability by substituting equation (2.7)
into equation (2.8), to get the following relationship
Pout (Cs  Rs) = Pr (γm  γth+ γthγw−1)
 Pr (γm  γthγw)
 Pr
(
γm
γw
 γth
)
 Pr
(
gm
gw
 Pw
Pm
· γth
)
 Fγ (γth) .
(2.9)
2.4 Numerical Analysis
Fig. 2.2 shows the simulation and analysis results of the probability of positive secrecy capacity
versus the transmission power Pm over α − μ fading channel for selected power values of
eavesdropper Pw provided that α = 2 and μm = μw = 1 (Rayleigh fading). One can observe
that the analytical and simulation results are in perfect match for any given set of parameters.
In addition, for the case of ﬁxed values of Pw, the larger Pm the higher the probability of positive
secrecy capacity. In Fig. 2.3, the probability of positive secrecy capacity in terms of different
values of α and μ for ﬁxed Pw = 10 dB is illustrated. Here, a similar conclusion is obtained to
that of Fig. 2.2.
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Figure 2.2 The probability of positive secrecy
capacity versus Pm for selected values of Pw
values with ﬁxed values of α = 2 and
μm = μw = 1
−10 −5 0 5 10 15 20 25
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Pm (dB)
P r
(C
s>
0)
α = 2, μ
m
 = μ
w
 = 1
α = 2, μ
m
 = μ
w
 = 2
α = 3, μ
m
 = μ
w
 = 2
α = 5, μ
m
 = μ
w
 = 3
α = 2, μ
m
 = 1, μ
w
 = 3
α = 2, μ
m
 = 3, μ
w
 = 2
Figure 2.3 The probability of positive secrecy
capacity versus Pm for different values of α and
μi and a ﬁxed value of Pw = 10 dB. The solid
and circle (o) lines correspond to the
simulation and analysis results, respectively
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Figure 2.4 The upper bound of secrecy
outage probability versus Pm for selected values
of Pw with ﬁxed values of α = 2 and
μm = μw = 1
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Figure 2.5 The upper bound of secrecy
outage probability versus Pm for different
values of α and μi and a ﬁxed value of Pw = 10
dB. The solid and circle (o) lines correspond to
simulation and analysis results, respectively
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Similarly, Fig. 2.4 and Fig. 2.5 show the simulation and analysis results of the upper bound
of the outage probability of physical layer security over α − μ fading channel with regard to
two cases: (i) ﬁxed α = 2, μm = μw = 1 while varying Pw; (ii) ﬁxed Pw while changing the
values of α and μ . Here, we ﬁx the target data rate as Rs = 0.01 bps. We can easily draw the
same conclusion about the accuracy of our derived expression for the upper bound of outage
probability, i.e. analytical derivations are veriﬁed by the simulation results.
2.5 Conclusion
In this letter, we derive closed-form expressions for the probability of positive secrecy capacity
and upper bound of outage probability for physical layer security over α −μ fading channels.
For veriﬁcation and correctness measures, the derived closed-form expressions are validated
by simulation results.
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HIGHLY ACCURATE AND ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS ON THE SOP OVER SIMO
α −μ FADING CHANNELS
Long Kong1, Georges Kaddoum1, and Zouheir Rezki2
1Département de Génie électrique, École de Technologie Supérieure,
1100 Notre-Dame Ouest, Montréal, Québec, Canada H3C 1K3
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3.1 Abstract
In order to ﬁll the gap of the mathematical analysis’s lack for the secrecy outage probability
(SOP) over single-input multiple-output (SIMO) α −μ wiretap fading channels, this letter ini-
tially provides highly accurate and asymptotic closed-form expressions for the SOP. The novel
highly accurate formulations are derived in a simple and general form in terms of the bivari-
ate Fox’s H-function, which is extensively used in the literature. Additionally, the asymptotic
analysis of the SOP is derived at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. The obtained expres-
sions are numerically validated and compared with the Monte-Carlo simulation results. The
derived SOP is in highly accurate match with simulation results for SIMO case, and perfect
match with simulated results for single-input single-output (SISO) case.
Keywords: SIMO α−μ wiretap fading channels, secrecy outage probability, asymptotic anal-
ysis, Fox’s H-function.
3.2 Introduction
Physical layer security (PLS) readily sharpens our vision and subsequently enjoys great ap-
petite of the academia and industrial spheres, responding to the inherent open nature of wire-
less transmission medium. The initial theoretical works for the PLS have laid solid foundations
to address security issues from the information theoretical perspective. Later on, many aspects
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of PLS began with the secrecy analysis over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)Leung-
Yan-Cheong & Hellman (1978) channel, and afterwards shifted to that over various fading
channels, such as Rayleigh Bloch et al. (2008), Nakagami-m Sarkar et al. (2009), Weibull Liu
(2013b), and α −μ (equivalently, generalized Gamma) Kong et al. (2016b); Lei, H., Gao, C.,
Guo, Y. & Pan, G. (2015); Lei et al. (2017a), etc., wiretap fading channels.
On the other hand, the α −μ fading model encompasses Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, Exponential
and Weibull fading Yacoub (2007a), and resultantly, the characterization of secrecy analysis
over α − μ wiretap fading channels is decisively signiﬁcant. Revisiting all existing results
concerning the secrecy performance over α − μ wiretap channels Kong et al. (2016b); Lei
et al. (2015,1), the works either focused on deriving the average secrecy capacity (ASC) Lei
et al. (2017a), the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ) Kong et al. (2016b), or a
lower bound of the secrecy outage probability (SOP) Lei et al. (2015). It is worthy to note that
the analytical expressions of the ASC and lower bound of the SOP were respectively provided
with respect to the bivariate Fox’s H-function and Meijer’s G-function in Lei et al. (2015,1).
In fact, the difﬁculty to obtain closed-form expressions, for the corresponding intractable inte-
grals, explicitly leads to the derivation of a lower bound on the SOP. Apart from the analysis
on the lower bound, none of them presents an exact closed-form expressions for the SOP, let
alone its extension to the single-input multiple-output (SIMO) scenario.
To ﬁll this gap, the objective thereafter is to complete the secrecy investigation over the SIMO
α−μ wiretap fading channels. More speciﬁcally, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
- Providing an exact SOP expression for single-input multiple-output (SISO) α − μ wiretap
fading channels.
- Considering the sum of multiple α−μ random variables (RVs) as another α−μ distributed
RV da Costa, D. B., Yacoub, M. D. & Filho, J. C. S. S. (2008); Zhang, J., Dai, L., Wang,
Z., Ng, D. W. K. & Gerstacker, W. H. (2015a), and deriving highly accurate SOP and lower
bound of SOP over SIMO α −μ wiretap fading channels.
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- Beneﬁting from the derived analytical SOP expression, we provide asymptotic analysis of
the SOP and secrecy diversity order, especially at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime,
due to the non-elementary form of the derived SOP.
Notations: [x]+ =max(x,0). Γ(.) is the complete Gamma function (Gradshteyn, I. S. & Ryzhik,
I. M., 2014, Eq. (8.310.1)), Γ(a,x) is the upper incomplete Gamma function (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik,
2014, Eq. (8.350.2)). Hm,np,q [.] is the univariate Fox’s H-function (Mathai et al., 2009a, Eq.
(1.2)), H0,n:m1.n1:m2,n2p,q:p1,q1:p2,q2 is the bivariate Fox’s H-function (Mathai et al., 2009a, Eq. (2.56)).
B(x,y) is the Beta function (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, Eq. (8.380.1)). M [ f (x),s] denotes
the Mellin transform of f (x) (Debnath, L. & Bhatta, D., 2014, Eq. (8.2.5)). Res[ f (x), p] repre-
sents the residue of function f (x) at pole x= p.
3.3 System Model and problem formulation
Consider a wiretap system model, where a legitimate transmitter (Alice) wishes to send secret
messages to an intended receiver (Bob) in the presence of a potential eavesdropper (Eve). The
link between Alice and Bob is called the main channel, while the one between Alice and each
Eve is named the wiretap channel. It is assumed that (i) Alice, Bob and Eve are equipped with
single, MB, and ME antennas, respectively; (ii) the main and the wiretap channels undergo the
α − μ fading Yacoub (2007a), with fading parameters αk,μk,k ∈ {B,E}; (iii) the maximum
ratio combining (MRC) scheme is utilized at Bob and Eve.
For the given system conﬁguration, the received instantaneous SNRs at Bob and Eve are re-
ceptively given as γk = Pgkσ2k
= γ¯kgk, and gk = ∑
Mk
m=1 |hk,m|2 represents the instantaneous channel
power gain with unit mean. P, σ2B and σ2E denote the transmission power, noise power at Bob
and Eve, respectively.
Since the probability density function (PDF) of gk is the convolution of Mk PDFs of hk,m,
however, the high complexity of the Mk-dimensional integrals of fγk(γ) hinders the adoption
of a closed-form expression for the SOP. Fortunately, as proved in (da Costa et al., 2008, Eq.
(28)), the PDF of γk can be accurately approximated to a α-μ random variable with parameters
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(αˆk, μˆk,Ωˆk)1, and is given as follows
fγk(γ)≈
αˆkγ
αˆk μˆk
2 −1
2Ωˆ
αˆk μˆk
2
k Γ(μˆk)
exp
⎡
⎣−( γ
Ωˆk
) αˆk
2
⎤
⎦ (a)= κkH1,00,1
⎡
⎣λkγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(μˆk− 2αˆk ,
2
αˆk )
⎤
⎦ , (3.1)
where Ωˆk =
γ¯kΓ(μˆk)
Γ
(
μˆk+ 2αˆk
) , κk = 1ΩˆkΓ(μˆk) , λk = 1Ωˆk . Step (a) is derived by using (Mathai et al.,
2009a, Eq. (1.125)). The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γk, i.e., Fγk(γ) is therefore
obtained from (Bodenschatz, 1992, Eq. (3.7)) and is given by
Fγk(γ) = 1−
κk
λk
H2,01,2
⎡
⎣λkγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(0,1),(μˆi, 2αˆi )
⎤
⎦= 1− F¯γk(γ), (3.2)
where F¯γk(γ) is the complementary CDF (CCDF).
Assuming the availability of perfect channel state information (CSI) at all terminals and the
unit distance between Alice and Bob, Alice and Eve, the instantaneous secrecy capacity is
given by Lei et al. (2017a)
Cs = [log2 (1+ γB)− log2 (1+ γE)]+ . (3.3)
3.4 Secrecy outage probability analysis
A secrecy outage event happens when either the secrecy capacity Cs is equal to 0, or when the
target secrecy rate Rt is greater than the instantaneous secrecy capacity, i.e.,Cs < Rt . Revisiting
(3.3), the SOP,Pout , is conceptually and mathematically deﬁned by2,
Pout = Pr(Cs < Rt) =
∫ ∞
0
FγB(γ0) fγE (γE)dγE = 1−
∫ ∞
0
F¯γB(γ0) fγE (γE)dγE , (3.4)
1 (αˆk, μˆk,Ωˆk) can be estimated using the moment-based approximation method proposed in (da Costa
et al., 2008, Eq. (22-24)).
2 Due to the space limitation, the detailed derivation is suggested as a reference Kong et al. (2016a).
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where γ0 = RsγE +W , Rs = 2Rt , W = Rs−1.
3.4.1 Analytical SOP
Proposition 1. The generalized SOP expression over the SIMO α−μ wiretap fading channels
is given by
Pout = 1− κBκEWRsλB H
0,1:0,1:1,1
1,0:1,1:1,1
⎡
⎣ 1
λBW
,
Rs
λEW
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(2,1,1)
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1− μˆB, 2αˆB )
(0,1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1− μˆE + 2αˆE , 2αˆE )
(1,1)
⎤
⎦ ,
(3.5)
where H0,n:m1.n1:m2,n2p,q:p1,q1:p2,q2 is the bivariate Fox’s H-function.
Proof. Revisiting (3.4) and using the Parseval’s relation for Mellin transform (Debnath & Bhatta,
2014, Eq. (8.3.23)), we have
I =
∫ ∞
0
F¯γB(γ0) fγE (γE)dγE =
1
2π j
∫
L1
M [F¯γB(γ0),1− s]M [ fγE (γE),s]ds, (3.6)
where j =
√−1, L1 is the integration path from υ − j∞ to υ + j∞, and υ is a constant Deb-
nath & Bhatta (2014).
Then by introducing the mathematical deﬁnition of univariate Fox’s H-function, and then in-
terchanging the order of two integrals,M [F¯B(γ0),1− s] can be rewritten as
M [F¯γB(γ0),1− s] =
∫ ∞
0
γ−sc F¯B(γ0)dγE
=
κB
2λBπ j
∫
L2
Γ(ξ )Γ(μˆB+ 2αˆB ξ )
Γ(1+ξ )
λ−ξB
∫ ∞
0
γE−s
γξ0
dγEdξ ,
(3.7)
where L2 is a certain contour separating the poles of Γ(ξ ) from the poles of Γ(μˆB + 2αˆB ξ ).
Next, by representing γ0 = RsγE +W , using (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, Eq. (3.194.3)) and
the property B(x,y) = Γ(x)Γ(y)Γ(x+y) (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, Eq. (8.384.1)), we obtain the
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following result
M [F¯γB(γ0),1− s] =
κB
2λBπ j
(
Rs
W
)s−1
Γ(1− s)
∫
L2
Γ(ξ + s−1)Γ(μˆB+ 2αˆB ξ )
Γ(1+ξ )
(λBW )−ξdξ .
(3.8)
Subsequently, substituting (3.8) and the Mellin transform for fγC(γc) (Alhennawi, H. R., Ayadi,
M. M. H. E., Ismail, M. H. & Mourad, H. A. M., 2016, eq. (5)), i.e., M [ fγE (γc),s] =
κEλ−sE Γ(μˆE − 2αˆE + sαˆE ) into (3.6), arrives at the following result,
I =− κBκEW
4λBRsπ2
∫
L1
∫
L2
Γ(ξ + s−1)Γ(μˆB+ 2αˆB ξ )
Γ(1+ξ )(λBW )ξ
×Γ(1− s)Γ
(
μˆE − 2αˆE +
2
αˆE
s
)(
Rs
λEW
)s
dξds,
(3.9)
and subsequently applying the deﬁnition of the bivariate Fox’sH-function, the proof is achieved.
3.4.2 Asymptotic SOP
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the result in Proposition 1 and for the sake of high-
lighting the effect of channel fading parameters on the SOP, the asymptotic behavior of Pout
is conducted in this subsection for different scenarios by using the residue approach given in
(Chergui, H., Benjillali, M. & Saoudi, S., 2016, sec. IV). Our asymptotic results are conse-
quently summarized in Table. 3.1.
Table 3.1 Asymptotic analysis of thePout
Scenario AsymptoticPout
γ¯E → ∞ 1−
Γ
(
μˆB+
αˆE μˆE
αˆB
)
μˆEΓ(μˆB)Γ(μˆE)
(
λE
RsλB
) αˆE μˆE
2 (3.10)
γ¯B → ∞
Γ
(
αˆB μˆB
αˆE
+μˆE
)
μˆBΓ(μˆB)Γ(μˆE)
(
RsλB
λE
) αˆB μˆB
2 (3.11)
39
According to Chergui et al. (2016), expansions of the univariate and bivariate Fox’sH-functions
can be derived by evaluating the residue of the corresponding integrands at the closest poles to
the contour, namely, the minimum pole on the right for large Fox’s H-function arguments and
the maximum pole on the left for small ones. In the case of γ¯E → ∞, we have RsλEW → ∞. The
bivariate Fox’s H-function is evaluated at the highest poles on the left of L1, i.e., s = 1− ξ ,
therefore, it leads to the following result,
1
2π j
∫
L1
Γ(ξ + s−1)Γ(1− s)Γ
(
μˆE − 2αˆE +
2
αˆE
s
)(
Rs
λEW
)s
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ(s)
ds
≈ Res[ψ(s),1−ξ ] = lim
s→1−ξ
(s+ξ −1)ψ(s)
= Γ(ξ )Γ
(
μˆE − 2αˆE ξ
)(
Rs
λEW
)1−ξ
.
(3.12)
Therefore, we have
Pout ≈ 1− κBκE2λBλEπ j
∫
L2
Γ(ξ )Γ
(
μˆE − 2αˆE ξ
)
Γ
(
μˆB+ 2αˆB ξ
)
Γ(1+ξ )
(
λBRs
λE
)ξ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ(ξ )
dξ
= 1− 1
Γ(μˆB)Γ(μˆE)
H2,12,2
⎡
⎣λBRs
λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1− μˆE , 2αˆE ),(1,1)
(0,1),(μˆB, 2αˆB )
⎤
⎦ .
(3.13)
In continuation, (3.13) can be successively and asymptotically simpliﬁed as (10) by computing
the highest pole on the right of the contourL2, namely ξ = αˆE μˆE2 ,
Pout ≈ 1− κBκEλBλE Res
[
τ(ξ ),
αˆE μˆE
2
]
, (3.14)
and then applying κkλk =
1
Γ(μˆk)
, the proof for (10) is achieved.
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Following the same methodology, the proof for the case, γ¯B →∞, can be similarly achieved by
ﬁrst computing (3.9) at the highest pole of L2 at ξ = 1− s, and subsequently evaluating the
obtained result at the poles ofL1, i.e., s= 0 and s=
αˆBμˆB
2 , respectively.
Remark 1. From the deﬁnition of SOP,
Pout =Pr(γB ≤ RsγE +W )≥Pr(γB ≤ RsγE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
PLout
=
∫ ∞
0
FγB(RsγE) fγE (γE)dγE , (3.15)
then plugging (3.1) and (3.2) into (3.15), using the Mellin transform of the products of two
Fox’s H-functions (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)),PLout is ﬁnally given by (3.13).
Remark 2. Conclusively speaking, the results shown by (10), (11) and (3.13) do not vary with
θ = γ¯Bγ¯E .
Remark 3. The secrecy diversity order at Bob is deﬁned as Dsec − limγ¯B→∞ log(P
∞
out)
log(γ¯B)
Liu, Y.,
Qin, Z., Elkashlan, M., Gao, Y. & Hanzo, L. (2017), and P∞out is given by (11). After some
algebraic manipulations, the diversity order is ﬁnally given by, Dsec =
αˆBμˆB
2 .
3.5 Numerical results and discussions
In this section, we conﬁrm the accuracy of our analytical derivations demonstrated in Section
3.4, in comparison with the Monte-Carlo (MC) simulation results3. It is noted that the bivari-
ate Fox’s H-function can be easily and efﬁciently implemented at MATLAB (Peppas, K. P.,
Lazarakis, F., Alexandridis, A. & Dangakis, K., 2012, Table. II), Python Alhennawi et al.
(2016) and Mathematica Lei et al. (2015)4.
Fig. 3.1(a) veriﬁes the derived SOP and PLout against γ¯B over SISO5 α − μ wiretap channels.
As seen from the ﬁgure, our derivation perfectly matches with the simulation outcomes, even
3 The α −μ fading channel is implemented by using the WAFO toolboxBrodtkorb et al. (2000).
4 It is worthy to mention that the numerical evaluation of the bivariate and univariate Fox’s H-function
for MATLAB implementations is based on the method proposed in (Peppas, K. P., 2012, Appendix.
A) and (Peppas et al., 2012, Table. II), respectively.
5 It is noted when MB =ME = 1, the SIMO α −μ fading channel is reduced to the SISO α −μ fading
channels, henceforth, we have αB = αˆB, and αE = αˆE .
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for several speciﬁc combinations of different values for α and μ , which correspond to Rayleigh
(α = 2, μ = 1), Nakagami-m (α = 2, μ = m) and Weibull (α is the fading parameter, and
μ = 1) fading channels, respectively. In addition, our derived PLout keeps consistent with the
result given in (Lei et al., 2015, eq.(11))6. Figs. 3.1 (b) and 3.2 plot the asymptotic SOP against
γ¯B and γ¯E , respectively, it can be seen that the results given in (10) and (11) are becoming tight
at high SNR regime.
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Figure 3.1 Pout versus γ¯B when Rt = 0.5 and MB =ME = 1
In Fig. 3.3, the comparison of the analytical expressions for the Pout , with simulation re-
sults regarding different (MB,ME), are performed. As suggested in the ﬁgure, the Pout is, as
expected, increased with the increase of ME , and decreased with the increase of MB.
6 The MC simulation in Lei et al. (2015) is used to conﬁrm the lower bound of SOP, whereas the MC
simulation herein is supposed to conﬁrm the exact SOP.
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Figure 3.2 Pout versus γ¯E when Rt = 0.5,
αB = 3,αE = 2,μB = μE = 4, and MB =ME = 1
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Figure 3.3 Pout versus γ¯B for selected values of
MB,ME when Rt = 0.5, γ¯E = 10 dB, αB = αE = 2,
μB = 1, μE = 2
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As observed in Figs. 3.1 and 3.3, one can grasp the following outcome about the asymptotic
behavior of Pout : (i) the lower bound of SOP given by (3.13) is becoming tight and closely
approximates the analytical Pout , as γ¯E increases; (ii) our derived asymptotic SOP given by
(11) is gradually approaching the analytical results, especially at high SNR γ¯E regime. As
discussed in Remark. 2 and plotted in Fig. 3.4, thePLout and the asymptotic SOP at high SNR
regime are only varying with the change of θ .
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Figure 3.4 Pout versus θ when Rt = 0.5,
MB =ME = 2, αB = αE = 2, μB = μE = 2, and γ¯B = θ γ¯E
3.6 Conclusions
In this letter, we presented the novel, highly accurate and asymptotic closed-form expressions
for the SOP over the SIMO α − μ wiretap channels. The Monte-Carlo simulation was per-
formed and compared with our mathematical representations. Useful insights can be summa-
rized as (i) the highly accurate expression seems cumbersome, but it is in perfect agreement
with numerical results; (ii) the lower bound of SOP closely approximates the analytical SOP
especially at high γ¯E regime; (iii) the obtained result is extremely general and advantageous
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when the main channel and wiretap channel undergo different small-scale fading effects; (iv)
on the other hand, the MIMO α − μ wiretap fading channel presents a particular challenge
as beamforming is generally required whereas for SISO and SIMO scenarios, only codebook
generation and power allocation are involved. The authors believe that MIMO systems require
a special treatment, hence this scenario is left for future work.
CHAPTER 4
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4.1 Abstract
In this paper, we initially investigate the physical layer security over device-to-device (D2D)
communications, where the channel is modeled from the Fisher-Snedecor F distribution. To
be speciﬁc, secrecy metrics, including the secrecy outage probability (SOP), the probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ), and the average secrecy capacity (ASC), are well derived
with exact closed-form expressions, which are given in terms of the Meijer’s G-function. The
accuracies of our mathematical expressions are further validated by Monte-Carlo simulation
results.
Keywords: Physical layer security, Fisher-Snedecor F wiretap fading channels, Meijer’s G-
function.
4.2 Introduction
Currently, D2D communication is widely regarded as a promising candidate for the ﬁfth-
generation (5G) communication. Due to the highly standardization of the communication
scheme, including the modulation and coding mechanism Zou, Y., Zhu, J., Wang, X. & Le-
ung, V. C. M. (2015), it is increasingly vulnerable for legitimate D2D pairs to highly ensure
secrecy from malicious third entities, especially when they are being wiretapped due to the
open access of transmission medium Shiu et al. (2011).
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More recently, the Fisher-SnedecorF fading model was proposed in Yoo, S. K., Cotton, S. L.,
Sofotasios, P. C., Matthaiou, M., Valkama, M. & Karagiannidis, G. K. (2017) to characterize
the D2D links. It is reported therein that the Fisher-Snedecor F distribution can provide a
good, and in most cases, a better ﬁt to the experimental channel data, especially in comparison
with another composite fading model, i.e., the generalized-K distribution. The seminal ﬁnding
in Yoo et al. (2017) demonstrates that the Fisher-Snedecor F fading model is a promising
alternative model to capitalize the device-to-device (D2D) communication links, especially at
5.8 GHz, for both indoor and outdoor environments Rahama, Y. A., Ismail, M. H. & Hassan,
M. (2018).
In addition, the probability density function (PDF) of Fisher-Snedecor F distribution is less
simpler than the generalized-K distribution due to the PDF of generalized-K distribution hav-
ing the non-elementary function, i.e., the modiﬁed Bessel function. In addition, the Fisher-
Snedecor F distribution is ﬂexible since it can be reduced to some special cases when the
fading parameters are ﬁxed for some values Badarneh, O. S., da Costa, D. B., Sofotasios,
P. C., Muhaidat, S. & Cotton, S. L. (2018), i.e., Nakagami-m distribution (ms,l → ∞,ml = m),
Rayleigh distribution (ms,l → ∞,ml = 1), and one-sided Gaussian distribution (ms,l → ∞,ml =
0.5).
As it can be seen from the existing works Lei, H., Ansari, I. S., Gao, C., Guo, Y., Pan,
G. & Qaraqe, K. A. (2016a); Lei, H., Gao, C., Ansari, I. S., Guo, Y., Pan, G. & Qaraqe, K. A.
(2016b); Lei, H., Zhang, H., Ansari, I. S., Gao, C., Guo, Y., Pan, G. & Qaraqe, K. A. (2016c);
Wu, L., Yang, L., Chen, J. & Alouini, M. S. (2018a), the secrecy concern over the generalized-
K wiretap fading models has been widely investigated. In Lei et al. (2016b), the lower bound
of secrecy outage probability and average secrecy capacity over the single-input and multiple-
output (SIMO) generalized-K wiretap fading model were derived, which were given in terms
of the Meijer’s G-function. This function is with a general form and is deﬁned in terms of the
Mellin-Barnes integral. In addition, it has been found widely applied in literature Kong et al.
(2018a); Kong, L., Kaddoum, G. & Vuppala, S. (2018d); Lei et al. (2015,1,1,1,1); Moualeu,
J. M. & Hamouda, W. (2017); Wu et al. (2018a) when analyzing secrecy performance over
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various fading channels, for example, α − μ Kong et al. (2016b,1,1); Lei et al. (2015,1) and
κ −μ Moualeu & Hamouda (2017), etc.
Motivated by the experimental and theoretical advantages of Fisher-Snedecor F distribution,
as such, the objectives of this paper are multi-fold,
- Considering the presence of an active eavesdropper, two essential secrecy metrics, includ-
ing the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
(PNZ), are derived with exact closed-form expressions, moreover, the lower bound of SOP
is also provided. The aforesaid metrics are exactly given either in terms of the univariate
Meijer’s G-function or the bivariate Meijer’s G-function.
- On the other hand, considering a passive eavesdropper, this paper is subjective to analyze
the average secrecy capacity (ASC) of a D2D network over the Fisher-SnedecorF wiretap
fading channels. Hence, the ASC is mathematically derived in terms of the univariate and
bivariate Merjer’s G-functions. Even though the Meijer’s G-function is a non-elementary
function, the implementation of univariate Meijer’s G-function is already available in math-
ematical software packages, like Matlab2017b, Mathematica Mei and Maple. In order to
gain more insights at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime, the bivariate Merjer’s G-
function is further simpliﬁed in terms of the univariate Merjer’s G-function. In addition, the
correctness of our analytical results are veriﬁed by Monte-Carlo simulation results.
Finally, the practical beneﬁt of having such analytical secrecy expressions allows wireless sys-
tem designers to have a quick system evaluation when facing security risks.
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows: Section 4.3 presents the system model. Sections
4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 provide the secrecy analysis. Numerical results and discussion are subse-
quently presented in Section 4.7, followed with concluding remarks in Section 4.8.
Mathematical Functions and Notations: Γ(.) is the complete Gamma function (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik,
2014, eq. (8.310.1)). B(x,y) is the Beta function. 2F1(a,b;c;x) is the Gauss hypergeomet-
ric function. Gm,np,q [.] is the univariate Meijer’s G-function (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq.
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(9.301)), Gm,n:m1.n1:m2,n2p,q:p1,q1:p2,q2 [.] is the bivariate Meijer’s G-function. B(x,y) is the Beta function
(Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (8.380.1)). 2F1(a,b;c;x) is the Gauss hypergeometric func-
tion (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq.(9.14.2)). M [ f (x),s] denotes the Mellin transform of
f (x) (Debnath & Bhatta, 2014, eq. (8.2.5)). Res[ f (x), p] represents the residue of function
f (x) at pole x= p.
4.3 System Model
Consider the Wyner’s wiretap channel model Wyner (1975), to be speciﬁc, as shown in Fig.
4.1, a wireless D2D link in the presence of an eavesdroppers, where the source (Alice) intends
to send private messages to legitimate receiver (Bob) over the main channel hB, and being
intercepted by a third entity (Eve) over the wiretap channel hE .
It is assumed that (i) all users are single antenna based; (ii) the D2D links are modeled by
the independent Fisher-Snedecor F distribution Yoo et al. (2017), hk,k ∈ {B,E} with fading
parameters (mk,s,mk), herein mk,s,mk represent the amount of shadowing of the root-mean-
square (rms) signal power and the fading severity parameter, respectively.
Alice Bob
hB
hE
Eve
Figure 4.1 Illustration of system model
with two legitimate transceivers (Alice and
Bob) and one eavesdropper (Eve)
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For the given system conﬁguration, the received instantaneous signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at
Bob and Eve are expressed as
γk =
Pgk
σ2k
= γ¯kgk (4.1)
where P, σ2B, and σ2E denote the transmission power, noise power at Bob and Eve, respectively.
gk = |hk|2 represents the instantaneous channel power gain with unit mean. It is assumed that
both the main channel (Alice → Bob) and the wiretap channel (Alice → Eve) are quasi-static
fading channels Bloch et al. (2008).
The PDF of the instantaneous received SNR, γk, is deﬁned in (Yoo et al., 2017, eq. (5)), we
further rewrite it in terms of the Meijer’s G-function from (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (8.4.2.5))
and (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq.(9.31.5)),
fk(γ) =
mmkk (mk,sγ¯k)
mk,sγmk−1
B(mk,mk,s)(mkγ +mk,sγ¯k)mk+mk,s
(4.2)
= CkG
1,1
1,1
⎡
⎣λkγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−mk,s
mk−1
⎤
⎦ , (4.3)
where λk = mkmk,sγ¯k and Ck =
λk
Γ(mk)Γ(mk,s)
.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γk, i.e., Fk(γ) is deﬁned in (Yoo et al., 2017, eq.
(11)) and given by
Fk(γ) =
γmk2F1
(
mk+mk,s,mk;mk+1;− mkγmk,sγ¯k
)
m1−mkk B(mk,mk,s)(mk,sγ¯k)mk
(4.4)
(a)
=ΦkG
1,2
2,2
⎡
⎣λkγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−mk,s,1)
(mk,0)
⎤
⎦ , (4.5)
where Φk =
Γ(mk+1)
mkΓ(mk)Γ(mk+mk,s)B(mk,mk,s)
, and step (a) is similarly developed from (Prudnikov
et al., 1990, eq. (8.4.49.13)).
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Assuming the availability of perfect channel state information (CSI) at all terminals, the in-
stantaneous secrecy capacity is deﬁned as the difference between the main channel capacity
CM and the wiretap channel capacity CW Lei et al. (2016c), and is expressed as follows
Cs(γB,γE) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
CM −CW , γB > γE
0, otherwise
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
log2
(
1+γB
1+γE
)
, γB > γE
0, otherwise.
(4.6)
4.4 SOP Characterization
When considering an active eavesdropper, secrecy outage probability (SOP) is frequently mea-
sured as a benchmark to indicate how secure the Alice-Bob transceiver pair is.
The SOP is an information-theoretical concept having a deﬁnition that a secrecy outage event
happens when the instantaneous secrecy capacityCs is equal to 0, or whenCs is lower than the
target secrecy rate, i.e., Cs < Rt .
To this end, making a revisit to (4.6), the secrecy outage probability,Pout(Rt), is conceptually
and mathematically explained in the following form Kong et al. (2016a,1).
Pout(Rt) =Pr(Cs < Rt) =Pr(γB ≤ RsγE +Rs−1) =
∫ ∞
0
FB(γ0) fE(γE)dγE , (4.7)
where γ0 = RsγE +Rs−1 = Rsγ +W , Rs = 2Rt , W = Rs−1.
Proposition 2. The secrecy outage probability over Fisher-SnedecorF Wiretap Fading Chan-
nels is given either in terms of the extended generalized bivariate Merjer’s G-function, shown
in (4.8a),
Pout,1 =
ΦBCEW
Rs
G0,1:2,1:1,11,0:2,3:1,1
⎡
⎣ Rs
λEW
,
1
λBW
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(2,1,1)
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−mB,1)
(0,mB,s,1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(2−mE)
(1,1+mE,s)
⎤
⎦ ,
(4.8a)
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or the univariate Merjer’s G-function shown in (4.8b),
Pout,2 =
ΦBCE
λBRs
∞
∑
n=1
(−λBW )n
n!
G3,34,4
⎡
⎣ λE
λBRs
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0,−mE,s,n−mB,n)
(mE −1,n−1+mB,s,n−1,n)
⎤
⎦ , (4.8b)
where Gm,n:m1.n1:m2,n2p,q:p1,q1:p2,q2 [.] is the bivariate Meijer’s G-function, G
m,n
p,q [.] is the univariate Meijer’s
G-function.
Proof. See Appendix. I.1 and Appendix. I.2 for the proofs of (4.8a) and (4.8b), respectively.
Remark 4. ThePout is lower bounded by
PLout =
ΦBCE
λE
G2,33,3
⎡
⎣λBRs
λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−mB,s,1,1−mE)
(0,mE,s,mB)
⎤
⎦ . (4.9)
Proof. Revisiting (4.7), we have
Pout =Pr(γB ≤ RsγE +W )≥Pr(γB ≤ RsγE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
PLout
=
∫ ∞
0
FB(RsγE) fE(γE)dγE . (4.10)
Substituting (4.3) and (4.5) into (4.10), and then applying Mellin transform of the product of
two Meijer’s G-functions from (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eqs.(2.25.1.1) and (8.3.2.21)), the proof
is achieved.
4.5 PNZ Characterization
The existence of non-zero secrecy capacity is a fundamental metric, and it is assured with the
probability given by
Pnz =Pr(γB > γE) =
∫ ∞
0
FE(γB) fB(γB)dγB. (4.11)
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Proposition 3. The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity over Fisher-SnedecorF Wiretap
Fading Channels is given by
Pnz =
CBΦE
λB
G2,33,3
⎡
⎣λE
λB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−mE,s,1−mB,1)
(0,mB,s,mE)
⎤
⎦ . (4.12)
Proof. Following the proof of remark. 4, the proof ofPnz is similarly obtained.
4.6 ASC Characterization
4.6.1 Exact ASC
Theorem 1. The average secrecy capacity over Fihser-Snedecor F wiretap fading channels
is given by
C¯s =
CBΦE
λB ln(2)
G1,1:1,2:1,21,1:2,2:2,2
⎡
⎣λE
λB
,
1
λB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(mB)
(mB,s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−mE,s,1)
(mE ,0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(1,0)
⎤
⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
+
CEΦB
λE ln(2)
G1,1:1,2:1,21,1:2,2:2,2
⎡
⎣λB
λE
,
1
λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(mE)
(mE,s)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−mB,s,1)
(mB,0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(1,0)
⎤
⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
− CE
λE ln2
G2,33,3
⎡
⎣ 1
λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1,1−mE)
(1,mE,s,0)
⎤
⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
.
(4.13)
Proof. Recalling the result given in (Lei et al., 2016b, eq.(17)), the ASC given in (4.6) can be
further mathematically expressed as
C¯s =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Cs(γB,γE) fγB(γB) fγE (γE)dγBdγE =I1+I2−I3, (4.14)
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where
I1 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1+ γB) fB(γB)FE(γB)dγB, (4.15a)
I2 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1+ γE) fE(γE)FB(γE)dγE , (4.15b)
I3 =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1+ γE) fE(γE)dγE . (4.15c)
Next, re-expressing the logarithm function in terms of the Meijer’s G-function Prudnikov et al.
(1990), i.e.,
log2(1+ x) =
1
ln(2)
G1,22,2
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(1,0)
⎤
⎦ , (4.16)
substituting (4.3), (4.5), and (4.16) into (4.15a), I1 can be developed in (4.17),
I1 =
CBΦE
ln(2)
∫ ∞
0
G1,22,2
⎡
⎣γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(1,0)
⎤
⎦G1,11,1
⎡
⎣λBγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−mB,s
mB−1
⎤
⎦G1,22,2
⎡
⎣λEγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−mE,s,1)
(mE ,0)
⎤
⎦dγ
=
CBΦE
ln(2)
∫
L1
Γ(mE + s)Γ(mE,s− s)Γ(−s)
Γ(1− s)λ sE
∫ ∞
0
γ−sG1,22,2
⎡
⎣γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(1,0)
⎤
⎦G1,11,1
⎡
⎣λBγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−mB,s
mB−1
⎤
⎦dγ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
ds,
(4.17)
whereL1 is a certain contour separating the poles of Γ(mE + s) from the poles of Γ(−s).
The inner integral U can be directly developed by using the Mellin transform for the product
of two Meijer’s G-functions (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)) as follows
U = λ s−1B G
2,3
3,3
⎡
⎣ 1
λB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1,s−1−mB)
(1,mB,s+ s,0)
⎤
⎦ , (4.18)
subsequently, rewriting (4.18) in terms of the deﬁnition of univariate Meijer’s G-function, then
substituting the obtained result into (4.17) and performing the change of variables s =−s and
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ξ =−ξ , leads to the following result
I1 =− CBΦE4ln(2)λBπ2
∫
L1
∫
L2
Γ(mB,s− s−ξ )Γ(s)
Γ(1+ s)Γ(1+ξ )
Γ(mB+ s+ξ )Γ(mE − s)Γ(mE,s+ s)
×Γ2(ξ )Γ(1−ξ )
(
1
λB
)ξ (λE
λB
)s
dξds,
(4.19)
where L2 is another contour, next, recognizing the deﬁnition of bivariate Meijer’s G-function
Gupta, S. (1969), the proof of I1 is accomplished.
Similarly, following the same methodology, the proof for I2 is achieved. With the help of
(Prudnikov et al., 1990, eqs. (2.25.1.1) and (8.3.2.21)), the proof of I3 is obtained.
4.6.2 Asymptotic ASC
Observed from (4.13), the exact ASC is given in terms of the extended generalized bivariate
Meijer’s G-function. Its implementation is not available in mathematical packages, like Math-
ematica, Maple or MATLAB. Fortunately, it is computationally tractable and programmable,
which can be found available in Peppas (2012). As such, the asymptotic ASC is derived espe-
cially when β = γ¯Bγ¯E is at high SNR regime.
Theorem 2. When β = γ¯Bγ¯E is at high SNR region, the asymptotic ASC would be given by
C¯s ≈ Iˆ1+ Iˆ2−I3, (4.20)
where Iˆ1 and Iˆ2 are respectively given by (4.21a) and (4.21b),
Iˆ1 ≈CBΦEΓ(mB,s+mB)ln(2)λB
(
λB
λE
)mB
G3,34,4
⎡
⎣λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0,1+mB,1−mE,s+mB,1)
(0,0,mB+mE ,mB)
⎤
⎦
+
CBΦEΓ(mE)Γ(mE,s)
ln(2)λB
G3,23,3
⎡
⎣λB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0,1−mB,s,1)
(0,0,mB)
⎤
⎦ ,
(4.21a)
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Iˆ2 ≈CEΦBΓ(mE +mE,s)ln(2)λE
(
λB
λE
)mE,s
G3,34,4
⎡
⎣λB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1+mE,s,1−mE,s−mB,s,1)
(0,0,mB−mE ,−mE,s)
⎤
⎦
+
CEΦBΓ(mB)Γ(mB+mB,s)
ln(2)λEΓ(1+mB)
(
λB
λE
)mB
G3,23,3
⎡
⎣λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1−mE,s+mB,1)
(0,0,mB+mE)
⎤
⎦ .
(4.21b)
Proof. Recalling the residue approach given in (Chergui et al., 2016, Sec. IV) and the expan-
sion principle for Meijer’s G-function (Karagiannidis, G. K., Sagias, N. C. & Mathiopoulos,
P. T., 2007, Appendix), when β →∞, λEλB →∞, making the change of variable s=−s, we have
G1 =
1
2π j
∫
L1
Γ(mB,s+ s−ξ )Γ(mB− s+ξ )
Γ(1− s) Γ(mE + s)Γ(mE,s− s)Γ(−s)
(
λB
λE
)s
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1(s)
ds,
(4.22)
where j=
√−1, G1 can be evaluated at the poles s=mB+ξ and s= 0 on the left of the contour
L1, respectively
G1 ≈ Res[J1(s),mB+ξ ]+Res[J1(s),0], (4.23)
where
Res[J1(s),mB+ξ ]
=− lim
s→mB+ξ
(s−mB−ξ )J1(s)
=
Γ(mB,s+mB)Γ(mE +mB+ξ )Γ(−mB−ξ )
Γ(1−mB−ξ ) Γ(mE,s−mB−ξ )
(
λE
λB
)−(mB+ξ )
,
(4.24a)
Res[J1(s),0] = Γ(mE)Γ(mE,s)Γ(mB,s−ξ )Γ(mB+ξ ), (4.24b)
subsequently, plugging the obtained results into (4.22) and then into (4.19), yields
Iˆ1 ≈ τ12π j
∫
L2
Res[J1(s),mB+ξ ]
Γ(1−ξ )Γ2(ξ )
Γ(1+ξ )λξB
dξ +
τ1
2π j
∫
L2
Res[J1(s),0]
Γ(1−ξ )Γ2(ξ )
Γ(1+ξ )λξB
dξ ,
(4.25)
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where τ1 = CBΦEλB ln(2) . After making some simple mathematical manipulations and applying the
univariate Meijer’s G-function, the proof of (4.21a) is obtained.
Regarding the proof for Iˆ2, it can be evaluated at the poles on the right of the contour L1, i.e.,
s = mE,s− ξ and s = mB, and subsequently following the similar steps with (4.22)-(4.25), we
obtain the asymptotic I2.
4.7 Numerical Results and Conclusions
In order to conﬁrm the accuracy of our derived analytical results given in Sections. 4.4, 4.5 and
4.6, Monte-Carlo simulations are therefore presented to compare with our analytical results
given in (4.8a), (4.8b), (4.9), (4.12), and (4.13), respectively.
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Figure 4.2 Pout versus γ¯B over Fisher-SnedecorF fading
channels when Rt = 0.5, mB = 2,mE = 3, ms,B = 2, ms,E = 3,
and ΩB =ΩE = 1, respectively
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Figure 4.3 Pout versus γ¯E over Fisher-SnedecorF
fading channels when Rt = 0.5, mB = 2,mE = 3,
ms,B = 2, ms,E = 3, and ΩB =ΩE = 1, respectively
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Figure 4.4 Pnz versus β = γ¯Bγ¯E over Fisher-Snedecor
F fading channels when mE = 3, ms,B = 2, ms,E = 2,
and ΩB =ΩE = 1, respectively
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Figure 4.5 C¯s versus γ¯B over Fisher-SnedecorF
fading channels when mB = ms,B = 3, mE = ms,E = 2,
and ΩB =ΩE = 1, respectively
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Figure 4.6 C¯s versus β over Fisher-SnedecorF
fading channels when mB = ms,B = 3, mE = ms,E = 2,
and ΩB =ΩE = 1, respectively
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Considering the active eavesdropping scenario, Figs. 4.2-4.4 verify the SOP and PNZ over the
Fisher-SnedecorF fading channels. As observed from the three graphs, it is observed that our
derivations are in good agreements with simulation outcomes. In addition, it is noteworthy to
mention that the obtained two SOP expressions, given in (4.8a) and (4.8b), match well.
Moreover, the lower bound of SOP given in (4.9) both plotted in Figs. 4.2 and 4.3 demonstrates
that thePLout , as expected, is gradually approximating the exact SOP, especially as γ¯E increases.
Such a phenomenon is particularly vivid in Fig. 4.3. The lower bound of SOP is apparently
beneﬁcial because (i) when γ¯E is at high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime, it is highly tight to
the exact SOP; (ii) it could offer a simple and general computational benchmark for wireless
system designers when requiring quick evaluation of security risks.
In Fig. 4.4, we plot the PNZ against the ratio of γ¯B and γ¯E for selected values of mB. One can
obtain that larger value of mB assures secure transmission with a higher probability. In other
words, higher amount of shadowing of rms signal power is helpful to improve system secrecy.
This is just the nature that how physical layer security deploys the randomness of wireless
channels, i.e., fading, to enhance secrecy.
Figs. 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate the ASC against γ¯B and β over the Fisher-Snedecor F wiretap
fading channels, respectively. Apparently, our analytical result given by (4.13) is successfully
conﬁrmed by Monte-Carlo simulation outcomes. In addition, one can perceive the following
conclusion: (i) higher γ¯E leads to a lower ASC; (ii) the ASC can be improved by assuring
high γ¯B; (iii) the ASC will reach a certain ﬂoor as β increases, as shown in Fig. 4.6; (iv) our
asymptotic C¯s given by (4.20) starts to gradually approach the exact one only when β is larger
than 10 dB for our given simulation conﬁguration.
4.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the physical layer security over the Fisher-Snedecor F
wiretap fading channels. The SOP, PNZ and ASC were derived with closed-form expressions,
which are given in terms of Meijer’s G-function. In addition, the asymptotic analysis of ASC
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was further provided when the ratio between γ¯B and γ¯E is at high SNR regime. The accuracy
of our analytical results were efﬁciently validated by Monte-Carlo simulation results.
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5.1 Abstract
Most of the well-known fading distributions, if not all of them, could be encompassed by
the Fox’s H-function fading. Consequently, we investigate the physical layer security (PLS)
over Fox’s H-function fading wiretap channels, in the presence of non-colluding and collud-
ing eavesdroppers. In particular, for the non-colluding scenario, closed-form expressions are
derived for the secrecy outage probability (SOP), the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
(PNZ), and the average secrecy capacity (ASC). These expressions are given in terms of either
univariate or bivariate Fox’s H-function. In order to show the effectiveness of our deriva-
tions, three metrics are respectively listed over the following frequently used fading channels,
including Rayleigh, Weibull, Nakagami-m, α − μ , Fisher-Snedecor (F-S) F , and extended
generalized-K (EGK). Our tractable results are not only straightforward and general, but also
feasible and applicable, especially the SOP, which is usually limited to the lower bound in the
literature due to the difﬁculty of deriving closed-from analytical expressions. For the colluding
scenario, a super eavesdropper equipped with maximal ratio combining (MRC) or selection-
combining (SC) schemes is characterized. The lower bound of SOP and exact PNZ are there-
after derived with closed-form expressions in terms of the multivariate Fox’s H-function. In
order to validate the accuracy of our analytical results, Monte-Carlo simulations are subse-
quently conducted for the aforementioned fading channels. One can observe that for the former
non-colluding scenario, we have perfect agreement between the exact analytical and simula-
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tion results, and highly accurate approximations between the exact and asymptotic analytical
results. On the contrary, the SOP and PNZ of colluding eavesdropper is greatly degraded with
the increase of the number of eavesdroppers. Also, the so-called super eavesdropper with MRC
is much powerful to wiretap the main channel than the one with SC.
Keywords: Physical layer security, Fox’s H-function wiretap fading channels, Mellin trans-
form, secrecy outage probability, probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, average secrecy
capacity.
5.2 Introduction
Different wireless systems are usually characterized with various statistical models. For ex-
ample, the gamma-gamma distribution was introduced to model the free space optical (FSO)
communication link Lei, H., Dai, Z., Ansari, I. S., Park, K. H., Pan, G. & Alouini, M. S.
(2017b); Lei, H., Luo, H., Park, K. H., Ren, Z., Pan, G. & Alouini, M. S. (2018a), and Fisher-
Snedecor (F-S) F to model the device-to-device communication Badarneh et al. (2018); Yoo
et al. (2017). As such, many endeavors have been drawn to investigate the mathematical char-
acteristics of secure transmission for different communication scenarios.
Dating back to the fundamental works of physical layer security (PLS) from the information
theoretical perspective, Shannon and Wyner are undoubtedly the pioneers in this ﬁeld Shannon
(1949); Wyner (1975). They established the mathematical background of perfect secrecy and
wiretap channel models. Later on, Wyner’s classic wiretap model was investigated over addi-
tive white Gaussian noise channel (AWGN) and Rayleigh fading channels Bloch et al. (2008);
Leung-Yan-Cheong & Hellman (1978). Over the past decades, plenty of research efforts have
been pursued on the investigation of PLS over various fading channels, such as Rayleigh Bloch
et al. (2008), Rician Ai , Y., Kong, L. & Cheffena, M. (2019); Liu (2013a), Nakagami-m,
Weibull Liu (2013b), Lognormal Pan, G., Tang, C., Zhang, X., Li, T., Weng, Y. & Chen, Y.
(2016), generalized-K Kong & Kaddoum (2019); Lei et al. (2016a,1,1); Wu et al. (2018a),
and α −μ (or, equivalently, generalized gamma) Kong et al. (2016b,1,1,1); Lei et al. (2015,1),
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α −η −κ − μ Mathur, A., Ai, Y., Bhatnagar, M. R., Cheffena, M. & Ohtsuki, T. (2018), etc.
Secrecy outage probability (SOP), the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ), and the
average secrecy capacity (ASC) are the three typical and frequently studied secrecy metrics.
As more new communication topologies appear, e.g., device-to-device (D2D) communications,
FSO communications, intervehicle communication, millimeterwave (mmWave) communica-
tions, wireless body area networks (WBAN), and cognitive radios, the existing models become
obsolete. As such, more advanced and better suited fading models were subsequently pro-
posed and analyzed, such as α − μ Yacoub (2007a), κ − μ/η − μ Yacoub, M. D. (2007b),
F-SF Badarneh et al. (2018); Yoo et al. (2017), the extended generalized-K (EGK) Yilmaz,
F. & Alouini, M. S. (2012), cascaded α − μ fading Kong et al. (2018a), among many other
fading channels.
With the emergence of various fading models, a uniﬁed and generic fading model is required to
subsume most, if not all, of these fading distributions. Fox’s H-function distribution, reported
in Alhennawi et al. (2016); Ayadi, M. M. H. E., Ismail, M. H. & Alhennawi, H. R. (2016);
Rahama, Y. A., Ismail, M. H. & Hassan, M. S. (2016), is one possible model to accommodate
various fading models with high ﬂexibility. It was ﬁrst introduced in Bodenschatz (1992)
and Cook Jr (1981) as a pure mathematical ﬁnding, and can be generalized to the Gamma,
exponential, Chi-square, Weibull, Rayleigh, Half-Normal distribution, etc. Other examples,
including generalized-K , α − μ , F-S F , and EGK, were recently explored by Alhennawi et
al. Alhennawi et al. (2016) and Rahama et al. Rahama et al. (2018). These ﬁndings were
achieved by transforming these probability density distributions (PDFs) of received signal-to-
noise ratios (SNRs) in terms of Fox’s H-function.
The feasibility and applicability of Fox’s H-function distribution as a general fading model
for wireless communication is not new. In Yilmaz & Alouini (2012), a variation of Fox’s H-
function fading model was proposed as a general model for most well-known distributions.
Jeong et al. found that Fox’s H-function distribution offers a better fading model of vehicle-
to-vehicle (V2V) communication than other ordinary fading distributions Jeong et al. (2013).
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More recently, Alhennawi et al. in Alhennawi et al. (2016) derived the symbol error rate (SER)
and channel capacity of single- and multiple-branch diversity receivers when communicating
over Fox’s H-function fading channels. As a consequence, the advantages of Fox’s H-function
fading are threefold:
- The genericity of its form for most distribution, e.g., Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, Weibull, α −
μ , etc;
- The simplicity and the generality of it to derive the key performance metrics of wireless
communications systems, e.g., outage probability, SER, and channel capacity Alhennawi
et al. (2016).
- The possibility of using its distribution to study the PLS analysis over α −μ , F-SF fading
channels Kong & Kaddoum (2018); Kong et al. (2018a,1); Lei et al. (2017a).
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, apart from the investigation of PLS over the afore-
mentioned fading channels Ai et al. (2019); Bloch et al. (2008); Kong & Kaddoum (2019);
Kong et al. (2016b,1,1); Lei et al. (2015,1,1,1,1); Liu (2013a,1); Pan et al. (2016); Wu et al.
(2018a), including generalized-K , α −μ , κ −μ Bhargav, N., Cotton, S. L. & Simmons, D. E.
(2016); Iwata, S., Ohtsuki, T. & Kam, P. Y. (2017); Moualeu & Hamouda (2017), F-S F
Kong & Kaddoum (2018), no works has ever been found to analyze the PLS over the general
Fox’s H-function fading channels. To this end, this paper is subject to the investigation of PLS
over Fox’s H-function fading channels, with consideration of the non-colluding and colluding
eavesdropping scenarios.
5.2.1 Our Work and Contributions
The contributions of this paper are multifold, which are listed as follows:
1) Novel exact and closed-form expressions are initially derived for the secrecy metrics, in-
cluding the SOP, PNZ, and ASC. Our formulations, in terms of univariate or bivariate Fox’s
H-function, are given in simple and tractable mathematical expressions.
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2) The difﬁculty of deriving closed-form expressions for the SOP explicitly lies in tractable in-
tegrals. Consequently, many works can be found on the development of lower bound of the
SOP (Pout = Pr(Cs ≥ Rs)). Since the lower bound of SOP is actually the complementary
of the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, i.e., Pnz = Pr(Cs > 0), it is much easier
to obtain the lower bound of the SOP and PNZ, which can be found in Yacoub (2007a).
Strictly speaking, our work ﬁlls this gap of lacking exact closed-form SOP expressions.
3) The obtained general and uniﬁed secrecy metrics’ expressions are found identical with the
existing works when being compared with Monte-Carlo simulation results. Moreover, the
obtained secrecy expressions can be straightforward applied to other transformable but not
listed herein wiretap fading channels.
4) The asymptotic behaviors of these secrecy metrics are also obtained for the sake of provid-
ing simple but highly accurate approximations of secrecy metrics at high average signal-to-
noise (SNR) regime.
5) Considering the colluding eavesdropping scenario with maximal ratio combining (MRC)
and selection combining (SC) schemes, the lower bound of the SOP and exact PNZ are
characterized in terms of multivariate Fox’s H-function.
Resultantly, the obtained analytical results are especially beneﬁcial since the analytical expres-
sions themselves (i) provide a uniﬁed approach to analyze the PLS over a generalized fading
model; (ii) serve as an efﬁcient and convenient tool to validate and compare the special cases
of Fox’s H-function fading channels; and (iii) enable researchers and wireless communication
engineers to quickly evaluate secrecy performance when encountering security risks.
5.2.2 Structure and Notations
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 5.3 illustrates Fox’s H-function fad-
ing and its Mellin transform. In Section 5.4, the system model and problem formulation are
presented. In the presence of non-colluding and colluding scenarios, secrecy analysis are re-
spectively conducted in Sections 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7, together with several examples. Afterwards,
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in Section 5.8, numerical results and discussions are presented. Finally, Section 5.9 concludes
the paper.
Mathematical Functions and Notations: j 
√−1, Γ(.) is the complete Gamma function,
Hm,np,q [.] is the univariate Fox’s H-function (Mathai, A. M., Saxena, R. K. & Haubold, H. J.,
2009b, eq. (1.2)), Hm,n;m1,n1;m2,n2p,q;p1,q1;p2,q2 is the extended generalized bivariate Fox’sH-function (Mathai
et al., 2009b, eq. (2.56)). Hm,n;m1,n1;··· ;mL,nLp,q;p1,q1;··· ;pL,qL is the multivariate Fox’s H-function (Mathai et al.,
2009b, eq. (2.56)). f (x) and F(x) represent the probability density function (PDF) and cu-
mulative distribution function (CDF) of x, respectively. B(x,y) is the Beta function (Grad-
shteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (8.380.1)). M [ f (x),s] denotes the Mellin transform of f (x).
Res[ f (x),s] represents the residue of function f (x) at pole x = p. Ψ0(·) is the digamma func-
tion.
5.3 Preliminary
5.3.1 Fox’s H-Function Fading
Consider a wireless communication link over a fading channel, where the instantaneous SNR
at user k, γk, follows Fox’s H-function PDF, given by Bodenschatz (1992)
fk(γk) = κHm,np,q
⎡
⎣λγk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ai,Ai)i=1:p
(bl,Bl)l=1:q
⎤
⎦ (a)= κ
2π j
∫
L
Θk(s)(λγk)−sds, γ > 0, (5.1)
where λ > 0 and κ are constants such that
∫ ∞
0 fk(γk)dγk = 1. (xi,yi)l is a shorthand for
(x1,y1), · · · ,(xl,yl). Step (a) is developed by expressing Fox’s H-function in terms of its deﬁ-
nition (Mathai et al., 2009b, eq. (1.2)). Ai > 0 for all i= 1, · · · , p, and Bl > 0 for all l = 1, · · · ,q.
0 ≤ m ≤ q, 0 ≤ n ≤ p, L is a suitable contour separating the poles of the gamma functions
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Γ(bl +Bls) from the poles of the gamma functions Γ(1−ai−Ais),
Θk(s) =
m
∏
l=1
Γ(bl +Bls)
n
∏
i=1
Γ(1−ai−Ais)
q
∏
l=m+1
Γ(1−bl −Bls)
p
∏
i=n+1
Γ(ai+Ais)
. (5.2)
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the received SNR at user k, i.e., γk is given by
(Bodenschatz, 1992, eqs. (3.9) and (3.7))
Fk(γk) =
κ
λ
Hm,n+1p+1,q+1
⎡
⎣λγk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(ai+Ai,Ai)p
(bl +Bl,Bl)q,(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (5.3a)
or
Fk(γk) = 1− κλ H
m+1,n
p+1,q+1
⎡
⎣λγk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ai+Ai,Ai)p,(1,1)
(0,1),(bl +Bl,Bl)q
⎤
⎦= 1− F¯k(γk), (5.3b)
where F¯k(γ) is the complementary CDF (CCDF). For the notational convenience, Θ
f
k and Θ
F
k
are used thereafter to denote the PDF and CDF of Fox’s H-function, respectively. The Mellin
transform of fk(γ) is deﬁned and given as (Alhennawi et al., 2016, eq. (5)) (Mathai et al.,
2009b, eq. (2.8)),
M [ fk(γk),s] =
∫ ∞
0
fk(γk)γs−1dγk = κλ−sΘk(s). (5.4)
5.3.2 Special Cases
As mentioned before, Fox’s H-function distribution provides enough ﬂexibility to accommo-
date most fading distributions. As a result, the objective herein is to list some well-known
examples, such as the α − μ1, F-S F , and EGK, as shown in Table. 5.1, where γ¯k is the
average received SNR at user k.
1 Since α −μ distributions can be attributed to exponential, one-sided Gaussian, Rayleigh, Nakagami-
m, Weibull and Gamma fading distributions by assigning speciﬁc values for α and μ , respectively
Yacoub (2007a), secrecy analysis on these fading distributions is thus omitted herein.
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Table 5.1 Exact expressions of fk(γk) for different special cases of Fox’s H-function
distribution
Instantaneous SNR fk(γk)
α −μ
(Yilmaz & Alouini, 2012, Tab. V)
fk(γk) = κH
1,0
0,1
⎡
⎣λγk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(μ − 1α , 1α )
⎤
⎦ ,
where κ = βΓ(μ)γ¯k ,λ =
β
γ¯k
,β = Γ(μ+
1
α )
Γ(μ) .
F-SF
(Yoo et al., 2017, eq. (5))
fk(γk) = κH
1,1
1,1
⎡
⎣λγk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(−mk,s,1)
(mk−1,1)
⎤
⎦ ,
where κ = λΓ(mk)Γ(mk,s) ,λ =
mk
mk,sγ¯k .
EGK
(Rahama et al., 2018, eq. (18))
fk(γk) = κH
2,0
0,2
⎡
⎣λγk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(ml − 1ξl ,
1
ξl
),(msl − 1ξsl ,
1
ξsl
)
⎤
⎦ ,
where κ = βlβslΓ(ml)Γ(msl)γ¯k ,λ =
βlβsl
γ¯k
,βl =
Γ
(
ml+ 1ξl
)
Γ(ml)
,
and βsl =
Γ
(
msl+ 1ξsl
)
Γ(msl)
.
5.4 System Model and Problem Formulation
5.4.1 System Model
The Alice-Bob-Eve classic wiretap model is used here to illustrate a legitimate transmission
link (Alice → Bob) in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper. In such a wiretap channel
model, the transmitter Alice (A) wishes to send secret messages to the intended receiver Bob
(B) in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve (E); the link between A and B is called the main
channel, whereas the one between A and E is named as the wiretap channel. It is assumed that
(i) all users are equipped with a single antenna; (ii) both links are independent and subjected to
Fox’s H-function fading; and (iii) a perfect channel state information (CSI) is available at all
users.
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As a result, the received SNRs at B and E are denoted as γk,k ∈ {B,E}, which follow Fox’s
H-function PDF, and are respectively given by
fB(γB) = κBHm0,n0p0,q0
⎡
⎣λBγB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ai,Ai)i=1:p0
(bl,Bl)l=1:q0
⎤
⎦ , γB > 0, (5.5a)
fE(γE) = κEHm1,n1p1,q1
⎡
⎣λEγE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ci,Ci)i=1:p1
(dl,Dl)l=1:q1
⎤
⎦ , γE > 0. (5.5b)
5.4.2 Problem Formulation
According to Bloch et al. (2008), the secrecy capacity over fading wiretap channels is deﬁned
as the difference between the main channel capacityCM = log2(1+γB) and the wiretap channel
capacity CW = log2(1+ γE) as follows
Cs =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
CM −CW , γB > γE
0, otherwise.
(5.6)
In other words, a positive secrecy capacity can be assured if and only if the received SNR at
Bob has a superior quality than that at Eve’s.
5.4.2.1 Secrecy Outage Probability
The outage probability of the secrecy capacity is deﬁned as the probability that the secrecy
capacity Cs falls below the target secrecy rate Rt , i.e.,
Pout(Rs) = Pr(Cs < Rt). (5.7)
Technically speaking, SOP can be conceptually explained as two cases: (i) Cs < Rt whilst
positive secrecy capacity is surely guaranteed; (ii) secrecy outage deﬁnitely happens when CS
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is non-positive. To this end, (A V-17) can be rewritten as follows Kong et al. (2016a); Lei et al.
(2016b),
Pout(Rs) =Pr(γB ≤ RsγE +Rs−1) =
∫ ∞
0
FB(γ0) fE(γE)dγE , (5.8)
where Rs = 2Rt , γ0 = RsγE +W , and W = Rs−1.
The SOP characterizes the probability of failure to achieve a reliable and secure transmission.
In addition, it shows that PLS can be achieved by fading alone, even when Eve has a better
average SNR than Bob.
5.4.2.2 Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity
The PNZ refers to the event that the positive secrecy capacity can be surely achieved, namely
Pr(Cs > 0), thus respecting its deﬁnition, (5.6) can be further rewritten as follows,
Pnz = Pr(γB > γE) =
∫ ∞
0
fB(γB)FE(γB)dγB. (5.9)
5.4.2.3 Average Secrecy Capacity
average secrecy capacity provides a mathematical indicator of the capacity limit for a given
constraint of perfect secrecy.
By using some simple mathematical manipulations, the ASC can be further re-expressed as the
sum of three terms, which are given by Lei et al. (2016c)
C¯s =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1+ γB) fB(γB)FE(γB)dγB︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
+
∫ ∞
0
log2(1+ γE) fE(γE)FB(γE)dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
−
∫ ∞
0
log2(1+ γE) fE(γE)dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
.
(5.10)
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For the brevity of the following derivations, let gk(γk) = ln(1+ γk) fB(γk).
5.5 Secrecy Metrics Characterization
To begin the characterization of the secrecy performance over Fox’s H-function fading chan-
nels, one useful and uniﬁed theorem is ﬁrst provided. This theorem is essentially beneﬁcial
to the acquisition of the ﬁnal closed-form expressions for the aforementioned three secrecy
metrics.
Theorem 3. Consider a general fading channel where the received SNR’s PDF is f (γ) and
another function u(γ). Suppose their Mellin transforms are M [ f (γ),s] and M [u(γ),s], re-
spectively. If the Mellin transform of u(γ) exists, then by using Parseval’s formula for Mellin
transform (Debnath & Bhatta, 2014, eq. (8.3.23)), we have
∫ ∞
0
f (γ)u(γ)dγ =
1
2π j
∫
L
M [ f (γ),s]M [u(γ),1− s]ds, (5.11)
whereL is the integration path from υ − j∞ to υ + j∞, and υ is a constant.
The aforementioned Theorem is recalled to make a basis for the following derivations. To this
end, we have the following remark.
Remark 5. The SOP, PNZ, and ASC over Fox’s H-function fading wiretap channels are re-
spectively given by
Pout =
1
2π j
∫
L1
M [FB(γ0),1− s]M [ fE(γE),s]ds, (5.12a)
Pnz =
1
2π j
∫
L1
M [FE(γB),1− s]M [ fB(γB),s]ds, (5.12b)
C¯s =
1
2π j
∫
L1
M [gB(γE),1− s]M [FE(γB),s]ds
+
1
2π j
∫
L1
M [gE(γE),1− s]M [FB(γE),s]ds
− 1
2π j
∫
L1
M [ fE(γE),1− s]M [ln(1+ γE),s]ds
(5.12c)
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Proof. Recalling (A V-18), (5.9), and (5.10), and then using Theorem 3, the proofs for (5.12a),
(5.12b), and (5.12c) are directly accomplished.
5.5.1 SOP Characterization
5.5.1.1 Exact SOP Characterization
Theorem 4. The SOP over Fox’s H-function fading wiretap channels is given by (5.13),
Pout = 1− κBκEWλBRs
H0,1:n1+1,m1:n0,m01,0:q1,p1+1:q0,p0+1
⎡
⎣ Rs
λEW
,
1
λBW
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(2,1,1)
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−dl,Dl)l=1:q1
(1,1),(1− ci,Ci)i=1:p1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−bl −Bl,Bl)l=1:q0
(1−ai−Ai,Ai)i=1:p0 ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦ ,
(5.13)
Proof. See Appendix II.1.
5.5.1.2 Lower Bound of SOP
As γ¯B and γ¯E tend to ∞, we have
Pout = Pr
(
log2
(
1+ γB
1+ γE
)
< Rt
)
≈ Pr
(
log2
(
γB
γE
)
< Rt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
PLout
=
∫ ∞
0
FB(Rsy) fE(y)dy.
(5.14)
Proposition 4. As γ¯B and γ¯E tend to ∞, the lower bound of the SOP over Fox’s H-function
fading channels is given by
PLout = 1−
κBκE
λBλE
Hm1+n2+1,n1+m2p1+q2+1,q1+p2+1
⎡
⎣λBRs
λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ai+Ai,Ai)i=1:n1 ,(1−dl −Dl,Dl)l=1:q2 ,(ai+Ai,Ai)i=n1+:p1 ,(1,1)
(0,1),(bl +Bl,Bl)l=1:m1 ,(1− ci−Ci,Ci)i=1:p2 ,(bl +Bl,Bl)l=m1+1:q1
⎤
⎦ .
(5.15)
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Proof. By applying the Mellin transform of the product of two Fox’s H-function (Prudnikov
et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)), the proof is accomplished.
5.5.2 PNZ Characterization
Theorem 5. The PNZ over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading channels is given by (5.16),
Pnz =
κBκE
λBλE
Hm1+n0,n1+m0+1p0+q1+1,q0+p1+1
⎡
⎣λE
λB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(ci+Ci,Ci)i=1:p1 ,(1−bl −Bl,Bl)l=1:q0 ,(ci+Ci,Ci)i=n1+1:p1
(dl +Dl,Dl)l=1:m1 ,(1−ai−Ai,Ai)i=1:p0 ,(0,1),(dl +Dl,Dl)l=m1+1:q1
⎤
⎦ .
(5.16)
Proof. According to (5.12b),M [FE(γB),1− s] andM [ fB(γB),s] are separately given by
M [FE(γB),1− s] = κEλ 2−sE
ΘFE(1− s), (5.17a)
M [ fB(γB),s] =
κB
λ sB
Θ fB(s). (5.17b)
Next, substituting (5.17a) and (5.17b) into (5.12b), yields the following result
Pnz =
κBκE
2λ 2Eπ j
∫
L1
Θ fB(s)Θ
F
E(1− s)
(
λB
λE
)−s
ds, (5.18)
Subsequently, directly applying the deﬁnition of univariate Fox’s H-function, the proof is
achieved.
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Alternatively, we provide another method to prove (5.16). Revisiting (5.9) and directly replac-
ing fB(γB) and FE(γB) with their expressions, we have
Pnz =
κBκE
λE
∫ ∞
0
Hm0,n0p0,q0
⎡
⎣λBγB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ai,Ai)i=1:p0
(bl,Bl)l=1:q0
⎤
⎦
×Hm1,n1+1p1+1,q1+1
⎡
⎣λEγB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(ci+Ci,Ci)i=1:p1
(dl +Dl,Dl)l=1:q1 ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦dγB,
(5.19)
where the last step is derived by using the Mellin transform of the product of two Fox’s H-
function (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)).
5.5.3 ASC Characterization
Theorem 6. The ASC over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading channels is given by
C¯s =
1
ln(2)
(I1+ I2− I3), (5.20)
where I1, I2 and I3 are respectively given by (5.21a), (5.21b) and (5.21c).
I1 =
κBκE
λBλE
×Hn0,m0:1,2:m1,n1+1q0,p0:2,2:p1+1,q1+1
⎡
⎣ 1
λB
,
λE
λB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−bl −Bl;Bl,Bl)l=1:q0
(1−ai−Ai;Ai,Ai)i=1:p0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0,1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(ci+Ci,Ci)i=1:q1
(dl +Dl,Dl)l=1:p1 ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦ ,
(5.21a)
I2 =
κBκE
λBλE
×Hn1,m1:1,2:m0,n0+1q1,p1:2,2:p0+1,q0+1
⎡
⎣ 1
λE
,
λB
λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−dl −Dl;Dl,Dl)l=1:q1
(1− ci−Ci;Ci,Ci)i=1:p1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0,1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(ai+Ai,Ai)i=1:p0
(bl +Bl,Bl)l=1:q0 ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦ .
(5.21b)
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I3 =
κE
λE
Hn1+1,m1+2q1+2,p1+2
⎡
⎣ 1
λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1),(1−dl −Dl,Dl)l=1:p1
(1,1),(1− ci−Ci,Ci)i=1:q1 ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦ . (5.21c)
Proof. See Appendix II.2.
5.5.4 Special Cases
Accommodating the closed-form expressions for secrecy performance metrics in the corre-
sponding entries in Table 5.1, directly yields the results, as displayed in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
After some simple algebraic manipulations, one can observe the obtained results herein are
consistent with the existing works Kong & Kaddoum (2018); Kong et al. (2018c); Lei et al.
(2015,1).
5.6 Asymptotic Secrecy Metrics Characterization
The obtained secrecy expressions are given in terms of either univariate or bivariate Fox’s H-
function. In order to provide more insights at high or low SNR regime, the asymptotic behavior
of the three aforementioned secrecy metrics are developed in this section.
According to Chergui et al. (2016), expansions of the univariate and bivariate Fox’sH-functions
can be derived by evaluating the residue of the corresponding integrands at the closest poles to
the contour, namely, the minimum pole on the right for large Fox’s H-function arguments and
the maximum pole on the left for small ones.
5.6.1 Asymptotic SOP
The lower bound of the SOP is still expressed in terms of Fox’s H-function, in order to study
the asymptotic behavior of the SOP, the lower bound is further simpliﬁed by expanding the
univariate Fox’s H-function.
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Table 5.2 Exact expressions ofPout ,Pnz and C¯s for different special cases of Fox’s
H-function distribution
Pout = 1− κBκEWλBRs
×H0,1:1,1:0,11,0:1,1:1,1
[
Rs
λEW
, 1λBW
∣∣∣∣ (2,1,1)−
∣∣∣∣∣ (1−μE +
1
αE ,
1
αE )
(1,1)
∣∣∣∣∣ (1−μB,
1
αB )
(0,1)
]
Pnz =
κBκE
λBλE
H2,12,2
[
λE
λB
∣∣∣∣∣ (1−μB,
1
αB ),(1,1)
(μE , 1αE ),(0,1)
]
α −μ C¯s = κBκEλBλE H
0,1:1,2:1,1
1,0:2,2:1,2
[
1
λB
, λEλB
∣∣∣∣∣ (1−μB;
1
αB ,
1
αB )
−
∣∣∣∣ (1,1),(1,1)(1,1),(0,1)
∣∣∣∣∣ (1,1)(μE , 1αE ),(0,1)
]
+κBκEλBλE H
0,1:1,2:1,1
1,0:2,2:1,2
[
1
λE
, λBλE
∣∣∣∣∣ (1−μE ;
1
αE ,
1
αE )
−
∣∣∣∣ (1,1),(1,1)(1,1),(0,1)
∣∣∣∣∣ (1,1)(μB, 1αB ),(0,1)
]
−κEλE H
1,3
3,2
[
1
λE
∣∣∣∣∣ (1,1),(1,1),(1−μE ,
1
αE )
(1,1),(0,1)
]
Pout = 1− κBκEWλBRs
×H0,1:2,1:1,11,0:1,2:1,2
[
Rs
λEW
, 1λBW
∣∣∣∣ (2,1,1)−
∣∣∣∣ (2−mE ,1)(1,1),(1+mE,s,1)
∣∣∣∣ (1−mB,1)(mB,s,1),(0,1)
]
Pnz =
κBκE
λBλE
H2,33,3
[
λE
λB
∣∣∣∣ (1,1),(−mB,s,1),(1−mE ,1),(0,1)(mE ,1),(−1,1),(mE,s,1),(0,1)
]
F-S
F
C¯s = κBκEλBλE H
1,1:1,2:1,2
1,1:2,2:2,2
[
1
λB
, λEλB
∣∣∣∣ (mB;1,1)(mB,s;1,1)
∣∣∣∣ (1,1),(1,1)(1,1),(0,1)
∣∣∣∣ (1,1),(1−mE,s,1)(mE ,1),(0,1)
]
+κBκEλBλE H
1,1:1,2:1,2
1,1:2,2:2,2
[
1
λE
, λBλE
∣∣∣∣ (mE ;1,1)(mE,s;1,1)
∣∣∣∣ (1,1),(1,1)(1,1),(0,1)
∣∣∣∣ (1,1),(1−mE,s,1)(mE ,1),(0,1)
]
−κEλE H
2,3
3,3
[
1
λE
∣∣∣∣ (1,1),(1,1),(1−mE ,1)(1,1),(mE,s,1),(0,1)
]
Consequently, at high γ¯B regime, we have 1λB →∞. By using the expanding rule, the asymptotic
SOP is given by (5.22)
PLout ≈1−
κBκE
λBλE
Γ(τ)
m0
∏
l=1,l 	=g
Γ(bl +Bl +Blτ)
n1
∏
i=1
Γ(1− ci−Ci+Ciτ)
Γ(1+ τ)
q0
∏
l=m0+1
Γ(1−bl −Bl −Blτ)
p0
∏
i=n0+1
Γ(ai+Ai+Aiτ)
×
n0
∏
i=1
Γ(1−ai−Ai+Aiτ)
m1
∏
l=1
Γ(dl +Dl −Dlτ)
p2
∏
i=n1+1
Γ(ci+Ci−Ciτ)
q1
∏
l=m1+1
Γ(1−dl −Dl +Dlτ)
(
λE
λBRs
)τ
,
where τ = max
l=1:m0
(
−bl+Bl
Bl
)
,g = argmax
l=1:m0
(
−bl+Bl
Bl
)
.
(5.22)
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Table
5.3
E
xactexpressions
of
P
out ,P
nz and
C¯
s fordifferentspecialcases
ofFox’s
H
-function
distribution
P
out
=
1−
κ
B κ
E
W
λ
B R
s
×
H
0
,1:1,1:0,2
1
,0:2,1:2,1 [
R
s
λ
E
W
,
1
W
λ
B ∣∣∣∣∣
(2,1,1)
−
∣∣∣∣∣
(1−
m
E
+
1ξE
,
1ξE
),(1−
m
sE
+
1ξsE
,
1ξsE
)
(1,1)
∣∣∣∣∣
(1−
m
B ,
1ξB ),(1−
m
sB ,
1ξsB )
(0,1)
]
P
nz
=
κ
B κ
E
λ
B λ
E H
2
,3
3
,3 [
λ
E
λ
B ∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1−
m
B ,
1ξB ),(1−
m
sB ,
1ξsB )
(m
E
,
1ξE
),(m
sE
,
1ξsE
),(0,1)
]
E
G
K
C¯
s
=
κ
B κ
E
λ
B λ
E H
0
,2:1,2:3,0
2
,0:2,2:1,3 [
1λB , λ
E
λ
B ∣∣∣∣∣
(1−
m
B ;
1ξB ,
1ξB ),(1−
m
sB ,
1ξsB ,
1ξsB )
−
∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1
,1)
(1,1),(0,1) ∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(m
E
,
1ξE
),(m
sE
,
1ξsE
),(0,1) ]
+
κ
B κ
E
λ
B λ
E H
0
,2:1,2:3,0
2
,0:2,2:1,3 [
1λE
,
λ
B
λ
E ∣∣∣∣∣
(1−
m
E ;
1ξE
,
1ξE
),(1−
m
sE ;
1ξsE
,
1ξsE
)
−
∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0
,1) ∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(m
B ,
1ξB ),(m
sB ,
1ξsB ),(0,1) ]
−
κ
E
λ
E H
4
,1
2
,4 [
1λE ∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(m
E −
1ξE
,
1ξE
),(m
sE −
1ξsE
,
1ξsE
),(0,1) ]
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Taking the case of α −μ distribution as an example, the lower bound of the SOP is given by
PLout = 1−
κBκE
λBλE
H2,12,2
⎡
⎣λBRs
λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
1−μE , 1αE
)
,(1,1)
(0,1),
(
μB, 1αB
)
⎤
⎦ . (5.23)
For the sake of high accuracy, the asymptotic SOP at high γ¯B regime is evaluated at τ = 0 and
τ =−αBμB, and is given by Kong et al. (2018c)
Pout ≈
Γ
(
αBμB
αE +μE
)
Γ(1+μB)Γ(μE)
(
RsλB
λE
)αBμB
. (5.24)
5.6.2 Asymptotic PNZ
The asymptotic PNZ at high or low γ¯B regime, is computed by evaluating the residues of
analytical PNZ, given in (5.16). According to Rahama et al. (2018), Fox’s H-function can be
further simpliﬁed by choosing the dominate term of the Mellin-Barnes type integral. As such,
we can evaluate the residue of the PNZ at low γ¯B regime, at the point
τ = min
l=1:m1,i=1:n0
(
−dl +Dl
Dl
,
ai+Ai−1
Ai
)
,g= argmin
l=1:m1,i=1:n0
(
−dl +Dl
Dl
,
ai+Ai−1
Ai
)
. (5.25a)
Assuming the case of a simple pole, the asymptotic PNZ is thereafter given in (5.26).
Pnz ≈
Γ(−τ)
m1
∏
l=1,l 	=g
Γ(dl +Dl +Dlτ)
n0
∏
i=1,i	=g
Γ(1−ai−Ai+Aiτ)
Γ(1− τ)
p0
∏
i=n0+1
Γ(ai+Ai−Aiτ)
q1
∏
l=m1+1
Γ(1−dl −Dl −Dlτ)
n1
∏
i=1
Γ(1− ci−Ci−Ciτ)
m0
∏
l=1
Γ(bl +Bl −Blτ)
p1
∏
i=n1+1
Γ(ci+Ci+Ciτ)
q0
∏
l=m0+1
Γ(1−bl −Bl +Blτ)
(
λB
λE
)s κBκE
λBλE
.
(5.26)
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Considering the case of α−μ as an example, applying the obtained result, the asymptotic PNZ
at low γ¯B regime is evaluated at s=−αEμE and thereafter given by
Pnz ≈ κBκEλBλEμE Γ
(
αEμE
αB
+μB
)(
λE
λB
)αEμE
. (5.27)
5.6.3 Asymptotic ASC
By applying the expansion rule, in the case of high γ¯B, the asymptotic ASC is given by (5.28),
which is obtained by individually expanding I1 and I2, respectively.
I1 ≈κBκEλBλE
[
ln
(
1
λB
)
+
m0
∑
l=1
BlΨ0(bl +Bl +Blu)−
q0
∑
l=ml+1
BlΨ0(bl +Bl +Blu)
−
p0
∑
i=1
AiΨ0(ai+Ai+Aiu)
] Γ(u) m0∏
l=1,l 	=g
Γ(bl +Bl +Blu)
n1
∏
i=1,i	=g
Γ(1− ci−Ci+Ciu)
Γ(1+u)
q0
∏
l=m1+1
Γ(1−bl −Bl −Blu)
p0
∏
i=n1+1
Γ(ai+Ai+Aiu)
,
×
m1
∏
l=1
Γ(dl +Dl −Dlu)
p1
∏
i=n2+1
Γ(ci+Ci−Ciu)
q1
∏
l=m2+1
Γ(1−dl −Dl −Dlu)
(
λE
λB
)s
where u= max
l=1:m0,i=1:n1
[
0,
(
−bl +Bl
Bl
)
l=1:m0
,
(
ci+Ci−1
ci
)
i=1:n1
]
,
g= argmax
l=1:m0,i=1:n1
[
0,
(
−bl +Bl
Bl
)
l=1:m0
,
(
ci+Ci−1
ci
)
i=1:n1
]
,
(5.28a)
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I2 ≈
m0
∏
l=1,l 	=g
Γ(bl +Bl −Blu)
(
λE
λB
)u κBκE
λBλE
Γ(u)
n0
∏
i=1
Γ(1−ai−Ai+Aiu)
Γ(1+u)
n0+1
∏
i=1
Γ(ai+Ai−Aiu)
m0+1
∏
l=1
Γ(1−bl −Bl +Blu)
×Hn1+1,m1+2q1+2,p1+2
⎡
⎣λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1),(1−dl −Dl,Dl)l=1:p1 ,(1,1)
(0,1),(0,1),(dl +Dl +Dls),(1− ci−Ci,Ci)i=1:q1
⎤
⎦ ,
where u= 1+min
(
bl
Bl
)
l=1:m0
,g= argmin
l=1:m0
(
bl
Bl
)
.
(5.28b)
The detailed proof for (5.28) is referenced to Appendix. II.3.
Similarly, taking the case of α−μ as an example, we get the asymptotic ASC at high γ¯B regime
as
I1 ≈ κBκEλBλE Γ(μB)Γ(μE)
[
Ψ0(μB)
αB
− ln(λB)
]
, (5.29a)
I2 ≈
κBκE
(
λB
λE
)αBμB
μBλBλE
H3,12,3
⎡
⎣λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0,1),(1,1)
(μE + αBμBαE ,
1
αE ),(0,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦ . (5.29b)
5.7 Colluding Eavesdropping Scenario
In this section, we mainly focus on the secrecy issue when multiple eavesdroppers appear and
work in a cooperative manner.
5.7.1 System Model
Consider the scenario that L eavesdroppers are in the presence and work cooperatively to wire-
tap the main link. It is assumed that all L eavesdroppers are single-antenna equipped, and
undergoes independent fading conditions. As a result of collusion Cho, S., Chen, G. & Coon,
J. P. (2018), the so-called eavesdropper is assumed to either use the MRC or the SC scheme.
All the wiretap links and main link undergo independent Fox’s H-function fading channels.
Consequently, the instantaneous received SNR at the so-called L-colluding eavesdropper with
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MRC scheme is given by
γC =
L
∑
r=1
γe,r, (5.30)
or with SC scheme
γC = max{γe,1, · · · ,γe,l, · · · ,γe,L}, (5.31)
where γe,r is the instantaneous received SNR of each eavesdropper. Clearly, (5.30) corresponds
to a maximum ratio combining (MRC) decoding which is the best strategy that the super eaves-
dropper can use. As we can see from (5.30), γC is the sum of L independent Fox’s H-function
distributed RVs, the PDF and CDF of γC are thus respectively given by (Rahama et al., 2018,
eqs. (8) and (9))
fC(γ)=
ηC
γ
H
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎝0,0
0,1
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝mr,nr+1
pr+1,qr
⎞
⎠
r=1:L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(1;(1)r=1:L)⎡
⎣(1,1),(ci+Ci,Ci)i=1:qr
(dl +Dl,Dl)l=1:pr
⎤
⎦
r=1:L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(λrγ)r=1:L
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ , γ > 0,
(5.32a)
FC(γ) = ηCH
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎝0,0
0,1
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝mr,nr+1
pr+1,qr
⎞
⎠
r=1:L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(0;(1)r=1:L)⎡
⎣(1,1),(ci+Ci,Ci)i=1:qr
(dl +Dl,Dl)l=1:pr
⎤
⎦
r=1:L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(λrγ)r=1:L
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
(5.32b)
where ηC =
M
∏
e=1
κE,e
λE,e
.
Similarly, the PDF and CDF of instantaneous SNR deployed with SC scheme is given by Kong,
N. & Milstein, L. B. (1999)
fC(γ) =
L
∑
τ=1
fe,τ(γ)
L
∏
l=1,l 	=τ
Fe,l(γ), (5.33a)
FC(γ) =
L
∏
l=1
Fe,l(γ), (5.33b)
82
where fe,τ(γ) and Fe,l(γ) are the corresponding PDF and CDF of the instantaneous received
SNR of each eavesdropper, which are given in terms of univariate Fox’s H-function.
It is worthy to mention that the multivariate Fox’s H-function PDF and CDF of the equivalent
super-eavesdropper makes it difﬁcult to seek the exact SOP and ASC for the colluding scenario.
Resultantly, we intend to provide the lower bound of the SOP and exact PNZ for this case.
5.7.2 Secrecy Characterization of SOP
Theorem 7. The SOP over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading channels in the presence of L-
colluding eavesdroppers with MRC scheme is lower bounded by (5.34),
PLout,MRC =
ηCκB
λB
H
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎝ n0+1,m0
q0+1, p0+2
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝mr,nr+1
pr+1,qr
⎞
⎠
r=1:L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−bi−Bi,(Bi)r=1:L),(1,(1)r=1:L)
(0,(1)r=1:L),(1−ai−Ai,(Ai)r=1:L),(1,(1)r=1:L)⎡
⎣(1,1),(ci+Ci,Ci)i=1:q2
(dl +Dl,Dl)l=1:p2
⎤
⎦
r=1:L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
λe,r
λBRs
)
r=1:L
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
(5.34)
Proof. Plugging (5.5b) and (5.32a) into
Pout,MRC =
∫ ∞
0
FB(γ0) fC(γC)dγC,
then re-expressing the univariate Fox’s H-function and multivariate Fox’s H-function in terms
of their deﬁnition, and performing the interchange of the Mellin-Barnes integrals and the def-
inite integral, with the help of (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eqs.(3.194.3) and (8.384.1)), we
arrive at the ﬁnal expression ofPout,MRC in (5.34).
Theorem 8. The SOP over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading channels in the presence of L-
colluding eavesdroppers with SC scheme is lower bounded by (5.35),
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PLout,SC =
L
∑
l=1
ηCκB
λB
H
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎝nl,ml
ql, pl
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝ m0,n0+1
p0+1,q0+1
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝mr,nr+1
pr+1,qr
⎞
⎠
r=1:l−1⎛
⎝ mr+1,nr+1+1
pr+1+1,qr+1+1
⎞
⎠
r=l+1:L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−di+Di,(Di)r=1:L)
(1− ci+Ci,(Ci)r=1:L)
(1,1),(ai+Ai,Ai)i=1:p0
(bl +Bl,Bl)l=1:q0⎡
⎣ (1,1),(ci+Ci,Ci)i=1:pr
(dl +Dl,Dl)l=1:qr ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦
r=1:l−1⎡
⎣ (1,1),(ci+Ci,Ci)i=1:pr
(dl +Dl,Dl)l=1:qr ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦
r=l+1,L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
λB
λe,l(
λe,r
λe,l
)
r=1:l−1(
λe,r
λe,l
)
r=l+1:L
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
(5.35)
Proof. Accordingly, by doing some simple substitutions,PLout,SC can be rewritten as
PLout,SC =
L
∑
τ=1
∫ ∞
0
FB(Rsγ) fe,τ(γ)
L
∏
l=1,l 	=τ
Fe,l(γ)dγ, (5.36)
then using the Mellin transform of multiple univariate Fox’s H-function, the proof is achieved.
5.7.3 Secrecy Characterization of PNZ
Theorem 9. The PNZ over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading channels in the presence of L-
colluding eavesdroppers with MRC scheme is given by (5.37),
Pnz,MRC =
ηCκB
λB
H
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎝ n0,m0
q0, p0+1
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝mr,nr+1
pr+1,qr
⎞
⎠
r=1:L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−bi−Bi;(Bi)r=1:L)i=1:q0
(1−ai−Ai;(Ai)r=1:L)i=1:p0 ,(0;(1)r=1:L)⎡
⎣(1,1),(ci+Ci,Ci)i=1:qr
(dl +Dl,Dl)l=1:pr
⎤
⎦
r=1:L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
λe,r
λB
)
r=1:L
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
(5.37)
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Proof. Substituting (5.5a) and (5.32b) into (5.9), then re-expressing the multivariate Fox’s H-
function in terms of its deﬁnition and interchanging the order of two integrals, we obtain (5.37).
Theorem 10. The PNZ over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading channels in the presence of L-
colluding eavesdroppers with SC scheme is given by (5.38),
Pnz,SC =
ηCκB
λB
H
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎝n0,m0
q0, p0
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝ mr,nr+1
pr+1,qr+1
⎞
⎠
r=1:L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−bi−Bi;(Bi)r=1:L)i=1:q0
(1−ai−Ai;(Ai)r=1:L)i=1:p0⎡
⎣ (1,1),(ci+Ci,Ci)i=1:qr
(dl +Dl,Dl)l=1:pr ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦
r=1:L
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
λe,r
λB
)
r=1:L
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
(5.38)
Proof. Substituting (5.5a) and (5.33b) into
PNZ,SC =
∫ ∞
0
fB(γB)FC,SC(γB)dγB =
∫ ∞
0
fB(γB)
L
∏
l=1
Fe,l(γB)dγB, (5.39)
then following the same methodology used in Theorem 8, the proof is obtained.
5.8 Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, Monte-Carlo simulations are used to validate the analytical derivations obtained
in Sections 5.5 and 5.7, particularly, over one special case of Fox’s H-function wiretap fading
channel, i.e., α − μ wiretap fading channels2. It is noted that bullets represent the simulation
results whereas solid lines are used to show the analytical expressions.
2 It is worthy to mention that (i) the α-μ fading channel is implemented by using the WAFO tool-
boxBrodtkorb et al. (2000); (ii) the numerical evaluation of univariate and bivariate Fox’s H-function
for MATLAB implementations are based on the method proposed in (Peppas et al., 2012, Table. II)
and (Peppas, 2012, Appendix. A), respectively.
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5.8.1 Non-colluding Scenario
In order to validate the analytical accuracy of our derivations, Monte-Carlo simulation out-
comes together with analytical results are presented in Figs. 5.1-5.3, with regard to the afore-
mentioned three secrecy performance metrics over α − μ fading channels. Apparently, these
ﬁgures show that our mathematical representations are in perfect agreements with the simula-
tion results.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Figure 5.1 Pout versus the average γ¯B over Rayleigh,
Nakagami-m, Weibull and α −μ fading channels when
γ¯E = 0 dB and Rt = 0.5, respectively.
In Fig. 5.1, the SOP against γ¯B is plotted for several fading scenarios, such as Rayleigh,
Weibull, Nakagami-m, and α −μ . As observed from the ﬁgure, speciﬁcally, the Nakagami-m
(α = 2, μ =m) against Rayleigh (α = 2, μ = 1), and Rayleigh against Weibull (α is the fading
parameter, μ = 1), one can conclude that larger α and μ values result in lower SOP. This is
mainly because lower α and μ values represent serious non-linearity and sparse clustering,
i.e., worse channel conditions Lei et al. (2017a). This phenomenon also remains true for the
PNZ, as shown in Fig. 5.2. In addition, the lower bound of SOP and the asymptotic SOP are
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also plotted. It is observed that the lower bound of the SOP, i.e., PLout offers a better SOP
performance trend prediction, on the other hand, the asymptotic SOP gradually approximates
the exact SOP with higher accuracy as γ¯B increases.
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Figure 5.2 Pnz versus the average γ¯B for selected
fading parameters when γ¯E = 4 dB.
As depicted in Fig. 5.2, both the exact and asymptotic behavior of Pnz are plotted against
γ¯B for Rayleigh, Weibull, Nakagami-m, and α − μ . Compared with the exact result, one can
conclude that our asymptotic PNZ behaves well at low γ¯B regime.
The ASC against the ratio of γ¯B and γ¯E is presented in Fig. 5.3, and as expected, there is a per-
fect match between our analytical and simulated results. Also, one can obtain two insights from
this graph: on one hand, lower α values lead to higher ASC, no matter whoever experiences
severe fading.
The insight obtained from this ﬁgure just vividly demonstrates how information-theoretic se-
curity exploits the fading property of wireless transmission medium to ensure secure transmis-
sion.
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Figure 5.3 C¯s versus
γ¯B
γ¯E over α −μ wiretap fading channels.
On the other hand, a potential malicious eavesdropper can also beneﬁt from poor channel
conditions, since worse fading channels reversely enable them to better access and wiretap the
main channel to a certain extent. Finally, to obtain a fair comparison, the asymptotic ASC is
also depicted in Fig. 5.3. Again, it can be seen that the asymptotic ASC presents a highly
accurate approximation to the exact ASC, especially at high γ¯B regime.
5.8.2 Colluding Scenario
In this subsection, both the lower bound of SOP and PNZ are presented over α − μ , F-S F ,
and EGK fading channels, respectively. For the simplicity of notations, it is assummed that all
eavesdroppers undergo similar fading condition, i.e., similar fading parameters. It is noted that
the implementation of multivariate Fox’s H-function is available in Python (Alhennawi et al.,
2016, Appendix A) and MATLAB Chergui, H., Benjillali, M. & Alouini, M.-S. (2018).
Figs. 5.4 demonstrates the analytical PLMRC,out and P
L
SC,out together with simulated SOP over
α − μ fading channels. One can perceive that our derived lower bound of SOP can closely
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Figure 5.4 The lower bound of SOP, i.e.,PLout over α −μ
fading channels when αB = 2,αE = 4,μB = μE = 3
Rt
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Figure 5.5 The lower bound of SOP, i.e.,PLout over EGK
fading channels when
mB = mE = 2,msB = msE = 4,ξB = ξsB = ξE = ξsE = 1.
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Figure 5.6 The lower bound of SOP, i.e.,PLout over F-SF
fading channels whenF , mB = mE = 2,mB,s = mE,s = 3.
approximate the exact SOP. As the number of cooperative eavesdroppers increases, the gap
between the lower bound of SOP and exact SOP gradually becomes smaller.
On the other hand, the increase of the number of L contributes largely to the PLout,MRC when
MRC scheme is employed, compared to thePout,SC case.
Apart from Fig. 5.4, we also compared the simulated and analytical SOPs for the following
two scenarios: (i) changing γE while ﬁxing Rt , as shown in Fig.5.5; and (ii) changing Rt while
keeping γE constant, as depicted in Fig. 5.6. Apparently, one can obtain the following two
observations. On one hand, Fig. 5.5 shows that the lower bound of the SOP is becoming
increasingly tight with the decrease of lower Rt . Different from 5.5, Fig.5.6 portrays that
higher γ¯E makes the lower bound of SOP sufﬁciently approximates the exact SOP. Those two
observations can be mathematically explained from the deﬁnition of the lower bound of SOP,
i.e., P(γB < (RsγC +W )) ≈P(γB < (RsγC)). This condition can be met when Rt goes to 0
(W = 2Rt −1), or γC 
W .
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Figure 5.7 Pnz,MRC,Pnz,SC versus γ¯B over α −μ wiretap
fading channels when αB = 2,αE = 4,μB = μE = 3.
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Figure 5.8 Pnz,MRC,Pnz,SC versus γ¯B over F-SF wiretap
fading channels when mB = mE = 2,ms,B = ms,E = 3.
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Figure 5.9 Pnz,MRC,Pnz,SC versus γ¯B over EGK wiretap
fading channels when mB = mE = 2,msB = msE = 4,
ξB = ξsB = ξE = ξsE = 1.
Likewise, in Figs. 5.7-5.9, the PNZ given in (5.37) and (5.38) are plotted and compared with
Monte-Carlo simulation. The validity of our presented PNZ expressions are examined over the
α −μ , F-SF , and EGK fading channels, respectively.
Each ﬁgure witnesses perfect agreements between the exact analysis and simulated results.
Besides, it is clear that the inﬂuences of L on Pnz,MRC is larger than that on Pnz,SC. This is
obviously due to the MRC and SC schemes.
5.9 Conclusion
Since Fox’s H-function fading channel can subsume most of the fading models, this paper
comprehensively investigated the PLS over Fox’s H-function wiretap fading channels, with
consideration of the non-colluding and colluding eavesdropping scenarios. For the former non-
colluding case, secrecy metrics, including the SOP, PNZ, and ASC, are derived with closed-
form expressions in a general and uniﬁed manner. Those expressions are given in terms of
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the univariate or bivariate Fox’s H-function. In addition, those closed-form expressions were
further simpliﬁed to acquire the asymptotic behavior of the secrecy metrics. The asymptotic
ones were much simpler and highly accurate for practical usage. In the presence of colluding
eavesdroppers, a super eavesdropper employing by MRC or SC schemes were formulated, and
subsequently the lower bound of SOP and the exact PNZ were provided in terms of multivariate
Fox’s H-function. Both scenarios are further demonstrated by Monte-Carlo simulations.
In addition, for the sake of providing more insights on some well-known fading models, several
special cases of Fox’s H-function distribution were particularly explored, including α −μ , F-
S F , and EGK. Those examples were further elaborated with the general form, and their
accuracy was also compared with Monte-Carlo simulation results. As observed and discussed,
the advantages of those general mathematical representations are listed as follows: (i) they are
consistent with the existing works; (ii) they provide a uniﬁed generic approach to other fading
models which can be expanded in terms of Fox’s H-function fading distribution; and (iii) they
provide a promising secrecy performance analysis framework when colluding eavesdroppers
are undergoing different independent fading conditions.
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6.1 Abstract
Considering the fact that the mixture gamma (MG) distribution is a general model that can
be used to elaborate most well-known distributions, including small-scale, large-scale, and
composite fadings, this letter studies the security issue when the received signal-to-noise ratios
(SNRs) follow MG distributions. Closed-form expressions for secrecy metrics including the
secrecy outage probability (SOP), the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ), and
the average secrecy capacity (ASC), are derived. Monte-Carlo simulations are presented to
corroborate the accuracy of our derived results. Our derived secrecy metrics provide a general
and uniﬁed analysis framework for the quick evaluation of the secrecy issue over wireless
channels, even when the main channel and wiretap channel are subject to different wireless
channels.
Keywords: Physical layer security (PLS), Mixture Gamma (MG) distribution, Meijer’s G-
function
6.2 Introduction
Physical layer security (PLS) is viewed as a promising fundamental security mechnism since
it is theoretically supported by two fundamental works, i.e., Shannon’s information theoretic
formulation and Wyner’s wiretap model. Numerous works have demonstrated that the random-
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ness of the wireless medium is essentially beneﬁcial and can be reversely used to boost secrecy
concerns Bloch et al. (2008).
Therefore, physical layer security has drawn signiﬁcant research interests. In particularly, se-
crecy metrics have been essentially analyzed over four kinds of fading channels: (i) small-scale
fading, e.g., Nakagami Liu, W., Vuppala, S., Abreu, G. & Ratnarajah, T. (2014), Nakagami-n
(Rician) Liu (2013a), Nakagami-q (Hoyt) Romero-Jerez, J. M. & Lopez-Martinez, F. J. (2017),
α − μKong et al. (2016b,1); Lei et al. (2017a), κ − μ Iwata et al. (2017), α − η − κ − μ
Mathur et al. (2018) (ii) large-scale fading, e.g., lognormal Pan et al. (2016), (iii) cascaded
fading, e.g., cascaded α − μ Kong et al. (2018a); (iv) composite fading, e.g., generalized-K
(KG) Lei et al. (2016c), Fisher-Snedecor F Kong & Kaddoum (2018). More recently, the
mixture gamma (MG) distribution was proposed by Atapattu et al. in Atapattu, S., Tellambura,
C. & Jiang, H. (2011) to model the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of wireless channels. This dis-
tribution can highly accurately characterize the SNRs of composite fading channels Al-Hmood,
H. & Al-Raweshidy, H. S. (2017); Atapattu et al. (2011), e.g., κ − μ/gamma, η − μ/gamma,
α − μ/gamma, and KG, in addition to it being a versatile approximation for any fading SNR
Al-Hmood & Al-Raweshidy (2017), e.g., Rayleigh, Nakagami-q (Hoyt), Nakagami-n (Rician),
α − μ , η − μ , κ − μ . Comprehensively speaking, the MG distribution provides a general ap-
proach to model the received SNRs of most fading channels.
Besides the work laid by Lei et al. in Lei et al. (2016c), they analyzed the secrecy performance
over KG fading channels by modeling the instantaneous received SNRs at the legitimate and
illegitimate users as MG distributed random variables (RVs), where the cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) are characterized with the lower incomplete gamma function ϒ(m,x). To the
best of the authors’ knowledge, no work investigating the physical layer security by modeling
the instantaneous received SNRs of wireless channels as MG distributed RVs has been reported.
Although the contribution in Lei et al. (2016c) is seemingly fascinating, its constraint by limit-
ing m as an integer indeed makes it lack generality. Therefore, in this letter we investigate three
secrecy metrics, including the secrecy outage probability (SOP), the probability of non-zero se-
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crecy capacity (PNZ), and average secrecy capacity (ASC), over generalized fading conditions
by modeling the received SNRs with the MG distribution.
6.3 System model
Consider the Alice-Bob-Eve classic wiretap model, it is assumed that the instantaneous re-
ceived SNRs γi, i ∈ {B,E} at Bob and Eve are MG distributed RVs, with probability density
functions (PDFs) and CDFs respectively given by Atapattu et al. (2011):
fi(γ) =
Li
∑
l=1
αi,lγβi,l−1 exp(−ζi,lγ)
(a)
=
Li
∑
l=1
αi,lγβi,l−1H
1,0
0,1
⎡
⎣ζi,lγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , γ ≥ 0, (6.1a)
Fi(γ) =
Li
∑
l=1
αi,lζ
−βi,l
i,l ϒ(βi,l,ζi,lγ)
(b)
=
Li
∑
l=1
αi,lζ
−βi,l
i,l H
1,1
1,2
⎡
⎣ζi,lγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(βi,l,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (6.1b)
here Li is the number of terms, and αi,l,βi,l,ζi,l are the parameters of the ith gamma component.
Hm,np,q [.] is the univariate Fox’s H-function. Steps (a) and (b) are developed by re-expressing
exp(·) and ϒ(·, ·) in terms of the unviariate Fox’s H-function (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eqs.
(8.4.3.1) and (8.4.16.1)), for the sake of assisting the following secrecy metrics derivations.
Assuming the availability of perfect channel state information (CSI) at all terminals and unit
distance between both Alice and Bob, and Alice and Eve. According to Bloch et al. (2008),
the instantaneous secrecy capacity for one realization of (γB,γE) pair over quasi-static wiretap
fading channels is given by
Cs(γB,γE) =
[
log2
(
1+ γB
1+ γE
)]+
, (6.2)
where [x]+

= max(x,0).
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6.4 Secrecy Characterization
6.4.1 SOP Characterization
The SOP is commonly seen as a crucial secrecy indicator, and widely used when analyzing
PLS over fading channels.
Theorem 11. The SOP is either given by (6.3a) in terms of the bivariate Meijer’s G-function
(Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (9.301)), i.e, Gm,np,q [.]1,
Pout,1 =
LE
∑
k=1
LB
∑
l=1
αB,lαE,k
W ζ 1−βE,kE,k
Rsζ
βB,l
B,l
×G0,1:1,1:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
⎡
⎣ 1
ζB,lW
,
Rs
ζE,kW
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(2,1,1)
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−βB,l,1)
(0,1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2−βE,k
1
⎤
⎦ ,
(6.3a)
or given by (6.3b) in terms of the univariate Meijer’s G-function Ansari et al. (2011), i.e.,
G0,n:m1.n1:m2,n2p,q:p1,q1:p2,q2 [.],
Pout,2 =
LE
∑
k=1
LB
∑
l=1
αB,lαE,k
ζ βB,lB,l ζ
βE,k
E,k
∞
∑
n=1
(−ζB,lW )n
n!
G2,23,3
⎡
⎣ ζE,k
ζB,lRs
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1+n−βB,l,1+n)
(βE,k,n,1+n)
⎤
⎦ . (6.3b)
Proof. For a given target secrecy rate Rt , the SOP is mathematically deﬁned asPout =Pr (Cs ≤ Rt)
(Bloch et al., 2008, eq. (9))Kong et al. (2018c), and further developed as follows
Pout =
∫ ∞
0
FB (γ0) fE(γ)dγ =
LE
∑
k=1
LB
∑
l=1
∫ ∞
0
exp(−ζE,kγ)ϒ(βB,l,ζB,lγ0)(
αB,lαE,kζ
βB,l
B,l
)−1
γ1−βE,k
dγ, (6.4)
where γ0 = Rsγ +W ,Rs = 2Rt ,W = 2Rt − 1. Subsequently, plugging (6.1a) and (6.1b) into
(6.4), and using (Kong et al., 2018c, eqs. (6-9)), the proof ofPout,1 is easily obtained.
1 It is noted that the bivariate Meijer’s G-function is computable and programmable in the open litera-
ture Ansari, I. S., Al-Ahmadi, S., Yilmaz, F., Alouini, M. & Yanikomeroglu, H. (2011); Chergui et al.
(2016); Lei et al. (2017a); Peppas et al. (2012), whereas the univariate Meijer’s G-function is already
available in mathematical software packages, like Mathematica, Maple, MATLAB.
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The proof for Pout,2 is obtained by applying the Mellin transform of the product of two Mei-
jer’s G-functions2 (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.24.1.3)).
In addition, the lower bound of the SOP PLout is usually considered when two events happen,
i.e., (i) when Rt → 0, which means that Alice adopts no transmission rate, i.e., Rt ; (ii) when both
γB and γE operate at high SNR regimes, physically speaking, it is interpreted as the scenario
that both Bob and Eve are super close to Alice. As such,PLout is developed as
PLout =
∫ ∞
0
FB(Rsγ) fE(γ)dγ, (6.5)
Next, substituting (6.1a) and (6.1b) into (6.5), and using (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (6.455.2)),
the lower bound of the SOP is eventually derived as
PLout =
LE
∑
k=1
LB
∑
l=1
αB,lαE,kR
βB,l
s Γ(βB,l +βE,k)
βB,lζ
βB,l+βE,k
E,k
2F1
(
βB,l,βE,k+βB,l;βB,l +1;−
ζB,lRs
ζE,k
)
. (6.6)
where 2F1(·, ·; ·; ·) Gauss Hypergeometric function (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (9.14)).
6.4.2 PNZ Characterization
The PNZ is regarded as another important secrecy metric to measure the existence of the posi-
tive secrecy capacity with a probabilityPnz.
Theorem 12. The PNZ is given by (6.7)
Pnz =
LE
∑
k=1
LB
∑
l=1
αB,lαE,kΓ(βE,k+βB,l)
βE,kζ
βB,l+βE,k
B,l
2F1
(
βE,k,βE,k+βB,l;βE,k+1;−
ζE,k
ζB,l
)
. (6.7)
Proof. Revisiting the deﬁnition of Pnz, i.e., Pnz =
∫ ∞
0 FE(γ) fB(γ)dγ , the proof is accom-
plished by using (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (6.455.2)).
2 It is noted that Meijer’s G-function is a special case of Fox’s H-function (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq.
(8.3.2.21)), i.e., Hm,np,q
[
x
∣∣∣∣ (ai,αi)i=1:p(ck,δk)k=1:q
]
= Gm,np,q
[
x
∣∣∣∣ aick
]
, when αi = δk = 1.
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6.4.3 ASC Characterization
The ASC is a secrecy metric that evaluates how much achievable secrecy rate can be guaranteed
for the whole system.
Theorem 13. The ASC is given by (6.8)
C¯s =
LE
∑
k=1
LB
∑
l=1
αB,lαE,k
ln(2)ζ βB,lB,l ζ
βE,k
E,k
G0,1:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,2
⎡
⎣ 1
ζB,l
,
ζE,k
ζB,l
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−βB,l)
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(1,0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1)
(βE,k,0)
⎤
⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
+
LE
∑
k=1
LB
∑
l=1
αB,lαE,k
ln(2)ζ βB,lB,l ζ
βE,k
E,k
G0,1:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,2
⎡
⎣ 1
ζE,k
,
ζB,l
ζE,k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−βE,k)
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(1,0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1)
(βB,l,0)
⎤
⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
−
LE
∑
k=1
αE,k
ln(2)ζ βE,kE,k
G1,33,2
⎡
⎣ 1
ζE,k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1,1−βE,k)
(1,0)
⎤
⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
.
(6.8)
Proof. By averaging (6.2) over γB and γE , the ASC is mathematically expressed as (Lei et al.,
2016c, eq.(6)), C¯s =I1+I2−I3, whereI1 =
∫ ∞
0 log2(1+γB) fB(γB)FE(γB)dγB,I2 =
∫ ∞
0 log2(1+
γE) fE(γE)FB(γE)dγE , I3 =
∫ ∞
0 log2(1+ γE) fE(γE)dγE .
Next, re-expressing log(1+x)= 1ln(2)H
1,2
2,2
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦ (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (8.4.6.5)),
and then directly using the Mellin transform of the product of three Fox’s H-functions (Mittal,
P. & Gupta, K., 1972, eq. (2.3)), the proofs of I1 and I2 are obtained Kong & Kaddoum
(2018), whereas the proof for I3 is achieved by applying the Mellin transform of the product
of two Fox’s H-functions (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq.(2.25.1.1)) and using (Prudnikov et al.,
1990, eq.(8.3.2.21)).
Remark 6. As γ¯Bγ¯E tends to ∞, the asymptotic ASC is given by C¯s ≈ Iˆ1+ Iˆ2−I3, where
Iˆ1 =
LE
∑
k=1
LB
∑
l=1
αB,lαE,kΓ(βE,k)
ln(2)ζ βB,lB,l ζ
βE,k
E,k
G3,12,3
⎡
⎣ζB,l
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0,1)
(0,0,βB,l)
⎤
⎦ , (6.9)
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Iˆ2 =
LE
∑
k=1
LB
∑
l=1
αB,lαE,k
ln(2)βB,lζ
βE,k+βB,l
E,k
G3,12,3
⎡
⎣ζE,k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0,1)
(0,0,βB,l +βE,k)
⎤
⎦ . (6.10)
Proof. Motivated by (Lei et al., 2017a, Sec. IV), as γ¯Bγ¯E →∞, we have
ζE,k
ζB,l
→∞. Next, using the
residue theorem,I1 is further evaluated at the simple residue 0 of the Mellin-Barnes integrand
function regarding ζE,kζB,l . Then after some simple manipulations, we get Iˆ1. Similarly,
ζB,l
ζE,k
→ 0,
I2 is evaluated at the simple residue βB,l , and results in Iˆ2.
6.5 Numerical Result and Discussions
In this section, the accuracy of our derived analytical results is validated. Since the MG distri-
bution is regarded as a general model to characterize the received SNRs, three examples listed
in Table 6.1 are henceforth used to correspondingly plot the Monte-Carlo simulated SOP, PNZ,
and ASC.
Table 6.1 Simulations parameters
Distribution Parameters, αl = θl
∑
Li
k=1 θkΓ(βk)ζ
−βk
k
, γ¯i is the average SNR.
KG (Atapattu et al., 2011, Sec.
III.B), mi and ki are distribu-
tion shaping parameters, LB =
LE = 5.
βl =mi, ζl = λtl , λ =
kimi
γ¯i , θl =
λmiwlt
ki−mi−1
l
Γ(mi)Γ(ki)
, tl,wl are the
abscissas and weight factors for the Gaussian-Laguerre
integration (Abromowitz, M. & Stegun, I. A., 1968, Ta-
ble 25.9).
Nakagami-n (Rician) (Atap-
attu et al., 2011, Sec. III.F),
0 ≤ n< ∞, LB = LE = 20
βl = l, ζl =
(1+n2i )
γ¯i , θl =
(1+n2i )
exp(n2i )[(l−1)!]2γ¯i
(
n2i (1+n
2
i )
γ¯i
)l−1
Nakagami-q (Hoyt) (Atapattu
et al., 2011, Sec. III.D), 0 <
q< 1, LB = LE = 5
βl = 2l−1, ζl = (1+q
2
i )
2
4q2i γ¯i
, θl =
(1+q2i )
2qiγ¯iΓ(l)(l−1)!
(
1−q4i
8q2i γ¯i
)2i−2
Fig. 6.1 plots the SOP against γ¯B over KG fading channels for selected values of mB,mB ∈
{1,1.5,2,2.5}. From this ﬁgure, one can observe that (i) our analytical results perfect the
contributions in Lei et al. (2016c); (ii) there is a perfect agreement between our two analytical
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SOP expressions respectively given by (6.3a) and (6.3b) and the corresponding simulation
results; (iii) the SOP is largely enhanced with the increase of the shaping factor mB in the high
γ¯B regime; and (iv) a larger shaping factor mB results in a higher secrecy outage.
0 5 10 15 20
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Figure 6.1 Pout versus γ¯B overKG fading channels for
selected values of mB when Rt = 0.01, γ¯E = 6 dB, kB = 4,
mE = 4, and kE = 8.
The lower bound of the SOP for two aforementioned cases are correspondingly depicted in
Fig. 6.2. (a) and (b). It is observed that our obtained analytical lower bound for the SOP is
valid for both scenarios.
In Fig. 6.3, Pnz is plotted against γ¯B for two cases: (a) for selected values of γ¯E ; (b) when
the wiretap channel undergoes various fading models. Obviously, a positive secrecy capacity
is ensured with a higher probability (i) either when the wiretap channel has a worse channel
quality for ﬁxed γ¯B; (ii) or when the main channel conditions gradually improve (namely,
higher γ¯B) for ﬁxed γ¯E . In addition, Fig. 6.3.(b) presents the PNZ when the main channel
and wiretap channel undergo different fading models. In this vein, one can extract another
interesting insight that we provide a uniﬁed and general analysis framework to analyze the
PLS when the main channel and wiretap channel experience two different fading models.
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Figure 6.2 Pout versus γ¯B overKG fading channels for
selected values of kB = 1.5,mB = 4, kE = 2.5,mE = 8 when
(a) Rt = 0.5; (b) γ¯E = 3 dB.
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(b)
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Hoyt, qE = 0.5
Theory
Figure 6.3 Pnz against γ¯B for two cases: (a) main channel
and wiretap channel undergo Nakagami-n fading when
nB = 3 and nE = 5; (b) main channel undergoesKG fading
(mB = 2.5,kB = 4), while wiretap channel respectively
undergoesKG, Rician, and Hoyt for γ¯E = 5 dB.
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Figure 6.4 C¯s over Hoyt fading channels when
qB = qE =
√
0.5 for two cases (a) C¯s versus γ¯B; (b) C¯s
versus γ¯Bγ¯E .
In continuation of verifying and comparing the exact and asymptotic ASC given in Sec. 6.4.3,
Fig. 6.4 depicts how our derived ASC expression is conﬁrmed by Monte-Carlo simulations
over Hoyt fading channels. In addition, in Fig. 6.4. (b), it is shown that our asymptotic ASC
accurately characterizes the exact ASC in the high γ¯Bγ¯E regime.
6.6 Conclusion
In this letter, we ﬁrst investigated PLS of wireless channels, by modeling the received SNRs
as MG distributed RVs. Three secrecy metrics, i.e., SOP, PNZ, and ASC, were subsequently
derived with closed-form expressions. Our derivations were validated by Monte-Carlo simula-
tions. This paper provides a general and uniﬁed mathematical frameworks for the evaluation
of the secrecy risks, especially when the instantaneous received SNRs could be rewritten in
terms of the MG distribution. In addition, the obtained expressions are beneﬁcial when the
main channel and the wiretap channel undergo two different wireless channels.
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7.1 Abstract
In this paper, the cascaded α − μ fading distribution is ﬁrst introduced and mathematically
characterized, which arises as a generalization of the cascaded Rayleigh, Weibull, and Nakagami-
m fading distribution, by properly selecting fading parameters α and μ with speciﬁc values. In
particular, the statistical characterization of the cascaded α − μ fading channels, namely, the
probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF), are ﬁrst stud-
ied. This set of new statistical results is applied to the modeling and analysis of the reliability
and security performance of wireless communication systems over the cascaded α −μ fading
channel. Regarding system reliability, the amount of fading (AoF), outage probability, average
channel capacity, and the average symbol error probability (ASEP) with coherent and non-
coherent demodulation schemes are derived with respect to the univariate Fox’s H-function.
In terms of security analysis, the secrecy outage probability Pout , the probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity Pnz, and the average secrecy capacity are analyzed in the exact closed-form
expressions which are derived in the presence of a potential eavesdropper. In addition, an
asymptotic analysis of all aforementioned metrics is carried out, in order to gain more insights
of the effect of the key system parameters on the reliability and security. Tractable results
are computed in terms of the Fox’s H-function and later on are successfully validated through
Monte-Carlo simulations.
104
Keywords: Cascaded α −μ fading channels, Fox’s H-function, reliability, secrecy analysis.
7.2 Introduction
The ever-increasing demand for highly reliable wireless communication systems has led to the
prosperous of various accurate channel modeling in system design and evaluation. A com-
prehensive summary of all existing fading models includes (i) short-term fading: Rayleigh,
Rician, Nakagami-m, and Weibull; (ii) long-term fading: Lognormal; (iii) composite fading:
Rayleigh-lognormal; and (iv) cascaded fading Boulogeorgos, A. A. A., Sofotasios, P. C., Selim,
B., Muhaidat, S., Karagiannidis, G. K. & Valkama, M. (2016); Hajri, N., Youssef, N., Kawa-
bata, T., Patzold, M. & Dahech, W. (2018); Karagiannidis et al. (2007); Peppas, K., Lazarakis,
F., Alexandridis, A. & Dangakis, K. (2010); Sagias, N. C. & Tombras, G. S. (2007); Trigui, I.,
Laourine, A., Affes, S. & Stephenne, A. (2009); Yilmaz, F. & Alouini, M. S. (2009); Zheng, Z.
(2015). In particular, the cascaded fading channel is mathematically based on the multiplicative
modeling approach and happens over wireless communication links when 1) transmitter-and-
receiver pairs experience rich scattering, but the existence of some keyholes or pinholes makes
it still possible to keep the transmission; 2) the received signals are engendered by the product
of a bunch of rays reﬂected via N statistically independent scatters.
7.2.1 Background and Related Works
Along the years, the use of cascaded fading channels has shown applicability in the modeling of
several scenarios such as multi-hop cooperative communications Chergui et al. (2016); Ilhan,
H. (2012), mobile-to-mobile (M2M) transmission channel Boulogeorgos et al. (2016); Erceg,
V., Fortune, S. J., Ling, J., Rustako, A. J. & Valenzuela, R. A. (1997); Talha, B. & Patzold,
M. (2011), dual-hop fading channels, radio-frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) pinhole channels
Bekkali, A., Zou, S., Kadri, A., Crisp, M. & Penty, R. V. (2015), and multiple-input-multiple-
output (MIMO) keyhole communication systems Chergui et al. (2016); Sofotasios, P. C., Mo-
hjazi, L., Muhaidat, S., Al-Qutayri, M. & Karagiannidis, G. K. (2016); Yilmaz & Alouini
(2009).
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Speciﬁcally, for M2M communication system, the double Rayleigh distribution was proposed
to model it Alghorani, Y., Kaddoum, G., Muhaidat, S., Pierre, S. & Al-Dhahir, N. (2016);
Boulogeorgos et al. (2016); Erceg et al. (1997). Later on, in Alghorani et al. (2016); Boulo-
georgos et al. (2016), a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication scenario was investigated
by characterizing the wireless links, via the N∗Nakagami-m distribution. As shown in Kara-
giannidis et al. (2007), the N∗Nakagami-m distribution is structured on the basis of the prod-
uct of N independent, but not necessarily identical distributed Nakagami-m random variables
(RVs). Its statistics, including the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF), were derived in Karagiannidis et al. (2007) as closed-form expressions, in
terms of Meijer’s G-function. The derived ﬁrst-order statistics are particularly beneﬁcial when
evaluating the performance of the aforementioned various wireless communication scenarios
over cascaded Nakagami-m fading channels. In addition, it is noted that the N∗Nakagami-m
distribution can be reduced to double Rayleigh by attributing m1 = m2 = 1, where m1 and
m2 represent the fading parameters of the respective channels. However, when accounting
for both short- and long-term fading effects, the N∗Nakagami-m and N∗Weibull distributions
Sagias & Tombras (2007) cannot be adopted to model both fading impairments. As a conse-
quence, the cascaded generalized K distribution Peppas et al. (2010); Trigui et al. (2009) was
put forth to model the composite fading/shadowing channels due to the lack of closed-form ex-
pressions for the statistics of other distributions, like Suzuki Boulogeorgos et al. (2016); Hajri,
N., Youssef, N. & Patzold, M. (2016); Laourine, A., Alouini, M. S., Affes, S. & Stephenne, A.
(2009).
More recently, Yacoub proposed in Yacoub (2007a) the α − μ (or, equivalently, generalized
gamma) distribution to model the small scale variation of fading signal under line-of-sight
conditions. It is physically described with two key fading parameters, i.e., non-linearity of
the propagation medium α and the clustering of the multipath waves μ . This fading distribu-
tion has been examined applicable in vehicle communication Wu et al. (2010) and on-body
communication networks Michalopoulou et al. (2012). In additon, the α − μ distribution en-
compasses as special cases of some well-known distributions, such as Rayleigh (α = 2,μ = 1),
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Weibull (α is the fading parameter, μ = 1), and Nakagami-m (α = 2, μ is the fading param-
eter) distribution, by setting appropriate fading parameters to speciﬁc values. Later on, the
statistical characterization of the product of α − μ variates, including its PDF and CDF, were
investigated in Badarneh, O. S. & Almehmadi, F. S. (2016); Badarneh, O. S. (2016); da Silva,
C. R. N., Leonardo, E. J. & Yacoub, M. D. (2018); Leonardo, E. J. & Yacoub, M. D. (2015a,1);
Leonardo, E. J., Yacoub, M. D. & de Souza, R. A. A. (2016); Mathai, A. M. (1972), and
the number of integers was extended from 2 to arbitrary N. The seminal results presented in
Mathai (1972) were given in terms of Fox’s H-function. Since the Fox’s H-function is an ex-
tremely general function, taking the shape of the Mellin-Barnes integral (Mathai et al., 2009a,
eq. (1.2)). It can also be reduced to Meijer’s G-function. However, the PDF and CDF of
the product of α − μ variates given in terms of hypergeometric functions is fairly complex
in Leonardo & Yacoub (2015b); it renders its adoption in the performance analysis of wire-
less communication systems. Inspired from Leonardo & Yacoub (2015b); Mathai (1972), the
objective of this paper is to regenerate the cascaded α − μ distribution in terms of Fox’s H-
function, due to its general form and feasible implementation in MATLAB, Mathematica and
Python1.
7.2.2 Contributions
Our analysis of cascaded α − μ fading channel in wireless networks will be performed in
terms of reliability and security. It is noteworthy that apart from analyzing the popular average
bit error ratio performance, plenty of research attention concerning the security issue is also
gained when designing a secure and reliable communication system. The security issue is
based on Wyner’s wiretap model Wyner (1975), where the legitimate links are endangered
by the malicious eavesdroppers. In the existing technical works Kong et al. (2016b,1); Lei
1 The implementation of the univariate, bivariate or multivariate Fox’s H-function are reported in
Ansari, I. S., Yilmaz, F. & Alouini, M. S. (2013); Peppas (2012); Peppas et al. (2012); Yil-
maz & Alouini (2009) at Mathematica, MATLAB or Python. More speciﬁcally, the univariate Fox’s
H-function is implemented at Mathematica in Ansari et al. (2013); Yilmaz & Alouini (2009), and at
MATLAB in Peppas et al. (2012), whereas the implementation of the bivariate Fox’s H-function is
given at MATLAB in Peppas (2012).
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et al. (2015,1), the authors studied the security problem over α − μ fading channels from
the perspective of information theory, in which the secrecy outage probability, the probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity, and average secrecy capacity were characterized, respectively.
However, no work in the open literature focused on cascaded α −μ fading channels.
To this end, this paper aims to provide a reliability and security analysis of communications
systems over cascaded α-μ fading channels. The main contributions can be summarized as
follows:
1) The cascaded α −μ distribution is ﬁrst introduced. Its PDF and CDF are analyzed by ﬁrst
expressing the α −μ distribution in terms of the Fox’s H-function, and subsequently being
derived by utilizing the property of the Fox’s H-function distribution. In addition, other
elementary statistics, including moments and moment-generating function (MGF), are also
derived.
2) The derived statistics are employed in the investigation of multi-hop relaying wireless sys-
tems with amplify-and-forward (AF) protocol over the cascaded α − μ fading channel. In
particular,
• In the absence of eavesdroppers, the reliability of point-to-point wireless systems is
characterized. Speciﬁcally, the amount of fading (AoF), the outage probability, the
average channel capacity and the average symbol error probability (ASEP) are evaluated
in terms of the univariate Fox’s H-function.
• In the presence of eavesdroppers, the physical layer security is investigated, where the
secrecy outage probability (SOP), the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ),
and the average secrecy capacity, are characterized and closed-form expressions in
terms of the bivariate and univariate Fox’s H-functions, are obtained.
• Asymptotic behavior of all the aforementioned metrics are analyzed to gain further
insights on the effect of the key system parameters on the overall performance. In
addition, numerical results are conducted to conﬁrm our analysis for both scenarios,
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perfect agreements are observed to show the accuracy and feasibility of our analysis in
the ﬁeld of wireless communication systems.
3) The useful insight provided in our paper lies in the essence of the cascaded α − μ fading
channels, which can be reduced to several well-known cascaded fading channels, such as the
cascaded Rayleigh, Weibull, Nakagami-m fading channels by ﬁxing α and μ with special
values, furthermore, the exact closed-form expression of the PDF and CDF of the cascaded
α−μ distribution makes it tractable to grasp the behavior of reliability and security analysis
for multi-hop wireless communication systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 7.3, the statistical characterization
of cascaded α − μ fading channel is ﬁrst performed. Section 7.4 demonstrates the applica-
tion of cascaded α − μ fading channels in modeling wireless communication systems, and
performance metrics including the outage probability, average channel capacity and the aver-
age symbol error probability (ASEP) are analyzed respectively. In Section 7.5, the physical
layer security of wireless communication systems over cascaded α-μ fading channels is in-
vestigated, and performance metrics including the secrecy outage probability, the probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity, and average secrecy capacity, are provided. Section 7.6 presents
some illustrative numerical results along with insightful discussions. Concluding remarks and
future works are outlined in Section 7.7.
Notations: Γ(x) denotes the Gamma function (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (8.310.1)),
Γ(a,x) is the upper incomplete gamma function, Hm,np,q [.] is the univariate Fox’s H-function
(Mathai et al., 2009a, eq. (1.2)), H0,n:m1.n1:m2,n2p,q:p1,q1:p2,q2 is the bivariate Fox’s H-function (Mathai et al.,
2009a, eq. (2.56)). erfc(.) is the complementary error function. B(x,y) is the Beta function
(Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (8.380.1)). ψ(·) is the digamma function. Gm,np,q [.] is the Mei-
jer’s G-function (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (7.811.1)). M [ f (x),s] denotes the Mellin
transform of f (x) (Debnath & Bhatta, 2014, eq. (8.2.5)), E(·) and V(·) mean expectation and
variance, respectively. Res[ f (x), p] represents the residue of function f (x) at pole x= p.
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7.3 System Model and Statistical Characterization
Let Z be the product of M,M ≥ 1 independently α − μ distributed random variables (RVs)
having parameters (αi,μi), i.e., Z =
M
∏
i=1
Ri, the PDF of Ri is given by Yacoub (2007a)
fRi(ri) =
αiμ
μi
i r
αiμi
i −1
Ωαiμii Γ(μi)
exp
(
−μi
(
ri
Ωi
)αi)
= τiH1,00,1
⎡
⎣υiri
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(μi− 1αi , 1αi )
⎤
⎦ , (7.1)
where τi =
μ
1
αi
i
ΩiΓ(μi)
, υi =
μ
1
αi
i
Ωi , Ωi =
Γ(μi)
Γ(μi+ 2αi )
, the last step holds by using (Mathai et al., 2009a,
eq. (1.125)).
Theorem 14. The PDF of Z is given by
fZ(z) =DMH
M,0
0,M
⎡
⎣VMz
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
ε1, · · · ,εM
⎤
⎦ , (7.2)
where DM =
M
∏
i=1
τi, VM =
M
∏
i=1
υi, εi = (μi− 1αi , 1αi ).
Proof. By using (Bodenschatz, 1992, eq. (3.12)), the proof is easily obtained.
7.3.1 System Model
Suppose a wireless multi-hop amplify-and-forward relaying communication link, shown in
Fig. 7.1, over cascaded α −μ fading channel. It is assumed that each hop undergoes the α −μ
fading with fading coefﬁcient hi, and hi is characterized with fading parameters αi and μi.
The instantaneous received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the desired destination is expressed
as
γ =
N
∏
i=1
γ¯gi, (7.3)
where γ¯ is the average power at the receiver side, gi = |hi|2, and hi is the fading coefﬁcient,
which follows independent and non-identically α −μ distribution with parameters (αi, μi). It
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1h Nh n
Figure 7.1 Cascaded fading channels with N components
is assumed that all hi are statistically independent, but not necessarily identically distributed.
The PDF of gi is deﬁned in (Kong et al., 2016b,1, eq. (2)) and given by
fg(gi) =
αig
αiμi
2 −1
i
2Ω
αiμi
2
i Γ(μi)
exp
[
−
(
gi
Ωi
)αi
2
]
(a)
= κiH1,00,1
⎡
⎣λigi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
Φi
⎤
⎦ , (7.4)
where Ωi = Γ(μi)Γ(μi+ 2αi )
, κi = 1ΩiΓ(μi) , λi =
1
Ωi , and Φi = (μi− 2αi , 2αi ). Step (a) is derived by using
(Mathai et al., 2009a, eq. (1.125)).
7.3.2 Statistical Characterization
Theorem 15. The PDF and CDF of the instantaneous SNR deﬁned in (7.3) can be expressed
as
fγ(γ) =KNHN,00,N
⎡
⎣C γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
Φ1, · · · ,ΦN
⎤
⎦ , (7.5a)
Fγ(γ) = 1−KN
C
HN+1,01,N+1
⎡
⎣C γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(0,1),θ1, · · · ,θN
⎤
⎦= 1− F¯γ(γ), (7.5b)
where KN =
∏Ni=1 κi
γ¯ , C =
∏Ni=1 λi
γ¯ , θi = (μi,
2
αi ), and F¯γ is the complementary CDF (CCDF) of
Fγ .
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Proof. Let Z be the product of N mutually independent and non-identically random variables
(RVs) g1,g2, · · · ,gN , that is
Z =
γ
γ¯
=
N
∏
i=1
gi. (7.6)
Since α-μ distribution is a special case of the Fox’s H-function distribution, by using the
transformation property of Fox’s H-function (Bodenschatz, 1992, eq. (3.12)) and fγ(γ) =
1
γ fZ
(
z
γ
)
, the proof for (7.5a) is easily obtained. Afterwards, by applying (Bodenschatz, 1992,
eq. (3.7)), the CDF is subsequently achieved.
Remark 7. The PDF of the ratio of two instantaneous SNRs, Y = γ1γ2 , respectively deﬁned in
(7.3), i.e., γ1 =
N1
∏
i=1
γ¯1g1,i, and γ2 =
N2
∏
i=1
γ¯2g2,i is given by
f γ1
γ2
(y) =
KN1KN2
C 2N2
HN1,N2N2,N1
⎡
⎣CN1
CN2
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Θ1, · · · ,ΘN2
Φ1, · · · ,ΦN1
⎤
⎦ , (7.7)
where Θn =
(
1−μi− 2αi , 2αi
)
,n= 1, · · · ,N2.
Proof. Using (Bodenschatz, 1992, Eq. (3.14)), and after some simple mathematical manipula-
tions, the proof is easily achieved.
As shown in Fig. 7.2, examples of PDFs for (7.5a) and (7.7) are plotted, one can observe that
there is a perfect match between the Monte-Carlo simulation results and our analysis.
For the conveniences of the following performance analysis, the deﬁnition of Mellin transform
for a continuous function f (x) is recalled, which is given by
M [ f (x),s] =
∫ ∞
0
f (x)xs−1dx. (7.8)
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Figure 7.2 PDFs of γ =∏Nk=1 γ¯gk and the ratio of γ =
γ1
γ2 ,
where γ1 =∏N1k=1 γ¯1g1,i, γ2 =∏
N2
i=1 γ¯g2,i, gk,g1,i,g2,i are
implemented by using the WAFO toolbox Brodtkorb et al.
(2000) when γ¯ = γ¯1 = 5 dB and γ¯2 =−5 dB
Likewise, the Mellin transform for (7.5a) is straightforward given from (Mathai et al., 2009a,
eq. (2.8))
M [ fγ(γ),s] =
KN
N
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μi− 2αi + 2αi s
)
C sN
. (7.9)
7.3.3 Moments and MGF
The n-th moment of the instantaneous SNR can be derived from the following deﬁnition,
E[γn] =
∫ ∞
0
xn fγ(x)dx, (7.10)
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it can be achieved by using the Mellin transform of the Fox’s H-function(Prudnikov et al.,
1990, eq. (2.25.2.1)), and thus given by
E[γn] =
KN
N
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μi+ 2αi n
)
C n+1N
. (7.11)
Likewise, the MGF of the received SNR γ , is deﬁned by
Mγ(−s) =
∫ ∞
0
exp(−xs) fγ(x)dx, (7.12)
it can be derived by re-expressing the exp(·) function through its Fox’s H-function form Prud-
nikov et al. (1990), namely,
exp(−x) = H1,00,1
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(0,1)
⎤
⎦ ,
and then making use of the Mellin transform of the product of two Fox’s H-functions (Prud-
nikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)), yields
Mγ(−s) = KNs H
N,1
1,N
⎡
⎣C
s
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0,1)
Φ1, · · · ,ΦN
⎤
⎦ . (7.13)
7.4 Reliability Analysis over Cascaded α −μ Fading Channels
In this section, the objective is to evaluate the link performance, as shown in Fig. 7.1, when no
eavesdropper is taken into account. The AoF, the outage probability, average channel capacity,
and average symbol error probability are analyzed and derived in terms of the univariate Fox’s
H-function, respectively. In addition, their asymptotic behavior is given by using the residue
approach given in (Chergui et al., 2016, Sec. IV).
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7.4.1 Amount of Fading
The AoF is deﬁned as the ratio of the variance to the square average SNR, and then using
(7.11), we have
AF =
V(γ)
E2(γ)
=
E(γ2)
E(γ)2
−1 = CN
KN
N
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μi+ 4αi
)
N
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μi+ 2αi
)2 −1. (7.14)
7.4.2 Outage Probability
The outage event happens when the output SNR falls below a given threshold γth, which can
be expressed mathematically as
Pop(γth) = Pr(γ < γth). (7.15)
7.4.2.1 Exact Analysis
By applying (7.5b), the outage probability is given by
Pop(γth) = 1−KNC H
N+1,0
1,N+1
⎡
⎣C γth
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(0,1),θ1, · · · ,θN
⎤
⎦ . (7.16)
7.4.2.2 Asymptotic Analysis
When γthγ¯ → ∞, by using the residue approach, the asymptotic behavior of (7.16) is given by
Pop ∼ 1−KN
C
N
∏
i=1
Γ(μi). (7.17)
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Proof. See Appendix. III.1.
7.4.3 Average Channel Capacity
The average channel capacity over fading channels is computed by averaging the instantaneous
channel capacity
C¯ =
∫ ∞
0
log2(1+ γ) fγ(γ)dγ. (7.18)
7.4.3.1 Exact Analysis
Theorem 16. The average channel capacity over cascaded α −μ fading channels is given by
C¯ =
KN
C ln(2)
HN+2,12,N+2
⎡
⎣C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0,1),(1,1)
(0,1),(0,1),θ1, · · · ,θN
⎤
⎦ . (7.19)
Proof. By applying the Parseval’s relation for the Mellin transform on (7.18), we have
C¯ =
1
2π j
∫
L
M [log2(1+ γ),1− s]M [ f (γ),s]ds, (7.20)
where j =
√−1,L is the integration path from υ − j∞ to υ + j∞, υ is a constant, and
M [log2(1+ γ),1− s] =
Γ(2− s)Γ(s−1)Γ(s−1)
ln(2)Γ(s)
, (7.21a)
M [ f (γ),s] =K
N
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μi− 2αi +
2
αi
s
)
C−s. (7.21b)
After plugging (7.21a) and (7.21b) into (7.20), leading to the following result
C¯ =
KN
2ln(2)πi
∫
L
Γ(2− s)Γ(s−1)Γ(s−1)
Γ(s)
N
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μi− 2αi +
2
αi
s
)
C−sds
(b)
=
KN
ln(2)
HN+2,12,N+2
⎡
⎣C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(−1,1),(0,1)
(−1,1),(−1,1),Φ1, · · · ,ΦN
⎤
⎦ , (7.22)
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where step (b) is developed by applying the deﬁnition of univariate Fox’s H-function, and
subsequently using (Mathai et al., 2009a, eq. (1.60)), the proof is completed.
7.4.3.2 Asymptotic Analysis
At high SNR regime, by using the residue approach (Kong et al., 2016b, Sec. IV), (7.19) can
be easily determined as
C¯ ∼
KN
N
∏
i=1
Γ(μi)
C ln(2)
[
N
∑
i=1
2
αi
ψ(μi)− ln(C )
]
. (7.23)
7.4.4 Average Symbol Error Probability (ASEP)
Apart from the aforementioned two metrics, the average symbol error probability is consid-
ered as another crucial criterion when designing reliable transmission system. It is deﬁned as
follows
P¯kse =
∫ ∞
0
Pkse(γ) fγ(γ)dγ, (7.24)
where k∈ {C,N},Pse(γ) is the conditional error probability with different generic expressions
for coherent and non-coherent modulation schemes, which are listed in Tables. 7.1 and 7.2
Badarneh, O. S. & Aloqlah, M. S. (2016), respectively.
Table 7.1 Values of a,b for different modulation
schemes by using coherent demodulation where
PCse = a erfc(
√
bγ)
Modulation Scheme a b
BPSK 12 1
BFSK 12
1
2
QPSK, 4-QAM 1 12
M-QAM (M ≥ 4) 2(
√
M−1)√
M
3
2(M−1)
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Table 7.2 Values of a,b for different modulation
schemes by using non-coherent demodulation where
PNse = aexp(−bγ)
Modulation Scheme a b
BFSK 12
1
2
DBPSK 12 1
7.4.4.1 Exact Analysis
Theorem 17. The average ASEP over cascaded α-μ fading channels by using coherent and
non-coherent demodulation are respectively given by
- Coherent Demodulation
P¯Cse =
aK
C
√
π
HN,22,N+1
⎡
⎣C
b
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(12 ,1)
θ1, · · · ,θN ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (7.25)
- Non-coherent Demodulation
P¯Nse =
aK
b
HN,11,N
⎡
⎣C
b
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0,1)
Φ1, · · · ,ΦN
⎤
⎦ . (7.26)
Proof. Re-expressingPCse in terms of the Fox’sH-function (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (8.4.14.2)),
we have
PCse = a erfc(
√
bγ) =
a√
π
H2,01,2
⎡
⎣bγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(0,1),(12 ,1)
⎤
⎦ , (7.27)
Next, applying the Parseval’s relation for Mellin transform of (7.24), yields the following result
P¯Cse =
∫ ∞
0
PCse(γ) fγ(γ)dγ =
a
2π
3
2 i
∫
L
M [erfc(
√
bγ),1− s]M [ fγ(γ),s]ds, (7.28)
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where M [erfc(
√
bγ),1− s] can be obtained from (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (8.4.14.2)) and
is given by
M [erfc(
√
bγ),1− s] = Γ(1− s)Γ
(3
2 − s
)
Γ(2− s) b
−(1−s). (7.29)
Subsequently, substituting (7.29) and (7.21b) into (7.28), and then applying the deﬁnition of
Fox’s H-function, we have
P¯Cse =
aK
2bπ
3
2 i
∫
L
Γ(1− s)Γ(32 − s)
Γ(2− s)
N
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μi− 2αi +
2
αi
s
)(
C
b
)−s
ds
=
aK
b
√
π
HN,22,N+1
⎡
⎣C
b
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0,1),(−12 ,1)
Φ1, · · · ,ΦN ,(−1,1)
⎤
⎦ . (7.30)
Finally, using the property of Fox’s H-function (Mathai et al., 2009a, eq. (1.60)), the proof for
(7.25) is accomplished.
Regarding the proof for (7.26), by providing the Mellin transform for the exponential function
(Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq.(8.4.3.1)) as follows,
M [exp(−bγ),1− s] = Γ(1− s)
b(1−s)
, (7.31)
and then following the same steps from (7.28) to (7.30), as such, the proof is achieved.
7.4.4.2 Asymptotic Analysis
At high γ¯ regime, the asymptotic behavior of (7.25) and (7.26) can be likely obtained as follows
by following the same method as shown in Appendix. 1 Kong et al. (2016b)
- Coherent Demodulation
P¯Cse ∼
aK
(
C
b
)α jμ j
2
μ j
√
πC
Γ
(
1+α jμ j
2
)N−1
∏
i=1,
Γ
(
μi− α jαi μ j
)
, (7.32)
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- Non-coherent Demodulation
P¯Nse ∼
aK
(
C
b
)α jμ j
2
√
πC
Γ
(α jμ j
2
)N−1
∏
i=1,
Γ
(
μi− α jαi μ j
)
, (7.33)
where α jμ j = min(αiμi), i= 1, · · · ,N.
7.5 Secrecy Analysis over Cascaded α −μ Fading Channels
In this section, the security issue over cascaded α − μ fading channels is analyzed from the
information theoretical perspective. The classic Wyner’s wiretap channel model is deployed,
where a transmitter, named Alice, intends to communicate with the legitimate destination, Bob,
whilst encountering a malicious wiretapper, Eve, over the cascaded α − μ fading channels, a
possible system conﬁguration is shown in Fig. 7.3. It is assumed that (i) all users are equipped
with a single antenna; (ii) they have perfect knowledge of their channel state information (CSI);
(iii) the main channel is independent of the wiretap channel.
7.5.1 System Model
Ă
Ă
1,Bh BNBh ,
1,Eh ENEh ,
Main channel
Wiretap channel
Alice Bob
Eve
Bn
En
Figure 7.3 Cascaded α −μ fading channels in the
presence of a potential eavesdropper
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Suppose a wireless legitimate link, from Alice to Bob, undergoes the cascaded fading channels
while in the presence of a potential Eve, where the channel coefﬁcients are modeled by inde-
pendent α − μ distributions. The link between Alice and Bob is named as the main channel,
whereas the one between Alice and Eve is called the wiretap channel. As a consequence, the
instantaneous SNRs at Bob and Eve can be respectively expressed as
γB =
NB
∏
i=1
γ¯BgB,i, (7.34a)
γE =
NE
∏
j=1
γ¯EgE, j, (7.34b)
where γ¯B = PσB and γ¯E =
P
σE , gB,i = |hB,i|2, gE, j = |hE, j|2, P,σB and σE are the transmission
power at Alice, the noise power at Bob and Eve, respectively.
By deploying Theorem 15 on γB and γE , fB(γB) and fE(γE) are respectively given by
fB(γB) =KNBH
NB,0
0,NB
⎡
⎣CNBγB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
Φ1, · · · ,ΦNB
⎤
⎦ , (7.35a)
fE(γE) =KNEH
NE ,0
0,NE
⎡
⎣CNE γE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
Θ1, · · · ,ΘNE
⎤
⎦ , (7.35b)
where
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
KNB =
NB
∏
i=1
κB,i
γ¯B
Φi =
(
μB,i− 2αB,i , 2αB,i
)
CNB =
NB
∏
i=1
λB,i
γ¯B
, i= 1, · · · ,NB ,
and
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
KNE =
NE
∏
j=1
κB, j
γ¯E
Θ j =
(
μE, j− 2αE, j , 2αE, j
)
CNE =
NE
∏
j=1
λE, j
γ¯E
, j = 1, · · · ,NE .
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According to Bloch et al. (2008), the instantaneous secrecy capacity is mathematically deﬁned
as the difference of the instantaneous capacity of the main channel and wiretap channel, given
as follows
Cs =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
CM −CW , γB > γE
0, otherwise.
(7.36)
where CM = log2(1+ γB), CW = log2(1+ γE).
7.5.2 Secrecy Outage Probability
The secrecy outage probabilityPout is deﬁned as the probability with an instantaneous secrecy
capacity, Cs, falling down the target secrecy rate Rt .
Revisiting (7.36), the secrecy outage probability Pout for the Wyner’s wiretap fading model
is conceptually explained through two cases: (i) Cs < Rs whilst positive secrecy capacity is
guaranteed; (ii) Pout(Rs) deﬁnitely happens when the secrecy capacity is non-positive Kong
et al. (2016a). Pout(Rs) can thus be rewritten as follows:
Pout(Rt) =Pr(Cs < Rt) =Pr(γB ≤ RsγE +Rs−1)
=Pr(Cs < Rs|γB > γE)Pr(γB > γE)+Pr(γB < γE)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γ0
γE
fB(γB) fE(γE)dγBdγE +
∫ ∞
0
∫ γE
0
fB(γB) fE(γE)dγBdγE
=
∫ ∞
0
fE(γE)
[∫ γ0
0
−
∫ γE
0
]
fB(γB)dγBdγE +
∫ ∞
0
∫ γE
0
fB(γB) fE(γE)dγBdγE
=
∫ ∞
0
FB(γ0) fE(γE)dγE = 1−
∫ ∞
0
F¯B(γ0) fE(γE)dγE ,
(7.37)
where γ0 = 2RtγE + 2Rt − 1 = RsγE +W , Rs = 2Rt ,W = 2Rt − 1, and with the help of (7.5b),
we have
F¯B(γ0) =
KNB
CNB
HNB+1,01,NB+1
⎡
⎣CNBγ0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(0,1),θ1, · · · ,θNB
⎤
⎦ . (7.38)
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7.5.2.1 Exact Analysis
Theorem 18. The secrecy outage probability over cascaded α −μ wiretap fading channels, in
the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers, is given by (7.39),
Pout(Rs) = 1−KNBKNEW
CNBRs
×H0,1;1,NE ;0,NB1,0;NE ,1;NB,1
⎡
⎣ Rs
CNEW
,
1
CNBW
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(2,1,1)
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Θ¯1, · · · ,Θ¯NE
(1,1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Φ¯1, · · · ,Φ¯NB
(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (7.39)
where Θ¯ j = (1−μE, j+ 2αE, j , 2αE, j ) and Φ¯i = (1−μB,i, 2αB,i ).
Proof. See Appendix. III.2.
Remark 8. The secrecy outage probability over cascaded α − μ wiretap fading channels is
lower bounded by
PLout = 1−
KNBKNE
CNBCNE
HNB+1,NENE+1,NB+1
⎡
⎣RsCNB
CNE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Θ¯1, · · · ,Θ¯NE ,(1,1)
(0,1),Φ1, · · · ,ΦNB
⎤
⎦ . (7.40)
Proof. As γ¯E tends to ∞, it physically means that the eavesdropper is super close to the trans-
mitter, thePout is lower bounded by
Pout =Pr(γB ≤ RsγE +W )
≥Pr(γB ≤ RsγE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
PLout
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
F¯B(RsγE) fE(γE)dγE
= 1−KNBKNE
CNB
∫ ∞
0
HNE ,00,NE
⎡
⎣CNE γE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
Θ1, · · · ,ΘNE
⎤
⎦
×HNB+1,01,NB+1
⎡
⎣CNBRsγE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(0,1),Φ1, · · · ,ΦNB
⎤
⎦dγE ,
(7.41)
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subsequently, the proof is achieved by using the Mellin transform of the product of two Fox’s
H-function (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq.(2.25.1.1)).
Remark 9. When αB,i = 2, and αE, j = 2, by using the transformation between Meijer’s G-
function and Fox’s H-function (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq.(8.3.2.21)), the asymptotic analy-
sis of (7.40) can be further simpliﬁed as follows in terms of the Meijer’s G-function (Grad-
shteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (7.811.1)) 2,
PAsyout = 1−
KNBKNE
CNBCNE
GNB+1,NENE+1,NB+1
⎡
⎣RsCNB
CNE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1−μE,1, · · · ,1−μE,NE ,1
0,μB,1, · · · ,μB,NB
⎤
⎦ . (7.42)
7.5.2.2 Asymptotic Analysis
By using the residue approach given in Chergui et al. (2016), the asymptotic behavior ofPout
is given in Table. 7.3.
Table 7.3 Asymptotic analysis of thePout
Scenario AsymptoticPout
γ¯E → ∞ 1− KNBKNECNBCNE
⎡
⎢⎣
NB
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μB,i+
αE,kμE,k
αB,i
)NE−1
∏
j=1
Γ
(
μE, j−
αE,kμE,k
αE, j
)
μE
(
CNE
CNBRs
)αE,kμE,k
2
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
where αE,kμE,k = min(αE,1μE,1, · · · ,αE, jμE, j), j = 1, · · · ,NE .
(7.43)
γ¯B → ∞
NE
∏
j=1
Γ
(
μE, j+
αB,kμB,k
αE, j
)NB−1
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μB,i−
αB,kμB,k
αB,i
)
μB,k
(
CNBRs
CNE
)αB,kμB,k
2
,
where αB,kμB,k = min(αB,1μB,1, · · · ,αB,iμB,i), i= 1, · · · ,NB.
(7.44)
γ¯E → 0 1− KNBCNB H
NB+1,0
1,NB+1
⎡
⎣RsCNB
CNE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(0,1),θ1, · · · ,θNB
⎤
⎦ , (7.45)
γ¯B → 0 1
2 The implementation of the Meijer’s G-function is available in mathematical packages, like Mat-
lab2017b, Maple and Mathematica Mei.
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Proof. See Appendix. III.3.
7.5.3 Probability of Non-zero Secrecy Capacity
Recalling the secrecy capacity over Wyner’s wiretap channel, a non-zero secrecy capacity event
happens when Cs is positive on the condition that γB > γE . By deploying the math language, it
can be thus expressed as follows
Pnz = Pr(Cs > 0) = Pr(γB > γE) = Pr
(
γE
γB
< 1
)
= FγE
γB
(1). (7.46)
7.5.3.1 Exact Analysis
Theorem 19. The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity over cascaded α−μ wiretap fading
channels is given by
Pnz = 1−KNBKNE
CNBCNE
HNE+1,NBNB+1,NE+1
⎡
⎣CNE
CNB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Φ¯1, · · · ,Φ¯NB ,(1,1)
(0,1),θ1, · · · ,θNE
⎤
⎦ , (7.47)
where θ j =
(
μE, j, 2αE, j
)
.
Proof. Recalling the Remark. 7, and subsequently applying (Bodenschatz, 1992, Eq. (3.7)),
the proof is completed.
Motivated by Remark 9, when αB,i = 2, and αE, j = 2, which means both the main and the wire-
tap channel undergo the Nakagami-m fading, thePnz is indeed over the cascaded Nakagami-m
wiretap fading channels, and it is thus given by
Pnz = 1−KNBKNE
CNBCNE
GNE+1,NBNB+1,NE+1
⎡
⎣CNE
CNB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1−μB,1, · · · ,1−μB,NB ,1
0,μE,1, · · · ,μE,NE
⎤
⎦ . (7.48)
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7.5.3.2 Asymptotic Analysis
When Rt = 0, Rs = 1, in accordance with the deﬁnition of SOP and PNZ, we have
Pout = Pr(γE ≤ RsγB+Rs−1) = 1−Pr(γB ≥ γE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pnz
. (7.49)
Consequently, the asymptotic behavior of the PNZ can be easily derived by making some
simple algebraic substitutions.
7.5.4 Average Secrecy Capacity
Theorem 20. The average secrecy capacity over cascaded α − μ wiretap fading channels is
given by (7.50),
C¯s =
KNBKNE
ln(2)CNBCNE
H0,NB;1,2;NE ,1NB,0;2,2;1,NE+1
⎡
⎣ 1
CNB
,
CNE
CNB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
D1, · · · ,DNB
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0,1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
θ1, · · · ,θNE ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
+
KNBKNE
ln(2)CNBCNE
H0,NE ;1,2;NB,1NE ,0;2,2;1,NB+1
⎡
⎣ 1
CNE
,
CNB
CNE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
E1, · · · ,ENE
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0,1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
φ1, · · · ,φNB ,(1,1)
⎤
⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
+
KNE
ln(2)CNE
H1,2+NE2+NE ,2
⎡
⎣ 1
CNE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1),
(
1−μE,l, 2αE,l
)
, · · · ,
(
1−μE,NE , 2αE,NE
)
(1,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
,
(7.50)
where Di =
(
1−μB,i, 2αB,i , 2αB,i
)
, E j =
(
1−μE, j, 2αE, j , 2αE, j
)
, φi =
(
μB,i, 2αB,i
)
, Hm,n;m1,n1;m2;n2p,q;p1,q1;p2,q2 [.]
and Hm,np,q [.] are the bivariate and univariate Fox’s H-function (Mathai et al., 2009a, Eqs. (1.2)
and (2.56)), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix. III.4.
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7.6 Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we conﬁrm the accuracy of our analytical derivations demonstrated in Sections
7.4 and 7.5, in comparison with Monte-Carlo simulation results3. For the conciseness of illus-
trations, the curves only with markers are the Monte-Carlo simulation outcomes, whereas the
ones denoted with lines are used to depict our analytical results.
7.6.1 Reliability Analysis over Cascaded α-μ Fading Channels
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Theory
Figure 7.4 Pop versus γth/γ¯ over cascaded α −μ
wiretap fading channels for selected values of N
Considering the system conﬁguration shown in Fig. 7.1, in Figs. 7.4-7.6, we plot the outage
probability, the average channel capacity and the ASEP with coherent demodulation scheme
over cascaded α −μ fading channels, respectively.
3 It is worthy to mention that (i) the α − μ fading channel is implemented by using the WAFO tool-
boxBrodtkorb et al. (2000); (ii) the implementation of the Fox’s H-function is computationally prac-
ticable, the numerical evaluation of univariate and bivariate Fox’s H-function of (7.39) and (7.40) for
MATLAB implementations are based on the method proposed in (Peppas et al., 2012, Table. II) and
(Peppas, 2012, Appendix. A), respectively.
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Figure 7.5 Average channel capacity C¯ over cascaded
α −μ fading channels
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Figure 7.6 The ASEP P¯Cse over cascaded α −μ fading
channels
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Those ﬁgures reveal that our derivations given by (7.16), (7.19) and (7.25) are in perfect match
with simulation outcomes, which are particularly validated for several speciﬁc cases, such as
Rayleigh, Nakagami-m, and Weibull, respectively.
To terminate the reliability analysis over cascaded α −μ fading channels, one can perceive the
following conclusions from the three ﬁgures (i) the performance metrics physically demon-
strate worse trend with the increase of N, outstandingly, it is caused by the fact that the mul-
tiplication of several successive fading makes it less likely to transmit the desired messages
successfully; (ii) for a given fading scenario, reliable communication can be assured only by
increasing the transmitting power.
7.6.2 Secrecy Analysis over Cascaded α-μ Wiretap Fading Channels
0 5 10 15 20
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100
NB = 1, NE = 1
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Theory, eq. (7.39)
Aysmptotic, eq. (7.43)
Figure 7.7 Pout versus γ¯B over cascaded α −μ
wiretap fading channels when γ¯E = 6 dB, Rs = 0.5,
αB = 4, μB = 2, αE = 2, and μE = 3
In the presence of a malicious eavesdropper, the secrecy outage probability and probability of
non-zero secrecy capacity are presented in this subsection. Fig. 7.7 plots the secrecy outage
probability Pout against the average transmitted power γ¯B when ﬁxing NB and NE for selected
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values. From this ﬁgure, it is observed that Pout decreases with the increase of γ¯B, which is
due to a better secrecy capacity which can be achieved with the increase of γ¯B. In addition,
the secrecy outage probability is, as expected, strongly inﬂuenced by the value of NB and NE ,
namely, the number of relays or keyholes. Naturally, this phenomenon can be explained via
the fact that more keyholes mean much severer propagation on the legitimate signals.
-5 0 5 10 15
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
Figure 7.8 Pout versus γ¯B over cascaded α −μ wiretap
fading channels when NB = NE = 2, Rs = 0.5, αB = 4,
μB = 3, αE = 2, and μE = 2
Additionally, as shown in Fig. 7.8, our derived asymptotic expression, thePAsyout given in (7.40),
closely approximates the exact secrecy outage probabilityPout , in particular, the gap between
them is becoming smaller as γ¯E increases.
In Fig. 7.9, we compare our analytical Pnz given in (7.47) with Monte-Carlo simulation re-
sults. On the contrary with Pout , positive secrecy capacity can be surely guaranteed with a
higher probability as γ¯B increases.
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Figure 7.9 Pnz versus γ¯B over cascaded α −μ wiretap
fading channels when γ¯E = 5 dB, αB = 3, μB = 2,
αE = 2, and μE = 2
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Figure 7.10 C¯s versus γ¯B for selected NB when αB = 3, αE = 4,
μB = 2, μE = 3, and γ¯E = 5dB
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In Figs. 7.10-7.11, the average secrecy capacity against γ¯B is presented for three case: (i)
selected values of NB; (ii) selected values of NE ; An obvious conclusion can be summarized
from Figs. 7.10 and 7.11 that: the average secrecy capacity is improved with the increase of
NE and degraded with the increase of NB. This is due to the fact, i.e., the bigger NB (or NE), the
worse quality of the received SNR of Bob (or Eve).
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Figure 7.11 C¯s versus γ¯B for selected NE when αB = 3, αE = 4,
μB = 2, μE = 3, and γ¯E = 5dB
Overall, interesting observations drawn from Figs. 7.7 and 7.9 can be summarized as follows
(i) our analytical results given by (7.39) and (7.47) are successfully veriﬁed by Monte-Carlo
simulation outcomes; (ii) no matter for thePout orPnz, the number of keyholes or relays is of
great signiﬁcance with the system security performance.
7.7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, the notion of N ∗ (α − μ) cascaded fading channels was introduced, together
with its statistics characteristics. As stated in the context, it can be respectively reduced to the
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cascaded Rayleigh, Weibull, Nakagami-m fading channels by attributing α and μ to speciﬁc
values.
Based on such a general channel model, we further investigated one wireless multi-hop AF
relaying link when considering two scenarios: in the absence and presence of a malicious
eavesdropper. Regarding the former scenario, the outage probability, average channel capacity
and the ASEP were deduced with closed-form expressions, which were derived in terms of the
Fox’s H-function. When it comes to the latter case, we studied such a digital communication
system from the information theoretical perspective. The secrecy metrics, including the secrecy
outage probability, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, and average secrecy capacity
were evaluated, which were correspondingly given with respect to the bivariate and univariate
Fox’s H-function. In addition, the asymptotic analysis of the secrecy outage probability was
also derived and therefore compared with the exact expression. Subsequently, our analytical
mathematical representations for both cases were further successfully veriﬁed via the Monte-
Carlo simulation outcomes.
As readily observed from our work, it is so far limited to the investigations of digital wireless
communication systems under the assumptions of independent N ∗ (α − μ) fading channels,
generally speaking, one possible future research direction may be the extension of our results
to the correlated cascaded N ∗ (α −μ) fading channels.
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8.1 Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of stochastic MIMO wireless networks
over small-scale α −μ fading channels, where both the legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers
are distributed with two independent homogeneous Poisson point processes (HPPPs). Specif-
ically, accounting for the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers, secrecy performance met-
rics, including the connection outage probability (COP), the probability of non-zero secrecy
capacity (PNZ) and ergodic secrecy capacity, are derived regarding the k-th nearest/best user
cases. The index for the k-th nearest user is extracted from the ordering, in terms of the dis-
tances between transmitters and receivers, whereas that for the k-th best user is based on the
combined effects of path-loss and small-scale fading. In particular, the probability density
functions (PDFs) and cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the composite channel gain,
for the k-th nearest and best user, are characterized, respectively. Beneﬁting from these results,
closed-form representations of the COP, PNZ and ergodic secrecy capacity are subsequently
obtained. Furthermore, a limit on the maximal number of the best-ordered users is also com-
puted, for a given secrecy outage constraint. Finally, numerical results are provided to verify
the correctness of our derivations. Additionally, the effects of fading parameters, path-loss
exponent, and density ratios are also analyzed.
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Keywords: Physical layer security, Poisson point process, α −μ fading, random MIMO wire-
less networks, k-th legitimate user.
8.2 Introduction
The security issue impacting the wireless networks has recently attracted signiﬁcant attention
from the academic and industrial communities. In this vein, the development of conventional
approaches, based on cryptography techniques, faces new challenges, especially in large-scale
wireless network, due to its high power consumption and complexity requirements. Alterna-
tively, physical layer security (PLS) appears as an appealing strategy to address such a concern
by conversely exploiting the inherent randomness and noisy characteristics of radio channels
in order to protect conﬁdential messages from being wiretapped.
8.2.1 Background and Related Works
The fundamental of the PLS was initially built on the discovery of ‘perfect secrecy’ by Shannon
Shannon (1949) and the conceptual ﬁnding of degraded ‘wiretap channel’, for the discrete
memoryless channel, by Wyner Wyner (1975). Later on, successive efforts were devoted to
the generalization of the results in Wyner (1975) to additive Gaussian noise channels Leung-
Yan-Cheong & Hellman (1978), broadcast channels Csiszar & Korner (1978), fading channels
Bloch et al. (2008); Gopala et al. (2008); Kong et al. (2016b); Lei et al. (2015,1), multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) communications Chen, X. & Yin, R. (2013); Kong et al. (2016a);
Zhu, J., Zou, Y., Wang, G., Yao, Y. D. & Karagiannidis, G. K. (2016), cooperative networks
Thai, C. D. T., Lee, J. & Quek, T. Q. S. (2016), cellular networks Tolossa et al. (2018); Vuppala
et al. (2018) among other topics.
A common shortage of the aforesaid works Bloch et al. (2008); Csiszar & Korner (1978);
Gopala et al. (2008); Kong et al. (2016a,1); Lei et al. (2015,1); Leung-Yan-Cheong & Hell-
man (1978); Thai et al. (2016), based on the point-to-point communication links, lies in the
uncertainty of users’ spatial locations. Strictly speaking, users’ spatial locations undoubtedly
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play a crucial role when investigating the large scale fading in random networks. The pioneer
works, led by Haenggi Haenggi, M. (2008a,0), and where users distributed randomly based on
stochastic geometry, was modeled as the Poisson point process (PPP). Speciﬁcally, it is worthy
to mention that the concept of ‘secrecy graph’ was ﬁrstly proposed to study the secrecy con-
nectivity metric, and subsequently the maximum secrecy rate Pinto, P. C., Barros, J. & Win,
M. Z. (2012b) when colluding eavesdroppers are considered.
More recently, in Bai, J., Tao, X., Xu, J. & Cui, Q. (2014); Jeong, Y., Quek, T. Q. S., Kwak,
J. S. & Shin, H. (2014); Liu et al. (2014); Tolossa, Y. J., Vuppala, S. & Abreu, G. (2017);
Zheng, T. X., Wang, H. M. & Yin, Q. (2014), the authors considered the two-dimensional
random wireless network under Rayleigh, composite fading and Nakagami-m fading channels,
where both the legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers are drawn from two independent homo-
geneous PPPs (HPPPs). Authors in Jeong et al. (2014) studied the secure MIMO transmission
subjected to Rayleigh fading. Zheng et al. in Zheng et al. (2014) analyzed the transmission
secrecy outage probability for multiple-input and single-output (MISO) systems, and proposed
the concept of ‘security region (SR)’, which is a geometry region, deﬁned as the legitimate
receiver’s locations having a certain guaranteed level of secrecy. Differently, Satyanarayana et
al. proposed another SR1 Vuppala, S., Biswas, S., Ratnarajah, T. & Sellathurai, M.; Vuppala,
S., Biswas, S. & Ratnarajah, T. (2017), which is deﬁned as the region where the set of ordered
nodes can safely communicate with typical destination, for a given secrecy outage constraint.
Motivated by those references, it is thus of tremendous signiﬁcance to study how many legiti-
mate users are located within the coverage of the transmitter (i.e., base station), in the presence
of unknown number of eavesdroppers. Most of the existing work can be summarized in terms
of the ordering policy, namely the k-th legitimate user, either based on the distances between
transmitters and users, or the instantaneous received composite channel gain. Moving in this
direction, it is reported that limited studies are seen on the secrecy assessment of the k-th legit-
imate receiver. Speciﬁcally, the result disclosed in Bai et al. (2014) is merely restricted to the
mathematical treatment of the secrecy outage probability of the k-th nearest receiver (i.e., the
1 Within the security region, all users can achieve high secrecy gains.
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index is from the ordering based on the distance between the source and the destination). In
contrast, the results unveiled in Liu et al. (2014); Tolossa et al. (2017); Vuppala et al., 2017)
are constrained to the k-th best receiver2 (i.e., the index is according to the array of the com-
posite channel gains). It is reported that Chen, G. & Coon, J. P. (2017) investigated the secrecy
issue over Rayleigh fading channels, while considering both ordering policies without offering
any SR. On the other hand, the introduced k-th nearest or best receiver is applicable to vehic-
ular networks. The k-th best user can be considered as any potential vehicle receiving the k-th
maximum path gain from a source vehicle. One can construct the security region by selecting
all the best nodes instead of random users. Selecting the best users to coordinate among each
other can further improve the security of the network.
Outstandingly, the aforesaid studies merely focus on the secrecy analysis, inﬂuenced by the
colluding/non-colluding eavesdroppers but have not taken the more general fading model,
namely, α − μ fading channel, into consideration. The α − μ distribution was ﬁrst proposed
by Yacoub in Yacoub (2007a) to model the small scale variation of fading signal under line-
of-sight conditions Leonardo & Yacoub (2015b); Papazafeiropoulos, A. K. & Kotsopoulos,
S. A. (2010). It is physically described with two key fading parameters, i.e., non-linearity of
the propagation medium α and the clustering of the multipath waves μ . The advantage of
these two factors is regarded as a useful tool to vividly depict the inhomogeneous surroundings
compared with other existing fading models, such as Rayleigh, Nakagami-m. Most of them are
based on the unrealistic assumption of homogeneous (scattering) environment. Fortunately, the
α − μ fading model was later on found valid and feasible in many realistic situations Chong
et al. (2011); Dias & Yacoub (2009); Karadimas et al. (2010); Michalopoulou et al. (2011,1);
Reig & Rubio (2013); Wu et al. (2010), including the vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communica-
tion networks and wireless body area networks (WBAN). In addition, the α − μ distribution
is ﬂexible and mathematical tractable, since it can be extended to Rayleigh, Nakagami-m and
Weibull fading by simply attributing the fading parameters α and μ to selected values. For
2 It is worth mentioning that the k-th best user is the one with the k-th maximal received signal out of
K users.
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example, choosing α = 2 and μ = 1 will reduce it to Rayleigh fading, while choosing α = 2
and μ = m will make it correspond to Nakagami-m fading.
To the best knowledge of the authors, in Kong et al. (2016b); Lei et al. (2015), the authors
derived the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability of point-
to-point communication over α − μ fading channels. Lei et al. Lei et al. (2017a) later on
studied the average secrecy capacity of α − μ wiretap fading channels. The importance of
evaluating the aforementioned two metrics is based on the behavior of the eavesdroppers. If
they are active, meaning that it is possible to have their channel state information (CSI) at the
transmitter, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and the secrecy outage probability
are crucial. If they are passive, average secrecy capacity is therefore a key benchmark. With
respect to the random single-input and single-output (SISO) wireless networks, the authors in
Vuppala et al., 2017) and Liu, W., Ding, Z., Ratnarajah, T. & Xue, J. (2016) correspondingly
investigated the secrecy outage probability and the ergodic secrecy capacity in terms of the k-th
best user, respectively. Apart from the literature Kong et al. (2016b,1,1); Lei et al. (2015,1);
Liu et al. (2016); Vuppala et al., 2017), efforts to explore the secrecy evaluation of random
MIMO wireless networks over α −μ fading channels are rarely witnessed.
8.2.2 Contribution and Organization
Consequently, the essence of this paper is the exploration of the k-th legitimate user’s secrecy
performance over α −μ fading channel in typical random wireless networks.
In this paper, we consider a stochastic MIMO wireless system, in the presence of two types of
receivers, namely, legitimate users and eavesdroppers. They are assumed to be distributed with
two independent HPPPs. The conventional space-time transmission (STT) is considered Zhu
et al. (2016). All receivers have access to perfect channel state information (CSI), which are
all subjected to quasi-static α −μ fading. Since Wyner had concluded that perfect secrecy can
be assured only if legitimate links have higher transmission rate, compared to wiretap links,
the pursuit of outage-based secrecy performance analysis is considered reasonable and feasible
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when a ﬁxed data transmission scheme is adopted for such quasi-static fading channels, as
indicated in Tolossa et al. (2017); Wang & Wang (2016). In Liu et al. (2016), the secure
connection probability of the k-th legitimate receiver to the transmitter was studied, as well as
the ergodic secrecy capacity.
To this end, the connection outage probability (COP), the probability of non-zero secrecy ca-
pacity (PNZ) and the ergodic secrecy capacity, in terms of the k-th nearest and best legitimate
receivers, are taken into consideration.
Since the concept of the k-th best user can be regarded as a security region, it is crucial to
identify the k∗ best users out of K users that can communicate securely with the transmitter
in such region. In this work, we identify a zone (i.e., a limited number of legitimate users)
comprising of such ordered k∗ best users, for a given secrecy constraint.
The contributions of this paper are multifold, which can be pointed out as:
1) The probability of density functions (PDFs) and cumulative distribution function (CDFs) of
the composite channel gain for the k-th nearest and best user are derived, respectively. This
is essentially important for formulating the secrecy metrics, including the connection outage
probability, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity and ergodic secrecy capacity.
2) Unlike the model studied in Lei et al. (2017a), which considered the point-to-point system
and a single eavesdropper, we study the secrecy capacity of random networks with multiple
legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers. The exact closed form expressions of the COP, PNZ
and ergodic secrecy capacity of the k-th legitimate user are derived.
3) Motivated by the PNZ of the k-th best receiver, a limit on the maximal number of the best-
ordered receivers is calculated thereafter respecting a given secrecy outage probability. In
other words, this limit eventually provides a security region concept, henceforth, all the
system parameters are looked upon, based on this concept, giving a better insight into the
secrecy capacity regions of random wireless networks.
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4) The accuracy of our derivations are successfully validated by Monte-Carlo simulation. Nu-
merical outcomes are presented to indicate the effect of the path-loss exponent, densities of
the users and fading parameters.
The insights obtained from the outcomes of this paper, regarding the crucial parameters of
the secrecy performance, inspire researchers and vehicle wireless communication engineers
to quickly evaluate system performance and optimize available parameters when confronting
various security risks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: system model and problem formulation are
depicted in Sections 8.3 and 8.4, respectively. The COP, PNZ and the ergodic secrecy capacity
are derived in Section 8.5. Numerical results and discussions are then presented in Section
8.6 and followed by Section 8.7 with concluding remarks. Notations and symbols used in this
paper are shown in Table. 8.1.
8.3 System Model
In this paper, a random wireless network, displayed in Fig. 8.1 in an unbound Euclidean space
of dimension d is under consideration. The typical transmitter is located at the origin, who
has Na (Na ≥ 1) antennas, and two types of receivers, namely the legitimate receivers and
eavesdroppers with Nb (Nb ≥ 1), Ne (Ne ≥ 1) antennas, respectively. The locations of these
receivers are drawn from two independent HPPPs. Their location sets are separately denoted
by Φb(λb) and Φe(λe) with corresponding densities λb and λe Jeong et al. (2014); Liu et al.
(2014). In such a network conﬁguration, it is assumed that the communication links undergo a
path-loss characterized by the exponent υ and α −μ fading.
Consider a transmitter that intends to send private messages to a legitimate user in the presence
of eavesdroppers located at some unknown distances re. In such a stochastic MIMO wireless
system, the conventional STT scheme is considered at the transmitter and receivers Zhu et al.
(2016), then the instantaneous received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at a legitimate user, γb,
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Table 8.1 Notations and symbols
Notations Description
[x]+ [x]+ = max(x,0)
N positive integer
E expectation operator
i.i.d identical independent distributed
Rt transmission rate
d dimensions of the network
r distance from the origin to the receiver
υ path-loss exponent
fX PDF of X
FX CDF of X
cd πd/2/Γ(1+d/2)
δ d/υ
Ψ path-loss process before fading
Ξk path-loss process with fading for legitimate users
Ξe path-loss process with fading for eavesdroppers
λb density for legitimate receivers
λe density for eavesdroppers
Γ(a)
Γ(a) =
∫ ∞
0 t
a−1e−tdt
Gamma function (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (8.310.1))
γ(a,x)
γ(a,x) =
∫ x
0 t
a−1e−tdt
lower incomplete gamma function (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (8.350.1))
Γ(a,x)
Γ(a,x) =
∫ ∞
x t
a−1e−tdt
upper incomplete gamma function(Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (8.350.2))
Hp,qm,n[·] Fox’s H-function (Mathai & Saxena, 1978, eq. (1.1.1))
and an eavesdropper, γe, would be expressed as (Zhu et al., 2016, eq.(1))
γb =
P
Na
∑
na=1
Nb
∑
nk=1
gna,nk
rυl σ
2
k
= ηk
gk
rυl
, (8.1a)
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Legitimate user
Transmitter
Eavesdropper
Figure 8.1 A 2-dimensional stochastic MIMO
wireless network with independently HPPP distributed
legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers
γe =
P
Na
∑
na=1
Ne
∑
ne=1
gna,ne
rυe σ2e
= ηe
ge
rυe
, (8.1b)
where ηi = Pσ2i
, gna,ni = |hna,ni |2, i ∈ {k,e}, denote the instantaneous channel power gain with
unit mean. P denotes the transmission power and the terms σi denote the noise power at the
legitimate and eavesdropping receivers, respectively. So herein, rl and hna,nk are the distance
and fading envelope from the transmitter to the k-th legitimate receiver, respectively. Similarly,
re and hna,ne are the distance and fading envelope from the transmitter to the eavesdropper,
respectively. Here, hna,ni are modeled by α − μ fading with an arbitrary fading parameter
αi > 0 and an inverse normalized variance of hαii denoted as μi.
Since STT scheme is used, gi is obviously the sum of all the receivers’ channel gain. Recalling
the results obtained in da Costa et al. (2008), the exact PDF and CDF of gi are too complex
due to the convolution of M PDFs of each eavesdropper’s channel gain when developing the
secrecy performance. Thanks to the highly tight approximation method provided therein, it is
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deduced therein that the PDF of gi is given as the following form with parameters (αi, μi, Ωi)3,
fgi(x)≈
αix
αiμi
2 −1
2Ω
αiμi
2
i Γ(μi)
exp
(
−
(
x
Ωi
)αi
2
)
= εiH1,00,1
⎡
⎣θix
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(μi− 2αi , 2αi )
⎤
⎦ , (8.2)
where Ωi = Γ(μi)
Γ
(
μi+ 2αi
) , εi = 1ΩiΓ(μi) , and θi = 1Ωi . After integrating (8.2), the CDF of gi is given
by
Fgi(x) =
γ
(
μi,
(
x
Ωi
)αi
2
)
Γ(μi)
= 1− εi
θi
H2,01,2
⎡
⎣θix
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(0,1),(μi, 2αi )
⎤
⎦ . (8.3)
8.4 Problem Formulation
8.4.1 User Association
8.4.1.1 The nearest user
In this case, all the receivers are ordered according to their distance from the transmitter. Let
{rk} be a random set of legitimate receivers in ascending order of the distances from the re-
ceiver to the transmitter (i.e., |r1|< |r2|< |r3|< · · · ). Letting Z = gkrυk , the PDF and CDF of the
composite channel gain are respectively given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The PDF and CDF of the composite channel gain for the k-th nearest legitimate
user are given by (8.4a) and (8.4b) in terms of the Fox’s H-function4, respectively.
f gk
rυk
(z) =
εk
A
1
δ
k Γ(k)
H1,11,1
⎡
⎣θkz
A
1
δ
k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1− k− 1δ , 1δ )
(μk− 2αk ,
2
αk
)
⎤
⎦ , (8.4a)
3 The method of obtaining all these three parameters is suggested to refer to da Costa et al. (2008).
4 The numerical evaluation of Fox’s H-function for MATLAB implementations is to use the method
given in (Peppas et al., 2012, Table. II).
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Fgk
rυk
(z) = 1− εk
θkΓ(k)
H2,12,2
⎡
⎣θkz
A
1
δ
k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1− k, 1δ ),(1,1)
(0,1),(μk, 2αk )
⎤
⎦ , (8.4b)
where Ak = πλb.
Proof. See Appendixes IV.1 and IV.2, respectively.
Similarly, the PDF and CDF for the k-th nearest eavesdropper can be obtained with parameters
Ae = πλe.
8.4.1.2 The best user
Unlike the nearest user, the k-th best user describes the ordering of the recerivers according to
the received SNR function of the combination of the path-loss and small-scale fading. Letting
Ξk = {ξk  rυk /gk,k ∈ N} be the path-loss process with small-scale fading. It is reported in
Haenggi (2008b) that Ξk is also a PPP with the intensity function λΞk . For the k-th best user,
we have |ξ1|< |ξ2|< |ξ3|< · · · , since ξk takes the inverse shape of the composite channel gain.
Lemma 2. Given the path-loss process with the α −μ fading, the intensity of Ξk is given by
λΞk = Ab0x
δ−1, (8.5)
where Ab0 =
λbcdδΩδk Γ
(
μk+ 2δαk
)
Γ(μk)
.
Proof. See Appendix IV.3.
Similarly, with regard to eavesdroppers, we have Ξe = {rυe /ge,e ∈ N}, λΞe = Ae0yδ−1, Ae0 =
λecdδΩδe Γ(μe+ 2δαe )
Γ(μe) .
Let 1ξk = Z, then the PDF and CDF of
1
ξk
are provided in the following Lemma.
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Lemma 3. The PDF and CDF of the composite channel gain for the k-th best user are
f 1
ξk
(z) = exp
(
−Ab1z−δ
) δ (Ab1z−δ )k
z−1Γ(k)
. (8.6a)
F 1
ξk
(z) =
Γ(k,Ab1z−δ )
Γ(k)
, (8.6b)
where Ab1 = Ab0/δ .
Proof. See Appendix IV.4.
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Figure 8.2 The PDFs for the k-th best and nearest users when
αk = 2, μk = 3, ηk = 0 dB, d = υ = 2, λb = 2, Na = Nb = 1
As shown in Fig. 8.2, the PDFs for the k-th nearest and the k-th best legitimate user are respec-
tively demonstrated, it is observed that our analysis are successfully validated by simulation
results.
145
8.4.2 Secrecy Metrics
8.4.2.1 Connection outage probability
Connection outage probability is deﬁned as the event in which the legitimate receiver cannot
successfully decode the transmitted messages. This happens when the main channel capacity
falls below the actual transmission rate Rt . It is mathematically deﬁned as
Pco(Rt) =Pr
(
log2
(
1+
ηkgk
rυl
)
< Rt
)
. (8.7)
8.4.2.2 Probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
The secrecy capacity of the aforementioned system model under the assumption that eaves-
droppers do not collude, is Liu et al. (2014)
Cs:k =
[
log2
(
1+
ηkgk
rυl
)
− log2
(
1+
ηege
rυe
)]+
. (8.8)
When the wiretap channel capacity is less than the main channel capacity, the eavesdroppers are
incapable of successfully decoding the transmitted messages. The probability of the occurrence
for this event is called as the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity. Mathematically from
(8.8), the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity is deﬁned as
Pnz =Pr
(
ηkgk
rυl
>
ηege
rυe
)
. (8.9)
8.4.2.3 Ergodic secrecy capacity
In line with Chen & Yin (2013); Kong et al. (2018b); Li, N., Tao, X. & Xu, J. (2014); Li, N.,
Tao, X., Wu, H., Xu, J. & Cui, Q. (2016); Liu et al. (2016); Zhou, X. & McKay, M. R. (2010),
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the ergodic secrecy capacity is obtained as follows
Cs:k =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣E
[
log2
(
1+
ηkgk
rυl
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RMk
−E
[
log2
(
1+
ηege
rυe
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RWk
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+
, (8.10)
where RMk and R
W
k are the ergodic capacity of the transmitter to the k-th legitimate receiver and
the k-th eavesdropper, respectively.
8.5 Performance Characterization
By using the PDFs and CDFs of the composite channel gain for the k-th nearest/best user, we
study the COP, PNZ, and ergodic secrecy capacity, respectively.
8.5.1 Performance Characterization of the COP
8.5.1.1 Connection outage probability for the k-th nearest receiver
From the deﬁnition, the COP for the k-th nearest legitimate receiver is mathematically ex-
pressed as
Pco,N(Rt) =Pr
(
log2
(
1+
ηkgk
rυk
)
< Rt
)
=Pr
(
gk
rυk
<
2Rt −1
ηk
)
. (8.11)
Notably, Pco,N(Rt) can be assessed from the PDF of the k-th legitimate receiver’s channel
gain. For the ease of notations, we set Δ= 2
Rt−1
ηk
.
Proposition 5. The COP of the k-th nearest legitimate receiver is given as
Pco,N(Rt) = Fgk
rυk
(Δ) . (8.12)
Proof. Substituting (8.4b) into (8.11), the proof is achieved.
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8.5.1.2 Connection outage probability for the k-th best receiver
Similarly, the COP for the k-th best receiver is given
Pco,B(Rt) =Pr
(
log2
(
1+
ηk
ξk
)
< Rt
)
= 1−Pr
(
ξk <
1
Δ
)
. (8.13)
Based on (8.13), it is becoming apparent that the COP for the k-th best receiver is termed as
Fξk .
Proposition 6. The COP of the k-th best legitimate receiver takes the following shape
Pco,B(Rt) =
Γ
(
k,Ab1Δ−δ
)
Γ(k)
. (8.14)
Proof. Substituting (8.6b) into (8.13), the proof is completed.
8.5.2 Performance Characterization of the PNZ
In this section, the PNZs, with respect to the k-th nearest and best legitimate receiver, are well
investigated.
As seen from (8.8) for the non-colluding eavesdroppers, the non-zero secrecy capacity for
the k-th legitimate receiver is mathematically guaranteed with the probability given for the
following four scenarios:
• case 1): the k-th nearest legitimate receiver in the presence of the 1st nearest eavesdropper5;
Pnz,NN =Pr
(
ηkgk
rυk
>
ηege
rυe
)
=Pr
(
ge
rυe
rυk
gk
<
ηk
ηe
)
=
∫ ∞
0
Fge
rυe
(ϖy) f gk
rυk
(y)dy. (8.15)
5 The nearest eavesdropper is the one closest to the legitimate receiver.
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• case 2): the k-th best legitimate receiver in the presence of the 1st best eavesdropper6;
Pnz,BB =Pr
(
ηk
ξk
>
ηe
ξe
)
= 1−Pr
(
ξe
ξk
<
1
ϖ
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
Fξe
( y
ϖ
)
fξk(y)dy. (8.16)
• case 3): the k-th nearest legitimate receiver in the presence of the 1st best eavesdropper;
Pnz,NB = Pr
(
ηkgk
rυk
>
ηe
ξe
)
= 1−Pr
(
gk
rυk
ξe <
1
ϖ
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
Fgk
rυk
(
1
ϖy
)
fξe(y)dy. (8.17)
• case 4): the k-th best legitimate receiver in the presence of the 1st nearest eavesdropper
Pnz,BN = Pr
(
ηk
ξk
>
ηege
rυe
)
= Pr
(
ge
rυe
ξk < ϖ
)
=
∫ ∞
0
Fge
rυe
(
ϖ
y
)
fξk(y)dy. (8.18)
8.5.2.1 The k-th nearest receiver & the 1st nearest eavesdropper
Proposition 7. The PNZ of the k-th nearest legitimate receiver in the presence of the 1st nearest
eavesdropper can be calculated from
Pnz,NN = 1− εkεeθkθeΓ(k)H
3,2
3,3
⎡
⎣θeϖ
θk
(
Ak
Ae
) 1
δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1−μk, 2αk ),(0,
1
δ )
(0,1),(μe, 2αe ),(k,
1
δ )
⎤
⎦ . (8.19)
Proof. See Appendix IV.5.
8.5.2.2 The k-th best receiver & the 1st best eavesdropper
Proposition 8. The PNZ of the k-th best legitimate receiver in the presence of the 1st best
eavesdropper is given as
Pnz,BB =
(
Ab1
Ab1+Ae1ϖ−δ
)k
. (8.20)
6 The best eavesdropper is supposed to be the one with the smallest ξe.
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Proof. Motivated by (A IV-6), for the best eavesdropper, the CDF of ξe is given by
Fξe(x) = γ
(
1,Ae1xδ
)
= 1− exp(−Ae1xδ ),
(8.21)
where Ae1 = Ae0/δ .
After plugging (8.21) and (A IV-7) into (8.16), it yields
Pnz,BB = 1−Pr
(
ξe
ξk
<
1
ϖ
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
Fξe
( y
ϖ
)
fξk(y)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−Ae1
( y
ϖ
)δ)
exp(−Ab1yδ )δ (Ab1y
δ )k
yΓ(k)
dy
(a)
=
δAkb1
Γ(k)
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−(Ab1+Ae1ϖ−δ )yδ
)
yδk−1dy
=
(
Ab1
Ab1+Ae1ϖ−δ
)k
,
(8.22)
where (a) follows from (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, Eq. (3.351.3)).
In the following lemma we characterize a limit on the k-th best receiver. From Proposition
8, one can obtain the maximum possible k-th index for a given probability constraint, τ =
1−Pnz,BB.
Lemma 4. The maximum number of ordered best intended receivers that can securely commu-
nicate with the source in the presence of the best eavesdropper is given as
k∗ = log Ab1
Ab1+Ae1ϖ−δ
(τ) . (8.23)
Proof. The proof directly follows from Proposition 8.
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8.5.2.3 The k-th nearest receiver & the 1st best eavesdropper
Proposition 9. The PNZ of the k-th nearest legitimate receiver in the presence of the 1st best
non-colluding eavesdropper is given by
Pnz,NB =
εk
θkΓ(k)
H1,33,2
⎡
⎣ϖ
θk
(
Ak
Ae1
) 1
δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1−μk, 2αk ),(0,
1
δ )
(k, 1δ ),(0,1)
⎤
⎦ . (8.24)
Proof. See Appendix IV.6.
8.5.2.4 The k-th best receiver & the 1st nearest eavesdropper
Proposition 10. The PNZ of the k-th best legitimate receiver in the presence of the 1st nearest
non-colluding eavesdropper is given by
Pnz,BN = 1− εeθeΓ(k)H
1,3
3,2
⎡
⎣ 1
θeϖ
(
Ae
Ab1
) 1
δ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1−μe, 2αe ),(1− k, 1δ )
(1, 1δ ),(0,1)
⎤
⎦ . (8.25)
Proof. See Appendix IV.7.
8.5.3 Performance Characterization of Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
From the perspective of the eavesdroppers’ received signal quality, the ﬁrst nearest or best
eavesdropper can achieve the highest composite channel gain. As such, the ergodic secrecy
capacity can be similarly analyzed for the four considered scenarios. Motivated from (8.10),
the ergodic secrecy capacity can be obtained from the difference of the ergodic capacities
between the transmitter-legitimate receiver link and the transmitter-eavesdropper link Liu et al.
(2016). In accordance with our proposed user association method, i.e., the k-th nearest or best
user, the ergodic capacity of the transmitter to the k-th nearest legitimate receiver, RMN,k, and the
transmitter to the k-th best legitimate receiver, RMB,k, are correspondingly obtained in the follow
proposition in order to simplify our derivations of ergodic secrecy capacity.
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Proposition 11. The ergodic capacity of the transmitter to the k-th nearest or best legitimate
user, RMN,k and R
M
B,k, are respectively given by
RMN,k =
εk
θkΓ(k) ln2
H2,33,3
⎡
⎣ηkA 1δk
θk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1),(1−μk, 2αk )
(1,1),(k, 1δ ),(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (8.26a)
RMB,k =
δ
Γ(k) ln2
H2,23,2
⎡
⎣Ab1ηδk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,δ ),(1,δ ))
(k,1),(1,δ ),(0,δ )
⎤
⎦ , (8.26b)
where Hm,np,q [.] is the Fox’s H-function.
Proof. See Appendix. IV.8.
Similarly, the RWN,k and R
W
B,k can be easily derived by making some simple manipulations. Ac-
cordingly, considering either the 1st nearest or best eavesdropper, by letting k = 1 for RWN,k and
RWB,k, and setting R
W
N,1 and R
W
B,1 as R
W
N and R
W
B , then we have the following remark.
Remark 10. Taking account of the aforementioned four scenarios, the ergodic secrecy capacity
are respectively given by
- case 1:
C¯s:k,NN = [RMN,k−RWN ]+, (8.27a)
- case 2:
C¯s:k,BB = [RMB,k−RwB ]+, (8.27b)
- case 3:
C¯s:k,NB = [RMN,k−RWB ]+, (8.27c)
- case 4:
C¯s:k,BN = [RMB,k−RWN ]+. (8.27d)
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For the sake of showing brevity, the details are not given in (8.27a-8.27d), respectively, how-
ever, those can be easily obtained from Proposition. 11 by making some simple algebraic
substitutions.
8.6 Numerical Results and Discussions
For a given network conﬁguration, the secrecy metrics, including the COP and PNZ, are under
analysis in Section 8.5. In this section, the accuracy of our analysis is validated by presenting
numerical simulations. In the whole simulation conﬁguration, it is assumed that r= 10 and the
simulation solely takes places under α −μ fading channels.
In addition, we will study the effects of the density, the path-loss exponent υ , different α −μ
fading factors and dimensions of space on the secrecy metrics. Note that in our simulation, the
WAFO toolbox of MATLAB Brodtkorb et al. (2000) has been used to generate α −μ variates.
It is very important to note that higher system performance is achieved at lower COP as well
as higher PNZ probabilities.
8.6.1 Results Pertaining to COP
This subsection studies the system performance with respect to the nearest and best legitimate
receivers, and we provide a comparison between the two performances.
The Pco,N stated in (8.11) versus the k-th nearest legitimate receiver under α − μ fading is
shown in Fig. 8.3. It demonstrates how the COP for the k-th nearest legitimate receiver is
affected as the legitimate user’s index increases, for various α−μ fading scenarios. In addition,
Fig. 8.3 also demonstrates the conformity of our analytical derivations to simulation outcomes.
The Pco,B drafted in (8.13) versus λb is illustrated and compared with the Pco,B in Fig. 8.4
for selected values of the k-th legitimate nearest/best receiver. From this graph, we obtain the
conclusions that: (i) the connection outage occurs with a higher probability for larger index
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values and larger λb; and (ii) since λb grows in equal steps, the gap between Pco,N and Pco,B
tends to be larger for higher index values λb.
Having studied the performance with respect to the nearest and best legitimate receivers, we
compare the COP for the 1st nearest and best legitimate receiver for various selected path-loss
exponent υ values and Nb, in the next step.
The result of this comparison is shown in Fig. 8.5. Strikingly, one can conceive that on one
hand, higher path-loss exponent always results in a higher probability of connection outage
both for the k-th nearest and best receivers. On the other hand, the k-th best receiver always
owns a relatively lower connection outage probability compared with the k-th nearest one, as
predicted. In addition, the COP deserves with lower probability due to its better quality of
received signal, as Nb increase.
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Figure 8.3 Pco,N versus the k-th nearest legitimate
receiver for ηk = 5 dB, λb = 1, Na = Nb = 1 Rt = 1
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Figure 8.4 Pco versus λb for selected k-th (k ∈ {2,4})
nearest/best user when ηk = 0 dB, Rt = 1, αk = 2,
μk = 3, υ = 4, d = 2
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Figure 8.5 Comparison ofPco,N toPco,B versus Nb
for λb = 0.1, ηk =−5 dB, αk = 2, μk = 3, Rt = 1,
d = 3 and various path-loss exponent υ ∈ {2,4}
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8.6.2 Results Pertaining to PNZ
In this subsection, we study the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity in the presence of non-
colluding eavesdroppers. Be reminded that higher PNZ probabilities indicate a better system
performance. For the sake of simplicity, the ﬁrst nearest/best eavesdropper is considered for
evaluating the secrecy risk.
Figs. 8.6–8.12 demonstrate the PNZ versus the k-th legitimate receiver in the presence of
non-colluding eavesdroppers. It is easily observed that our theoretical analyses are in strong
agreement with the simulation outcomes.
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100
 = 2, k = e = 1
 = 2, k = 1, e = 3
 = 2, k = 3, e = 2
 = 3, k = e = 2
 = 4, k = 2, e = 3
Analysis, eq. (8.19)
Figure 8.6 Pnz,NN versus the k-th nearest legitimate
receiver for ϖ = 0 dB, Na = Nb = Ne = 1, αk = αe = α ,
λb = 0.2, λe = 0.1, d = 2, υ = 2
Fig. 8.6 plots the PNZ against the k-th nearest legitimate receiver’s index for selected values
of α and μ when the nearest eavesdropper is considered. It is observed here that almost for all
values of the k-th user index, the PNZ performance is better (probability is higher) for smaller
values of α , μm and μw.
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Figure 8.7 Pnz versus the k-th legitimate receiver for
ϖ = 0 dB, λb = 0.2, λe = 0.1, Na = 2,Nb = 1,Ne = 2,
αk = 2, μk = 1, αe = 2, μe = 4, d = 2, υ = 2
Fig. 8.7 compares the PNZs given in (8.19), (8.20), (8.24) and (8.25) for the four scenar-
ios, where the 1st nearest or best eavesdropper is considered. One can conceive that (i)
our closed-form expressions are conﬁrmed by the Monte-Carlo simulation outcomes; (ii) the
Pnz,BN outperforms the other three scenarios when k = 1,2, this trend is changing as k reach
4, the probability of having a positive secrecy capacity drops in a descending order, namely,
Pnz,NN >Pnz,NB >Pnz,BN >Pnz,BB. The reason behind lies in that two ordering key factors,
i.e., distances and composite channel gain, are in turn playing a critical role on the secrecy
performance especially as k increases.
As shown in Fig. 8.8, the inﬂuence of υ on the PNZ is demonstrated. As it can be readily
observed, the PNZs tend to decrease as the k-th user index grows for all considered υ .
Fig. 8.9 presents the maximum number of the k-th best users for a given probability constraint
τ . As illustrated in this ﬁgure, it can be easily seen that many more best users are permitted for
higher ϖ and higher λb/λe.
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Figure 8.8 Pnz versus the k-th nearest/best legitimate
receiver for ϖ = 0 dB, λb = 0.2, λe = 0.1,
Na = 2,Nb = 1,Ne = 2, αk = αe = μk = 2, μe = 3, and
d = 3
As observed in Fig. 8.7, the 1st nearest/best legitimate receiver is mostly endangered by the
malicious eavesdropper. As a result, in the following three Figs, the impacts of ϖ , the receiving
antenna numbers Nb,Ne, and the density of two kinds of receivers, λb and λe on the PNZ are
investigated. In this case, the ﬁrst nearest/best legitimate receiver is considered in Figs. 8.10-
8.12.
In Fig. 8.10, the PNZs are anticipated to witness an increasing trend as ϖ increases. It is
intuitively observed that the 1st best user is guaranteed with a higher probability in the presence
of the 1st nearest eavesdropper. Such a phenomenon repeats itself for the Figs 8.11 and 8.12.
To terminate the discussion, in Figs. 8.11 and 8.12, we present the PNZs against the number
of receiving antennas and the densities, respectively. It is observed that an increased Nb/Ne
ratio indicates the legitimate receivers are much more capable to achieve a higher quality of
receiving signals, which naturally yields a higher probability of positive secrecy capacity. It is
validated by Fig. 8.11(a).
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Figure 8.9 The maximum size of the best ordered user
k∗ versus ϖ for selected values of τ and density ratios
λb/λe, according to (8.23), when Na = Nb = Ne = 1,
αk = 3,μk = 2, αk = 2,μk = 3, and d = υ = 2
On the contrary, this trend is conversely preserved regardless of the k-th user index value.
As Ne/Nb increases, the k-th best legitimate receiver achieves the highest and second-highest
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (best performance), in the presence of the nearest/best
eavesdropper, respectively, which are characterized by Pnz,BN and Pnz,BB. Next, the 1st near-
est legitimate receiver suffers more, resulting in a lower probability, as denoted by Pnz,NN .
Naturally, the worst performance is recoded when the system challenges against the best eaves-
dropper, described byPnz,NB.
From the comparison of the PNZ against densities shown in Fig. 8.12, one can conclude that (i)
conditioned on a given λb, the higher λe indicates a system with relatively more eavesdroppers.
An increase in the number of eavesdroppers progressively endangers the legitimate link, i.e.,
probability becomes worse (lower) for higher number of eavesdroppers; and (ii) for a ﬁxed
number of eavesdroppers, lower λb values result in worse performance, i.e., lower probability
of non-zero secrecy capacity.
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Figure 8.10 Pnz versus ϖ for the 1st nearest/best
legitimate receiver for λb = 0.2, λe = 0.1,
Na = Nb = Ne = 2, αk = αe = 2, μk = 2, μe = 3,
d = 3 and υ = 2
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Figure 8.11 Pnz versus the number of received
antennas at the 1st nearest/best receivers for ϖ = 10
dB, λb = 0.2, λe = 0.1, αk = αe = 2, μk = 1,
μe = 3, d = 3, Na = 2 and υ = 2
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Figure 8.12 Pnz versus the density of 1st nearest/best
receivers for ϖ = 10 dB, Na = Nb = Ne = 2, αk = αe = 2,
μk = 2, μe = 3, d = 3 and υ = 2
8.6.3 Results Pertaining to Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
Fig. 8.13 plots the ergodic secrecy capacity versus the k-th nearest or best legitimate receiver,
while in the presence of the 1st nearest or best eavesdropper, respectively. Again, the same
conclusion can be obtained: the ergodic secrecy capacity, as depicted in case 4, outperforms
the other 3 cases.
8.7 Conclusion
In the context of this paper, we investigated the secrecy performance of HPPP-based random
MIMO wireless networks over α−μ fading channels for the ﬁrst time. For the purpose of eval-
uating the secrecy performance of such a network, the COP, PNZ and ergodic secrecy capacity
for the k-th nearest/best legitimate receiver in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers are
derived and quantiﬁed with closed-form expressions.
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Figure 8.13 C¯s versus the k-th nearest/best legitimate
receiver for λb = λe = 1, Na = Nb = Ne = 1,
αk = αe = 2, μk = μe = 1, d = 2 and υ = 2, ηk = 15 dB,
ηe = 0 dB
The accuracy of our analytical derivations are further successfully conﬁrmed by simulation out-
comes. Remarkable observations are drawn from the numerical results obtained in this paper.
Indeed, the secrecy performance metrics are inﬂuenced by the density of users, the path-loss
exponent, the number of transmitting and receiving antennas, as well as the fading parameters.
In addition, the secrecy performance regarding the k-th best legitimate receiver outperforms
that of the k-th nearest one. Hence, the nearest path does not necessarily provide the best
secrecy performance. This paper’s results and outcomes regarding parameters that inﬂuence
secrecy performance will enable researchers or wireless system designers to quickly evaluate
system performance and determine the optimal available parameter choices when facing differ-
ent security risks. Finally, inspired from Wang, G., Liu, Q., He, R., Gao, F. & Tellambura, C.
(2015b), future works will focus on using the beamforming deploying artiﬁcial noise technique
over the homogeneous stochastic MIMO wireless network.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1 Conclusions
The aim of this dissertation is the secrecy characterization of physical layer security over
the α − μ , Fisher-Snedecor F , and Fox’s H-function wiretap fading channels. Conclusively
speaking, there are four main contributions in this dissertation: (i) secrecy investigation over
three fading models, where secrecy metrics are derived with closed-form expressions; (ii) ex-
ploration of physical layer security over wireless fading channels, with the assistance of MG
distributions; (iii) reliability and secrecy exploration of a new fading model, i.e., the cascaded
α − μ , and (iv) secrecy evaluation of random MIMO wireless networks over α − μ fading
channels. Speciﬁcally, the aforementioned contributions are further detailed as follows:
- The ﬁrst aspect of this dissertation contains three sub-contributions. Those contributions are
organized in accordance with the three fading models, namely, α −μ , Fisher-Snedecor F ,
and Fox’s H-function. The secrecy performance over SISO and SIMO α−μ wiretap fading
channels are provided in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively. Secrecy metrics, including secrecy
outage probability and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, are both characterized
by closed-form expressions. Similarly, secrecy evaluation over Fisher-Snedecor F and
Fox’s H-function wiretap fading channels are subsequently conducted in Chapters 4 and 5,
respectively. The exact and asymptotic behaviors of secrecy metrics are also provided. In
addition, the MG distribution was deployed in Chapter 6 to analyze the secrecy metrics.
- In continuation with the secrecy characterization over α − μ wiretap fading channels, in
Chapter 7, the cascaded α − μ fading channel was proposed. This new fading model can
be used to characterize several wireless communication scenarios, such as multi-hop AF
relaying networks and MIMO keyhole communication systems. The key contributions of
Chapter 7 are two-fold: (i) mathematical characteristics of the cascaded α −μ distribution;
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and (ii) feasibility and applicability of this model to a wireless communication system, in
other words, reliability and secrecy analysis over cascaded α −μ fading channels.
- The aforementioned chapters considered the secrecy analysis over three fading channels.
On account of the realistic wireless communication system, i.e., the impacts from the spa-
tial distribution of users, the path-loss exponent, the number of antennas, and the density of
users, secrecy exploration of random MIMO wireless networks over α − μ wiretap fading
channels was studied in Chapter 8. The legitimate and malicious users are respectively mod-
eled with two independent HPPPs. The connection outage probability, the probability of
non-zero secrecy capacity, and the ergodic secrecy capacity were derived with closed-form
expressions. This work enables wireless communication engineers to have quick access and
thus to perform secrecy evaluations when facing security risks.
9.2 Future work
In this dissertation, the contributions presented could be extended to the following future di-
rections:
9.2.1 Imperfect CSI, Outdated CSI, and Aging CSI
In this dissertation, assuming the availability of perfect CSI at the transmitters and receivers,
secrecy performance was explored over several fading channel models. Actually, the imperfect
CSI caused by the channel estimation process, and the outdated and aging CSI caused by
the users’ mobility, are of high signiﬁcance to the secrecy performance evaluation. As stated
in one of the conference papers entitled ‘Secrecy Analysis of A MIMO Full-Duplex Active
Eavesdropper with Channel Estimation Errors’, it has shown that imperfect CSI degrades the
secrecy performance. Also, the works in Hu, J., Yang, W., Yang, N., Zhou, X. & Cai, Y. (2016);
Michalopoulos, D. S., Suraweera, H. A., Karagiannidis, G. K. & Schober, R. (2012); Zhao, R.,
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Lin, H., He, Y. C., Chen, D. H., Huang, Y. & Yang, L. (2018) investigated the impacts caused
by outdated CSI and channel aging on secrecy metrics. As a result, the secrecy performance
with consideration of the practical CSI situation is worthwhile to be examined and analyzed in
the future.
9.2.2 Unavailability of Eavesdroppers’ CSI
Throughout this thesis, it is assumed that the eavesdroppers’ CSI is perfectly known at the
transmitter. Such an assumption is usually impractical, especially in the presence of passive
eavesdroppers. Towards this end, how to elaborate the inﬂuences of the uncertainty of the
eavesdroppers’ CSI into the secrecy exploration will be a promising direction.
9.2.3 Full-duplex Transceivers and Interference
In the aforementioned conference paper, a full-duplex eavesdropper is considered to wiretap the
legitimate link while sending jamming signals to the legitimate receiver. From the perspective
of legitimate users, jamming signals from illegitimate users are surely regarded as interference
to prevent secure transmission of intended private messages. To this end, how to reasonably
employ full-duplex techniques and jamming policies at the legitimate users is a promising and
interesting research problem to enhance secrecy in wireless networks.
9.2.4 Relaying Scheme and Randomly Distributed Users
In Chapter 8, the legitimate users and eavesdroppers are modeled as two independent HPPPs.
Random eavesdroppers are ordered according to the quality of eavesdroppers’ received signal
or to the distance from the transmitter, to explore how much risk are burdened on the legitimate
receivers. Motivated by the results obtained in Chapter 8, a new future research work could
be the investigation of multi-hop relaying networks in the presence of random eavesdroppers.
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Relaying schemes can be AF or decode-and-forward (DF). Linear and non-linear multi-hop
relaying networks can be conﬁgured to evaluate the security concern.
APPENDIX I
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 4
1. Proof forPout,1
In order to obtain the analytical solution to (4.7), the Parseval’s relation for Mellin transform
(Debnath & Bhatta, 2014, eq. (8.3.23)) is recalled, which is given by
Pout(Rt) =
∫ ∞
0
FB(γ0) fE(γE)dγE =
1
2π j
∫
L1
M [FB(γ0),1− s]M [ fE(γ),s]ds, (A I-1)
whereL1 is the integration path from υ − j∞ to υ + j∞, and υ is a constant Debnath & Bhatta
(2014).
Then by introducing the deﬁnition of univariate Meijer’s G-function, M [FB(γ0),1− s] can be
rewritten as
M [FB(γ0),1− s] =
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE FB(γ0)dγE
(b)
=
ΦB
2π j
∫
L2
Γ(−ξ )Γ(mB+ξ )Γ(mB,s−ξ )
Γ(1−ξ ) λ
−ξ
B ×
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE γ
−ξ
0 dγEdξ ,
(A I-2)
where step (b) is developed by interchanging the order of two integrals.
The inner integral in (A I-2) can be further written as
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE γ
−ξ
0 dγE
(c)
=W −ξ
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE(
1+ RsW γE
)ξ dγE
(d)
=W −ξB(1− s,ξ + s−1)
(
Rs
W
)s−1
(e)
=W −ξ
Γ(1− s)Γ(ξ + s−1)
Γ(ξ )
(
Rs
W
)s−1
,
(A I-3)
where step (c) is developed by representing γ0 = RsγE +W , step (d) is obtained from (Grad-
shteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (3.194.3)), and step (e) is further simpliﬁed in a closed-form by
deploying the propertyB(x,y) = Γ(x)Γ(y)Γ(x+y) (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (8.384.1)).
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Next, plugging (A I-3) into (A I-2), yields the following result
M [FB(γ0),1− s] = ΦB2π j
∫
L2
Γ(−ξ )Γ(mB+ξ )
Γ(1−ξ )
Γ(mB,s−ξ )Γ(1− s)Γ(ξ + s−1)
Γ(ξ )(λBW )ξ
(
Rs
W
)s−1
dξ
=
ΦBΓ(1− s)Rs−1s
W s−1
G2,23,3
⎡
⎣λBW
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−mB,s,1,0)
(s−1,mB,0)
⎤
⎦ ,
(A I-4)
whereL2 is a certain contour, which separates the poles of Γ(−ξ ) from the poles of Γ(mB+ξ ).
In continuation, with the help from (Mathai et al., 2009a, eq. (2.9)),M [ fE(γ),s] is given by
M [ fE(γE),s] = CE
Γ(mE −1+ s)Γ(1+mE,s− s)
λ sE
. (A I-5)
Next, substituting (A I-4) and (A I-5) into (A I-1), yields
Pout =−ΦBCEW4π2Rs
∫
L1
∫
L2
Γ(ξ + s−1)Γ(−ξ )
Γ(1−ξ )Γ(ξ ) Γ(mB,s−ξ )Γ(mB+ξ )Γ(1− s)
×Γ(mE −1+ s)Γ(1+mE,s− s)
(
Rs
λEW
)s( 1
λBW
)ξ
dξds,
(A I-6)
subsequently, applying the deﬁnition of bivariate Meijer’s G-function results in the accom-
plishment of the proof.
2. Proof forPout,2
By substituting (4.5) and (4.3) into (4.7), making change of variables λBRsγE = y, then we have
Pout =
ΦBCE
λBRs
∫ ∞
0
G1,11,1
⎡
⎣ λE
λBRs
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−mE,s
mE −1
⎤
⎦G1,22,2
⎡
⎣y+λBW
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1−mB,s,1)
(mB,0)
⎤
⎦dy, (A I-7)
next, using (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq.(2.24.1.3)), we complete the proof.
APPENDIX II
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 5
1. Proof of the Theorem 4
At the very beginning, revisiting (5.12a)
Pout =
∫ ∞
0
FB(γ0) fE(γE)dγE
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
F¯B(γ0) fE(γE)dγE
= 1− 1
2π j
∫
L1
M [F¯B(γ0),1− s]M [ fE(γE),s]ds,
(A II-1)
and using the deﬁnition of Mellin transform and Fox’s H-function, we arrive atM [FB(s)]
M [FB(γ0),1− s] =
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE FB(γ0)dγE
(a)
=
κB
2λBπ j
∫
L1
ΘFB(ξ )λ
−ξ
B
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE γ
−ξ
0 dγEdξ ,
(A II-2)
where step (a) is developed by interchanging the order of two integrals. The inner integral in
(A II-2) can be further expressed as
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE γ
−ξ
0 dγE =W
−ξ
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE
(
1+
Rs
W
γE
)−ξ
dγE
(b)
=
B(1− s,ξ + s−1)
W ξ
(
Rs
W
)s−1
(c)
=
Γ(1− s)Γ(ξ + s−1)
Γ(ξ )W ξ
( Rs
W
)1−s ,
(A II-3)
where step (b) is developed from (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (3.194.3)), and step (c) is
obtained by usingB(x,y) = Γ(x)Γ(y)Γ(x+y) (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (8.384.1)).
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Plugging (A II-3) into (A II-2), yields the result given in (A II-4),
M [FB(γ0),1− s]
(d)
=
κB
2λBπ j
(
Rs
W
)s−1
Γ(1− s)
∫
L1
Γ(ξ + s−1)ΘFB(ξ )
Γ(ξ )
(λBW )−ξdξ
=
κBΓ(1− s)
λB
(
Rs
W
)s−1
Hm1+1,n1+1p1+2,q1+2
⎡
⎣λBW
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(a j+Aj,Aj) j=1:p,(0,1)
(s−1,1),(b j+Bj,Bj) j=1:q,(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (A II-4)
and step (d) is directly achieved from the deﬁnition of bivariate Fox’s H-function.
Subsequently, substituting (A II-4) andM [ fE(γE),s] =
κEχ
f
E(s)
λ sE
into (A II-1), yields the follow-
ing result
Pout = 1− κBκEW4λBRsπ2
∫
L1
∫
L2
Γ(ξ + s−1)ΘF¯B(ξ )
Γ(ξ )(λBW )ξ
Γ(1− s)Θ fE(s)
(
Rs
λEW
)s
dξds, (A II-5)
Next, deploying the deﬁnition of the bivariate Fox’s H-function Gradshteyn & Ryzhik (2014),
the proof is achieved.
2. Proof for Theorem 20
Since the logarithm function can be alternatively re-expressed in terms of Fox’s H-function
with the help from (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (8.4.6.5)) and (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq.
(8.3.2.21)),
ln(1+ x) = H1,22,2
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (A II-6)
For the ease of proof, we take the proof for I1 as an example.
I1 =
1
2π j
∫
L1
M [FE(γB),s]M [g(γB),1− s]ds, (A II-7)
M [FE(γB),s] =
κE
λ 1+sE
ΘFE(s), (A II-8)
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where ΘFE(s) is given by
ΘFE(s) =
Γ(−s)
m2
∏
l=1
Γ(dl +Dl +Dls)
Γ(1− s)
q2
∏
l=m2+1
Γ(1−dl −Dl −Dls)
n2
∏
i=1
Γ(1− ci−Ci−Cis)
p2
∏
i=n2+1
Γ(ci+Ci+Cis)
, (A II-9)
M [gk(γk),1− s] can be regarded as the Mellin transform of the product of two Fox’s H-
function (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)), which is given by (A II-10)
M [gB(γB),1− s] =
∫ ∞
0
γ−sB ln(1+ γB) fB(γB)dγB
= κB
∫ ∞
0
γ−sB H
1,2
2,2
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦Hm1,n1p1,q1
⎡
⎣λBγB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(a j,Aj) j=1:p1
(b j,Bj) j=1:q1
⎤
⎦dγB
=
κB
λ 1−sB
Hn1+1,m1+2q1+2,p1+2
⎡
⎣ 1
λB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1),(1−b j− (1− s)Bj,Bj) j=1:q1
(1,1),(1−a j− (1− s)Aj,Aj) j=1:p1 ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦ .
(A II-10)
Next, substituting (A II-8) and (A II-10) into (A II-7), yields the following result
I1 =− κBκE4π2λBλE
∫
L1
∫
L2
Θ(s,ξ )Θ(ξ )ΘFE(s)(
λE
λB
)s
λξB
dsdξ , (A II-11)
where Θ(s,ξ ) and Θ(ξ ) are respectively given by (A II-12a) and (A II-12b)
Θ(s,ξ ) =
n1
∏
i=1
Γ(1−ai−Ai+Ais+Aiξ )
m1
∏
l=1
Γ(bl +Bl −Bls−Blξ )
p1
∏
i=n1+1
Γ(ai+Ai−Ais−Aiξ )
q1
∏
l=m1+1
Γ(1−bl −Bl +Bls+Blξ )
, (A II-12a)
Θ(ξ ) =
Γ(1+ξ )Γ(−ξ )Γ(−ξ )
Γ(1−ξ ) . (A II-12b)
172
Next, replacing ξ = −η , s = −τ , I1 can be expressed as (5.21a) in terms of the bivariate
Fox’s H-function. In particular, when n1 = 0, I1 is further simpliﬁed in terms of the extended
generalized bivariate Fox’s H-function.
Following the same methodology, I2 can be obtained. I3 can be ﬁnally achieved from (Alhen-
nawi et al., 2016, eq. (18)),
I3 =
κE
2π j
∫
L1
M {ln(1+ γE),s}λ−1+sE Θ fE(1− s)ds
=
κE
λE
Hn2+1,m2+2q2+2,p2+2
⎡
⎣ 1
λE
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1),(1−dl −Dl,Dl)l=1:p2
(1,1),(1− ci−Ci,Ci)i=1:q2 ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦ . (A II-13)
3. Proof for Asymptotic ASC
Speciﬁcally, at high γ¯B regime, I1 can be expanded at the pole, i.e., ξ = 0, since ξ = 0 is the
second order pole, as such, by using the residue theorem, we have
Res
[
Θ(s,ξ )Θ(ξ )
λξB
,0
]
= lim
ξ→0
d
dξ
ξ 2Θ(s,ξ )Γ(ξ )2Γ(1−ξ )
λξBΓ(1+ξ )
. (A II-14)
Using the fact that dΓ(s)ds = Γ(s)Ψ0(s) and the general Leibniz rule, we have
Res
[
Θ(s,ξ )Θ(ξ )
λξB
,0
]
=Θ(s,0)
[
m1
∑
l=1
BlΨ0(bl +Bl +Bls)−
n1
∑
j=1
AjΨ0(1−a j−Aj−Ajs)
+
q1
∑
l=ml+1
BlΨ0(1−bl −Bl −Bls)−
p1
∑
i=n1+1
AiΨ0(ai+Ai+Ais)− lnλB
]
,
(A II-15)
and subsequently when
λE
λB
→ ∞, we evaluate the residue at s, where
s= max
[
0,
(
−bl +Bl
Bl
)
l=1,··· ,ml
,
(
ci+Ci−1
ci
)
i=1,··· ,n2
]
. (A II-16)
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Considering all poles are simple, we arrive at the derived asymptotic I1.
Similarly, at high γ¯B regime, I2 can be obtained at the point u = min
(
bl+Bl
Bl
)
l=1,··· ,m1
, we
complete the proof.

APPENDIX III
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 7
1. Proof for AsymptoticPop
Rewrite (7.16) in terms of the Fox’s H-function, we have
Pop = 1− KN2πC j
∫
L
Γ(s)
N
∏
k=1
Γ
(
μi+ 2αk s
)
Γ(1+ s)(KNγth)s︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε(s)
ds. (A III-1)
According to Chergui et al. (2016), expansions of the univariate and bivariate Fox’sH-functions
can be derived by evaluating the residue of the corresponding integrands at the closest poles to
the contour, namely, the minimum pole on the right for large Fox’s H-function arguments and
the maximum pole on the left for small ones.
When KNγth → ∞, then applying the residue method given in (Chergui et al., 2016, Sec. IV),
one can obtain
Pop ≈ 1−KN
C
Res[ε(s),0] = 1− lim
s→0
su(s) = 1−KN
C
N
∏
k=1
Γ(μk). (A III-2)
2. Proof for Theorem 18
Revisiting (7.37) and using the Parseval’s relation for Mellin transform (Debnath & Bhatta,
2014, eq. (8.3.23)), we have
I =
∫ ∞
0
F¯B(γ0) fE(γE)dγE
=
1
2π j
∫
L1
M [F¯B(γ0),1− s]M [ fE(γE),s]ds.
(A III-3)
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whereL1 is the integration path from υ − j∞ to υ + j∞, and υ is a constant Debnath & Bhatta
(2014) Then by introducing the deﬁnition of univariate Fox’s H-function,M [F¯B(γ0),1−s] can
be rewritten as
M [F¯B(γ0),1− s] =
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE FB(γ0)dγE
(c)
=
KNB
2CNBπ j
∫
L2
Γ(ξ )
NB
∏
i=1
Γ(μB,i+ 2αB,i ξ )
Γ(1+ξ )C ξNB
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE
γξ0
dγEdξ ,
(A III-4)
where step (c) is developed by interchanging the order of two integrals.
The inner integral in (A III-4) can be further written as
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE γ
−ξ
0 dγE
(d)
=W −ξ
∫ ∞
0
γ−sE(
1+ RsW γE
)ξ dγE
(e)
=W −ξB(1− s,ξ + s−1)
(
Rs
W
)s−1
( f )
=W −ξ
Γ(1− s)Γ(ξ + s−1)
Γ(ξ )
(
Rs
W
)s−1
,
(A III-5)
where step (d) is developed by representing γ0 = RsγE +W , step (e) is obtained from (Grad-
shteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (3.194.3)), and step ( f ) is further simpliﬁed in a closed-form by
deploying the propertyB(x,y) = Γ(x)Γ(y)Γ(x+y) (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (8.384.1)).
Next, plugging (A III-5) into (A III-4), yields the following result
M [F¯B(γ0),1− s] = KNB2CNBπ j
(
Rs
W
)s−1
Γ(1− s)
∫
L
Γ(ξ + s−1)
NB
∏
i=1
Γ(μB,i+ 2αB,i ξ )
Γ(1+ξ )(λBW )ξ
dξ
(g)
=
KNBΓ(1− s)Rs−1s
CNBW
s−1 H
NB+1,0
1,NB+1
⎡
⎣CNBW
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(s−1,1),θ1, · · · ,θNB
⎤
⎦ ,
(A III-6)
where step (g) is directly achieved from the deﬁnition of Fox’s H-function.
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Subsequently, substituting (A III-6) and M [ fE(γE),s] into (A III-3), where M [ fE(γE),s] is
given by (Alhennawi et al., 2016, eq. (5))
M [ fE(γE),s] = CNE
NE
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μE,i− 2αE,i + 2αE,i s
)
C sNE
, (A III-7)
results in the following result
I =−KNBKNEW
4CNBRsπ2
∫
L1
∫
L2
Γ(ξ + s−1)
NB
∏
i=1
Γ(μB,i+ 2αB,i ξ )
Γ(1+ξ )(CNBW )ξ
×Γ(1− s)
NE
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μE,i− 2αE,i +
2
αE,i
s
)(
Rs
CNEW
)s
dξds.
(A III-8)
Finally, plugging (A III-8) in (7.37) and subsequently applying the bivariate Fox’s H-function
(Mathai et al., 2009a, eq. (2.57)), the proof is eventually achieved.
3. Proof for AsymptoticPout
In the case of γ¯E → ∞, we have RsCNEW → ∞. The bivariate Fox’s H-function is evaluated at the
highest poles on the left of L1, i.e., s = 1− ξ , by using the residue approach Chergui et al.
(2016), therefore, it leads to the following result,
1
2π j
∫
L1
Γ(ξ + s−1)Γ(1− s)
NE
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μE,i− 2αE,i +
2
αE,i
s
)(
Rs
CNEW
)s
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ(s)
ds
≈ Res[ψ(s),1−ξ ]
= lim
s→1−ξ
(s+ξ −1)ψ(s)
= Γ(ξ )
NE
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μE,i− 2αE,iξ
)(
Rs
CNEW
)1−ξ
.
(A III-9)
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Therefore, we have
Pout ≈ 1− KNBKNE2πCNBCNE j
∫
L2
Γ(ξ )
NE
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μE,i− 2αE,i ξ
) NB
∏
i=1
Γ
(
μB,i+ 2αB,i ξ
)
Γ(1+ξ )
(
CNBRs
CNE
)ξ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ(ξ )
dξ ,
(A III-10)
continuation (A III-10) can be successively and asymptotically simpliﬁed as (10) by comput-
ing the highest pole on the right of the contour L2, namely ξ =
αE,kμE,k
2 , where αE,kμE,k =
min(αE,1μE,1, · · · ,αE, jμE, j), j = 1, · · · ,NE .
Pout ≈ 1−KNBKNE
CNBCNE
Res
[
τ(ξ ),
αE,kμE,k
2
]
, (A III-11)
then making some simple manipulations, the proof for (43) is achieved.
Following the same methodology, the proof for the case, γ¯B → ∞, can be similarly achieved
by ﬁrst computing (A III-8) at the highest pole of L2 at ξ = 1− s, and subsequently eval-
uating the obtained result at the poles of L1, i.e., s = 0 and s =
αB,kμB,k
2 , where αB,kμB,k =
min(αB,1μB,1, · · · ,αB,iμB,i), i= 1, · · · ,NB, respectively.
When γ¯E → 0, the asymptotic Pout is computed at the pole of L1, i.e., s = 1. For the case
γ¯B → 0, no pole exists on the right of the contourL2, I is directly equal to 1.
4. Proof for Theorem 16
For the ease of deriving the average secrecy capacity, the CDFs of γB and γE can be equivalently
rewritten as follows by using (Bodenschatz, 1992, eq. (3.9))
FB(γB) =
KNB
CNB
HNB,11,NB+1
⎡
⎣CNBγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
φ1, · · · ,φNB ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (A III-12a)
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FE(γE) =
KNE
CNE
HNE ,11,NE+1
⎡
⎣CNE γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
θ1, · · · ,θNE ,(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (A III-12b)
Recalling the result given in Lei et al. (2017a), the ASC given in (7.36) can be further mathe-
matically expressed as
C¯s =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Cs(γB,γE) fγB(γB) fγE (γE)dγBdγE =I1+I2−I3, (A III-13)
where I1 =
∫ ∞
0 log2(1+ γB) fB(γB)FE(γB)dγB,I2 =
∫ ∞
0 log2(1+ γE) fE(γE)FB(γE)dγE ,
I3 =
∫ ∞
0 log2(1+ γE) fE(γE)dγE .
Next, re-expressing the logarithm function in terms of the Meijer’s G-function Prudnikov et al.
(1990), and then using (Prudnikov et al., 1990, Eq. (8.3.2.21))
log2(1+ x) =
1
ln2
G1,22,2
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(1,0)
⎤
⎦ , Hm,np,q
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ap,1)
(bq,1)
⎤
⎦= Gm,np,q
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(ap)
(bq)
⎤
⎦ .
I1 can be rewritten in (A III-14),
I1 =
KNBKNE
ln(2)CNE
∫ ∞
0
H1,22,2
⎡
⎣γB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)(1,1))
(1,1),(0,1))
⎤
⎦HNB,00,NB
⎡
⎣CNBγB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
Φ1, · · · ,ΦNB
⎤
⎦
×HNE ,11,NE+1
⎡
⎣CNE γB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
θ1, · · · ,θNE
⎤
⎦dγB
=
KNBKNE
2π j ln(2)CNE
∫
L1
NE
∏
l=1
Γ
(
μE,l − 2sαE,l
)
Γ(s)
Γ(1+ s)C−sNE
×
∫ ∞
0
γsBH
1,2
2,2
⎡
⎣γB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1))
(1,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦HNB,00,NB
⎡
⎣CNBγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
Φ1, · · · ,ΦNB
⎤
⎦dγB
︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
ds,
(A III-14)
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where L1 is a certain contour separating the poles of
NE
∏
l=1
Γ(μE,l − s) from the poles of Γ(s).
The inner integral U can be directly developed by using the Mellin transform for the product
of two Fox’s H-functions (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)) as follows
U = C s+1NB H
1,2+NB
2+NB,2
⎡
⎣ 1
CNB
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1),ω1, · · · ,ωNB
(1,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (A III-15)
where ωi = (1−μB,i− 2sαB,i , 2αB,i ), subsequently, rewriting (A III-15) in terms of the deﬁnition of
Fox’s H-function, then substituting the obtained result into (A III-14), leads to the result given
in (A III-16),
I1 =− KNBKNE4π2 ln(2)CNBCNE
∫
L1
∫
L2
NE
∏
l=1
Γ
(
μE,l − 2sαE,l
)
Γ(s)Γ(1− t)Γ2(t)
Γ(1+ s)Γ(1+ t)C tNB
(
CNE
CNB
)s
×
NB
∏
i=1
Γ
(
mB,i+
2s
αB,i
+
2t
αB,i
)
dtds,
(A III-16)
where L2 is another contour, next recognizing the deﬁnition of bivariate Fox’s H-functions
Mathai et al. (2009a), the proof for I1 is accomplished.
Similarly, following the same methodology, the proof for I2 is achieved.
With the help of (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)), the proof for I3 can be similarly
obtained.
APPENDIX IV
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 8
1. Derivation of f gk
rυk
(z)
Setting Z = gkrυk
, the PDF of Z can be assessed by the ratio of gk and rυk , given by the following
form
f gk
rυk
(z) =
∫ ∞
0
y fgk(yz) frυk (y)dy
(b)
=
δAkkεk
Γ(k)
∫ ∞
0
ykδ exp(−Akyδ )H1,00,1
⎡
⎣θkzy
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(μk− 2αk ,
2
αk
)
⎤
⎦dy,
(A IV-1)
where frυk (y) = exp(−Akyδ )
δ (Akyδ )k
yΓ(k) , Ak = πλb (Liu et al., 2014, eq. (5)), (b) is developed by
substituting (8.2).
Since the exponential function can be expressed in terms of Fox’s H-function (Jeong et al.,
2014, eq. (17)), given as
exp(−Akyδ ) = 1δ H
1,0
0,1
⎡
⎣A 1δk y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(0, 1δ )
⎤
⎦ , (A IV-2)
subsequently, substituting (A IV-2) into (A IV-1) and using the Mellin transform of the product
of two Fox’s H-function (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)), the proof is concluded.
2. Derivation of Fgk
rυk
(z)
Essentially, Fgk
rυk
(z) can be mathematically expressed as
Fgk
rυk
(z) =
∫ ∞
0
Fgk(yz) frυk (y)dy
= 1− δεkA
k
k
θkΓ(k)
∫ ∞
0
ykδ−1 exp(−Akyδ )H2,01,2
⎡
⎣A 1δk y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1)
(0,1),(μk, 2αk )
⎤
⎦dy, (A IV-3)
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by using (A IV-2) and with the aid of (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)), the proof is
ﬁnally achieved.
3. Proof of Lemma 2
The intensity function of Ψ= {rυk } can be derived from E{Ψ[0,x)}= λbcdxδ by utilizing the
mapping theorem (Haenggi, 2008b, Corollary 2.a), i.e., λΨ = λbcdδxδ−1.
The intensity of Ξk is obtained by applying the displacement theorem Haenggi, M. (2012) as
follows
λΞk =
∫ ∞
0
λΨρ(x,y)dx=
∫ ∞
0
λΨ
x
y2
fgk(x/y)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
λbcdδ
xδ
y2
fgk(x/y)dx
(c)
= λbcdδyδ−1
∫ ∞
0
zδ fgk(z)dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
U4
,
(A IV-4)
where (c) is obtained by changing the variable z= x/y. The integral in (A IV-4) is solved as
U4 =
∫ ∞
0
αkz
αkμk
2 +δ−1
2Ω
αkμk
2
k Γ(μk)
exp
(
−
(
z
Ωk
)αk
2
)
dz
(d)
=
Γ(μk+ 2δαk )Ω
δ
k
Γ(μk)
, (A IV-5)
where (d) holds by using (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (3.381.10)). The proof is eventually
concluded by substituting (A IV-5) into (A IV-4).
4. Proof of Lemma 3
By using (Tolossa et al., 2017, Lemma 2), we have
Fξk(x) =Pr(ξk < x) = 1−Pr(Ξ[0,x]< k) = 1−
k−1
∑
n=0
exp
(
−
∫ x
0
λΞk(y)dy
) (∫ x
0 λΞk(y)dy
)
n!
= 1−
k−1
∑
n=0
exp(−Ab1xδ )(Ab1x
δ )n
n!
=
γ
(
k,Ab1xδ
)
Γ(k)
.
(A IV-6)
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When taking the derivative of (A IV-6), all terms in the sum are canceled out but the one for
n−1. The PDF of ξk becomes
fξk(x) = exp
(
−Ab1xδ
) δ (Ab1xδ )k
xΓ(k)
. (A IV-7)
Therefore, the composite channel gain for the k-th best user can be termed as
F 1
ξk
=Pr
(
1
ξk
< z
)
= 1−Fξk
(
1
z
)
= 1−
γ
(
k,Ab1z−δ
)
Γ(k)
=
Γ
(
k,Ab1z−δ
)
Γ(k)
. (A IV-8)
Herein, the last step is derived from (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik, 2014, eq. (8.356.3)). By taking
the derivative of F 1
ξk
(z) in terms of z, the PDF of 1ξk is directly obtained.
5. Derivation ofPnz,NN in (8.19)
Inspired by Lemma 1,Pnz,NN can be essentially derived as follows
Pnz,NN =
∫ ∞
0
Fge
rυe
(ϖy) f gk
rυk
(y)dy
= 1− εkεe
θeA
1
δ
k Γ(k)
∫ ∞
0
H1,11,1
⎡
⎣ θk
A
1
δ
k
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1− k− 1δ , 1δ )
(μk− 2αk ,
2
αk )
⎤
⎦H2,12,2
⎡
⎣ θe
A
1
δ
e
ϖy
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0, 1δ ),(1,1)
(0,1),(μe, 2αe )
⎤
⎦dy, (A IV-9)
with the help of (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)), the proof is accomplished.
6. Derivation ofPnz,NB in (8.24)
Thanks to the CDF of gkrυk
and PDF of ξe, respectively given in (8.4b) and (A IV-7), the expres-
sionPnz,NB can be easily stated as
Pnz,NB = 1−
∫ ∞
0
Fgk
rυk
(
1
ϖy
)
fξe(y)dy
=
2δAe1
αkΓ(μk)Γ(k)
∫ ∞
0
yδ−1 exp(−Ae1yδ )H2,12,2
⎡
⎣ ϖk
ϖA
1
δ
k y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1− k, 1δ ),(1,1)
(0,1),(μk, 2αk )
⎤
⎦dy. (A IV-10)
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By using (A IV-2) and with the assistance of the property of Fox’s H-function (Prudnikov et al.,
1990, eq. (8.3.2.7)),
H2,12,2
⎡
⎣ ϖk
ϖA
1
δ
k y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1− k, 1δ ),(1,1)
(0,1),(μk, 2αk )
⎤
⎦= H1,22,2
⎡
⎣ϖA 1δk y
ϖk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1−μk, 2αk )
(k, 1δ ),(0,1)
⎤
⎦ . (A IV-11)
Pnz,NB can be further developed as
Pnz,NB =
2Ae1
αkΓ(μk)Γ(k)
∫ ∞
0
yδ−1H1,00,1
⎡
⎣A 1δe1y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(0, 1δ )
⎤
⎦
×H1,22,2
⎡
⎣ϖΩkA 1δk y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1− k, 1δ ),(1, 2αk )
(μk, 2αk ),(0,
2
αk
)
⎤
⎦dy,
(A IV-12)
afterwards, performing the Mellin transform of the product of two Fox’s H-functions (Prud-
nikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)), the proof is eventually obtained.
7. Derivation ofPnz,BN in (8.25)
ThePnz,BN in (8.18) can be tracked from the PDF of ξk and the CDF of gerυe ,Pnz,4 is given by
Pnz,BN =
∫ ∞
0
Fge
rυe
(
ϖ
y
)
fξk(y)dy
= 1− εeδA
1
δ
b1
θeΓ(k)
∫ ∞
0
ykδ−1 exp(−Ab1yδ )H2,12,2
⎡
⎣θeϖ
A
1
δ
e y
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(0, 1δ ),(1,1)
(0,1),(μe, 2αe )
⎤
⎦dy. (A IV-13)
Subsequently, following the similar steps as (A IV-10-A IV-12), the proof is easily proved.
8. Derivation of Proposition (11)
As the very beginning, the logarithm function and exponential function can be alternatively
rewritten in terms of the Fox’s H-function (Mathai & Saxena, 1978, eq. (1.7.2)) and (Prudnikov
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et al., 1990, eq. (8.4.6.5))
log2(1+ x) =
1
ln2
H1,22,2
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦ , (A IV-14)
exp(−x) = H1,00,1
⎡
⎣x
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(0,1)
⎤
⎦ . (A IV-15)
RMN,k = E gk
rυk
[
log2
(
1+
ηkgk
rυk
)]
=
εk
A
1
δ
k Γ(k) ln2
∫ ∞
0
H1,22,2
⎡
⎣ηky
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦H1,11,1
⎡
⎣θky
A
1
δ
k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1− k− 1δ , 1δ )
(μk− 2αk ,
2
αk )
⎤
⎦dy.
(A IV-16)
Next, applying the Mellin transform of the product of two Fox’s H-function (Prudnikov et al.,
1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)), the proof is accomplished.
Using (Mathai & Saxena, 1978, eq. (1.2.4)), the PDF of ξk in (A IV-7) can be re-expressed in
terms of Fox’s H-function,
fξk(x) =
δ
xΓ(k)
H1,00,1
⎡
⎣Ab1xδ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(k,1)
⎤
⎦ , (A IV-17)
subsequently, using (Mathai & Saxena, 1978, eq. (1.2.2)) of log2(1+
1
x ) and plugging (A
IV-17), yields
RMB,k = Eξk
[
log2
(
1+
ηk
ξk
)]
=
δ
Γ(k) ln2
∫ ∞
0
y−1H1,22,2
⎡
⎣ y
ηk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(1,1),(1,1)
(1,1),(0,1)
⎤
⎦H1,00,1
⎡
⎣Ab1yδ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
(k,1)
⎤
⎦dy, (A IV-18)
next, using (Prudnikov et al., 1990, eq. (2.25.1.1)) and (Mathai & Saxena, 1978, eq. (1.7.1)),
the proof is achieved.
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1. Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of the multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) wiretap channels in the presence of an active full-duplex eavesdropper with consid-
eration of channel estimation error at the legitimate destination and eavesdropper. For this
purpose, the probability density functions (PDFs) and cumulative density functions (CDFs) of
the receive signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the destination and eavesdropper
are given by conducting the singular value decomposition (SVD) on the estimated channel co-
efﬁcient matrices. Consequently, the closed-form expressions for the probability of positive
secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability over Rayleigh fading channels are derived.
Finally, the Monte-Carlo simulation results are presented to validate the accuracy of our theo-
retical analysis.
Keywords: Physical layer security, channel estimation error, the MIMO full-duplex active
eavesdropper.
2. Introduction
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels, security issues are increasingly becoming
one of the top critical concerns of wireless network. Currently, the traditional cryptography
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technique widely used in the upper-layer of wireless networks faces big challenges because
of the high computational complexity of the communication devices. Fortunately, unlike the
traditional methods, a complement or alternative appealing approach termed as physical layer
security was emerged to achieve secure wireless transmission, which is based on Shannon
theory Shannon (1949) using the physical characteristics (i.e. noise, fading, interference) of
wireless channels. The main philosophy of physical layer security is to achieve perfect se-
crecy capacity from the information-theoretic perspective, which is deﬁned as the maximiza-
tion of wireless transmission rate while achieving perfect secure transmission Bloch & Barros
(2011). In other words, it can be further explained as that eavesdroppers can not do better
than the legitimate destinations Saad, W., Zhou, X., Debbah, M. & Poor, H. (2015). Against
this background, some promising techniques, such as multiple antennas, cooperative jam-
ming/relay Allen, T. & Al-Dhahir, N. (2015); Atallah, M., Kaddoum, G. & Kong, L. (2015);
Bloch & Barros (2011); Saad et al. (2015); Yan, S., Yang, N., Malaney, R. & Yuan, J. (2014),
are exploited to degrade the capability of either active attacker or passive eavesdroppers so as
to ease the information leakage.
Multiple antenna technique, as an effective approach, is widely used toward improving the se-
crecy rate. The literature using MIMO technique in the ﬁled of physical layer security demon-
strated its capability of boosting secrecy performance Ahn, K. S., Choi, S.-W. & Ahn, J.-M.
(2015); Khisti, A. & Wornell, G. W. (2010b); Mukherjee, A. & Swindlehurst, A. (2011); Og-
gier, F. & Hassibi, B. (2015); Shaﬁee, S., Liu, N. & Ulukus, S. (2009); Yan et al. (2014). In
particular, the secrecy performance of single-input multiple-output (SIMO) Ahn et al. (2015),
multiple-input single-output (MISO) Khisti & Wornell (2010a) and multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) Khisti & Wornell (2010b) were widely studied from the information-theoretic
viewpoint. Shaﬁee. et. al investigated the existence of a computable expression for the secrecy
capacity of a 2-2-1 MIMO wiretap channel Shaﬁee et al. (2009). Yan. et. al investigated the
classical three-player MIMO wiretap scenario that Alice ﬁrstly selects two strongest transmit-
ter antennas from its multiple antenna set based on the channel gain for the sake of maximizing
the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and then performs Alamouti coding over the se-
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lected antennas, afterwards, the closed-form expression of secrecy outage probability for the
proposed scheme was derived Yan et al. (2014). In Mukherjee & Swindlehurst (2011), an
optimal jamming policy for a full-duplex active eavesdropper to minimize the secrecy rate of
the Alice-Bob-Eve MIMO wiretap channel was examined. The authors of Ahn et al. (2015)
analyzed the secrecy performance of a SIMO wiretap channel with channel estimation errors
available at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, its conclusion suggests that there exists
error ﬂoor of secrecy outage probability caused by the imperfect channel estimation.
Motivated by these studies, it is so far that there is no previous work that studied the secrecy
performance of a 2-2-2 MIMO wiretap channel with consideration of channel estimation error
whilst in the presence of an active full-duplex eavesdroppers. To this end, the contribution of
this paper lies in the investigation of the secrecy performance of the 2-2-2 MIMO wiretap chan-
nel, including the probability of positive secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability, over
Rayleigh fading in the presence of an active full-duplex eavesdropper with channel estimation
errors at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper side. First, the probability density functions
(PDFs) and cumulative density functions (CDFs) of the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios
(SINRs) of Bob’s and Eve’s received signals are given. Second, the closed-form expressions
for the secrecy metrics are derived, and the Monte-Carlo simulation are presented to examine
our theoretical analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. System model and problem formulation
are outlined in Section II. In the Section III, secrecy performance, including the probability of
positive secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability, are derived with closed-form expres-
sions, followed by the comparison of theoretical analysis and numerical simulations given in
Section IV. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section V.
Notations: In this paper, matrices and vectors are separately presented by boldfaced uppercase
(e.g., X) and lowercase (e.g., x) letters. Moreover, we use XH to denote the Hermitian transpose
of the matrix X, Tr(·) to the trace operator, E(·) to the expectation operator, Im the identity
190
matrix of m dimension, y ∼ CN (μ ,σ2I) to denote that y is the complex Gaussian random
variable, having a μ-mean and σ2-variance.
3. System Model and Problem Formulation
3.1 System Model
The Alice-Bob-Eve classic model shown in Fig. V-1 is used here to illustrate a wireless network
with a potential active eavesdropper, where all the users are equipped with 2 antennas. In
such a wiretap channel model, the transmitter Alice (A) wishes to send secret messages to the
intended receiver Bob (B) in the presence of an active eavesdropper Eve (E); the link between
Alice and Bob is called the main channel, whereas the one between Alice and Eve is named
as the wiretap channel, and the one between Eve and Bob is termed as interference channel.
It is assumed that all links are independent and undergoing quasi-static Rayleigh fading. The
fading coefﬁcients of the links i→j are denoted as Hi j, i, j ∈ {A,B,E}. In addition, assuming
Eve operates in the full-duplex mode, it means that she can listen to data transmission of main
channel whilst transmitting jamming signals to Bob. Additionally, it is assumed that Bob and
Eve have imperfect channel state information (CSI) of their links, and Alice and Bob have no
knowledge of the CSI of the wiretap links.
A
Main channel
Wiretap channel
Interference channel
E
B
Figure-A V-1 System model
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Then, the received signal at Bob and Eve can be expressed as
rB = HABxA+HEBxE +nB, (A V-1)
rE = HAExA+HEExE +nE , (A V-2)
where xA and xE are the 2× 1 transmit signal vector from Alice and jamming signal vector
from Eve, respectively. Alice’s transmit power is assumed to be ﬁxed to Tr{E[ xAxHA ]} = PA.
Likewise, Eve’s jamming power is subject to Tr{E[xExHE ]} = PE . Each entry of Hi j follows
independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit vari-
ance, denoted by Hi j(m,n)∼CN (0,1) for m,n∈ {1,2}. nB and nE are the zero mean additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) distributed with CN (0,σ2BI) and CN (0,σ2EI), respectively.
3.2 Problem Formulation
Due to the characteristic of wireless channel, a practical imperfect channel estimator is fre-
quently exploited at the legitimate receivers. The following model is broadly used throughout
this paper for the estimated channel Hˆi j Ahn et al. (2015),
Hi j =
√
1− ε2i jHˆi j+ εi jVi j, (A V-3)
where each entry of Vi j follows CN (0,I), Vi j is independent of Hi j, and εi j ∈ [0,1] is used
to measure the accuracy of the channel estimation.
Setting HB = HˆABHˆ
H
AB, HB can be decomposed as HB =WBΛWHB by using the singular value
decomposition (SVD), where Λ= diag(λ1,λ2) and λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ 0. WB is an unitary matrix, i.e.,
WBWHB = I. Based on the above description, we choose WB as the combiner matrix at user B.
Similarly, WE can be constructed in the same way as WB, and then is used as the combining
matrix at user E.
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Consequently, while taking consideration of channel estimation error, the combined signals at
Bob and Eve are given by
YB = WHB rB
=
√
1− ε2ABYHB HˆABxA+ εABWHBVABxA+WHB (HBExE +nB) ,
(A V-4)
YE = WHE rE
=
√
1− ε2AEWHE HˆAExA+ εAEWHE VAExA+WHE (HEExE +nE) .
(A V-5)
Therefore, the average SINR of the combined signal at Bob’s side γB is given by
γB =ΩBTr(WHB HˆABHˆ
H
ABWB), (A V-6)
where ΩB =
PA(1−ε2AB)
2ε2ABPA+σ
2
B+2PE
=
ΦB(1−ε2M)
2ε2MΦB+1+2ΦJ
. Herein, ΦB = PA/σ2B, ΦJ = PE/σ2B. For conve-
nience, ε2AB = ε
2
M.
Obviously, the denominator is constant while the numerator is equal to the sum of the eigen-
values of the Wishart matrix HˆABHˆ
H
AB. Based on the random matrix theory, the joint PDF of
the ordered eigenvalues of HB can be expressed as Telatar, I. E. et al. (1999)
p(λ1,λ2) = (λ2−λ1)2e−λ1−λ2 . (A V-7)
Let λ = λ1+λ2, then γB =ΩBλ . The CDF of γB can be expressed as
FγB(γB) = Pr (ΩB (λ1+λ2)≤ γB)
=
∫ γB
2ΩB
0
∫ γB
ΩB
−λ2
λ2
p(λ1,λ2)dλ1dλ2
= 1−
[
(
γB
ΩB
)3+3(
γB
ΩB
)2+6(
γB
ΩB
)+6
]
e−
γB
ΩB
6
.
(A V-8)
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Differentiating (A V-8) with regard to γB, the PDF of γB is established as follows
fγB(γB) =
dFγB(γB)
dγB
=
γ3B
6Ω4B
e−
γB
ΩB . (A V-9)
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Figure-A V-2 The PDFs of γB when ΩB are 5 dB and
10 dB, respectively.
Fig. V-2 shows the PDFs of γB with respect to different values of ΦB.
It is assumed that perfect self-interference cancellation can be performed at the Eve’s side.
Likewise, we have the received average SINR at Eve
γE =ΩETr(WHE HˆABHˆ
H
ABWE), (A V-10)
where ΩE =
(1−ε2AE)PA
2ε2AEPA+σ
2
E
=
(1−ε2W )ΦE
2ε2WΦE+1
, ΦE = PA/σ2E , and ε2AE = ε
2
W .
The CDF and PDF of γE are
FγE (γE) = 1−
[
(
γE
ΩE
)3+3(
γE
ΩE
)2+6(
γE
ΩE
)+6
]
e−
γE
ΩE
6
, (A V-11)
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and
fγE (γE) =
γ3E
6Ω4E
e−
γE
ΩE , (A V-12)
respectively.
4. Secrecy Performance Analysis
4.1 Probability of Positive Secrecy Capacity
According to Bloch & Barros (2011), the secrecy capacity for the MIMO wiretap channel
over Rayleigh fading is deﬁned as the difference between the main channel capacity CM =
log2(1+ γB) and the wiretap channel capacity CW = log2(1+ γE) as the following form,
Cs =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
CM −CW , γB > γE
0, otherwise.
(A V-13)
Therefore, the probability of positive secrecy capacity refers to the event that the secrecy ca-
pacity can be achieved, i.e. Pr(Cs > 0), thus with regard to its deﬁnition, (A V-13) can be
further rewritten as follows,
Pr(Cs > 0) = Pr(γB > γE)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γB
0
fγB(γB) fγE (γE)dγEdγB
=
∫ ∞
0
fγB(γB)FγE (γB)dγB.
(A V-14)
Substituting (A V-9) and (A V-11) into (A V-14), we use the equation (A V-15) (Gradshteyn & Ryzhik,
2014, Eq. (3.351.3)),
∫ ∞
0
xne−μxdx=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
n!μ−n−1, if n = 0,1,2,· · · , μ > 0,
0, otherwise.
(A V-15)
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then we have the closed-form expression for the probability of positive secrecy capacity in (A
V-16)
Pr(Cs > 0) =1− 1Ω4BΩ3E
[
20(
1
ΩB
+
1
ΩE
)−7+10ΩE(
1
ΩB
+
1
ΩE
)−6
+Ω2E(
1
ΩB
+
1
ΩE
)−5+Ω3E(
1
ΩB
+
1
ΩE
)−4
]
.
(A V-16)
4.2 Secrecy Outage Probability
The outage probability of the secrecy capacity is deﬁned as the probability that the secrecy
capacity Cs falls below the target secrecy rate Rs, i.e.,
Pout(Rs) = Pr(Cs < Rs). (A V-17)
Secrecy outage probability can be conceptually explained as two cases: (i)Cs < Rs whilst pos-
itive secrecy capacity is guaranteed; (ii) Pout(Rs) deﬁnitely happens when the secrecy capacity
is non-positive. (A V-17) can thus be rewritten as follows Ahn et al. (2015)
Pout(Rs) = Pr(Cs < Rs|γB > γE)Pr(γB > γE)+Pr(γB < γE)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γ0
γE
fγB(γB) fγE (γE)dγBdγE +
∫ ∞
0
∫ γE
0
fγB(γB) fγE (γE)dγBdγE
=
∫ ∞
0
fγE (γE)
[∫ γ0
0
−
∫ γE
0
]
fγB(γB)dγBdγE +
∫ ∞
0
∫ γE
0
fγB(γB) fγE (γE)dγBdγE
=
∫ ∞
0
FγB(γ0) fγE (γE)dγE ,
(A V-18)
where γ0 =M(1+ γE)−1, M = 2Rs .
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Similarly, substituting (A V-8) and (A V-12) into (A V-18) using (A V-15), the closed-form
expression for secrecy outage probability can be eventually derived as in (A V-19)
Pout(Rs) = 1−
exp(1−MΩB )
6Ω3BΩ4E
[
120M3(
M
ΩB
+
1
ΩE
)−7+60M2 (ΩB−1+M)( MΩB +
1
ΩE
)−6
+ 12M
(
1−2ΩB+2Ω2B−2M+2ΩBM+M2
)
(
M
ΩB
+
1
ΩE
)−5
+
(−1+6Ω3B+3ΩB−6Ω2B+3M−6ΩBM+6Ω2BM−3M2+3ΩBM2+M3)( MΩB + 1ΩE )−4
]
.
(A V-19)
5. Numerical Results and discussions
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Figure-A V-3 Probability of positive secrecy capacity
against ΦB for selected values of ΦE for the case of ΦJ = 0
dB and ΦJ = 5 dB whilst ε2M = 0.01, ε2W = 0.1
In this section, we perform the Monte-Carlo simulation to validate the accuracy of the closed-
form expressions for probability of positive secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability. In
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the following ﬁgures, the curves only using markers are the theoretical results, while the ones
in lines are the Monte-Carlo simulation results.
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Figure-A V-4 Probability of positive secrecy capacity
against ε2W/ε2M for selected values of ΦB while ε2M = 0.01, ΦJ
= 5 dB and ΦE = 5 dB
Fig. V-3 shows the simulation and analytic results of the probability of positive secrecy capac-
ity against ΦB for selected values of ΦE when ε2M = 0.01 and ε2W = 0.1 for the cases: (i) ΦJ =
0 dB, (ii) ΦJ = 5 dB.
One can observe that the numerical results are in perfect match with our analytical results.
Notably, we can obtain the conclusions below: (i) Pr(Cs > 0) increases with ΦB for a ﬁxed ΦE .
(ii) The higherΦE , the lower of probability of positive secrecy capacity. (iii) More importantly,
the jamming power ΦJ has a critical role to play in the probability of positive secrecy capacity
for ﬁxed γE . The larger values of ΦJ , the worse of Pr(Cs > 0). (iv) Additionally, there exists
secrecy loss of imperfect CSI compared with the case of perfect channel estimation (ε2M = 0
and ε2W = 0) at receiver sides.
198
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
ΦB (dB)
Se
cr
ec
y 
O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Φ
E
 = 0 dB
Φ
E
 = 5 dB
Φ
E
 = 10 dB
Φ
J
 = 0 dB, Monte−Carlo
Φ
J
 = 5 dB, Monte−Carlo
Φ
J
 = 5 dB, Φ
E
 = 0 dB, ε
M
2  = ε
W
2  = 0
Figure-A V-5 Secrecy outage probability against ΦB for
selected values of ΦE for the case of ΦJ = 0 dB and ΦJ = 5
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Fig. V-4 explores the relationship of probability of positive secrecy capacity against the ratio
of ε2W and ε2M whilst ε2M = 0.01, ΦJ = 5 dB and ΦE = 5 dB for selected values of ΦB. It is
saying that the higher the ratio, the much probable the event that the positive secrecy capacity
can be achieved.
Similarly, Fig. V-5 and Fig. V-6 examine the simulation and analysis results of the secrecy
outage probability of physical layer security with regard to two cases: (i) ﬁxed ε2M and ε2W
whilst varying ΦB and ΦE ; (ii) changing the ratio of ε2B and ε2W while ﬁxing ΦJ = 5 dB and ΦE
= 5 dB for selected values ofΦB, namely, 10 dB, 15 dB and 25 dB. Notably, we can easily draw
the same conclusion about the accuracy of our derived expression with Monte-Carlo simulation
results.
Additionally, as shown in Fig. V-5, the secrecy outage probability degrades with the increase
of ΦB for speciﬁc values ΦE and ΦJ .
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Figure-A V-6 Secrecy outage probability against ε2W/ε2M for
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More importantly, there exists an error ﬂoor due to the imperfect channel estimation at the
receiver sides in comparison with the case, i.e., ε2M = 0 and ε2W = 0. As ΦB is much larger than
ΦJ regarding a ﬁxed ΦE , ΩB converges to the same value for different ΦJ with a limited value,
which consequently makes their secrecy outage probabilities converge to the error ﬂoor.
When it comes to Fig. V-6, the secrecy outage probability witnesses a completely opposite
trend compared with that of the probability of positive secrecy capacity, shown in Fig. V-
4. Furthermore, the larger of the gap between ΦB and ΦE , the less likely the secrecy outage
probability.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed secrecy performance of the MIMO wiretap channel with chan-
nel estimation errors at the legitimate destination and eavesdropper’s receivers whilst in the
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presence of an active eavesdropper. The probability of positive secrecy capacity and secrecy
outage probability were derived with closed-form expressions through the PDFs and CDFs of
the receive SINRs. Finally, the theoretical analysis are conﬁrmed by the Monte-Carlo simula-
tion results by comparing the secrecy performances with different levels of channel estimation
errors, received SINRs and jamming signals.
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